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Bump setuptools to 84.2.1 (GHSA-xmj3-9gf7-h52w) - #58
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Dependabot flagged the locked setuptools 84.0.0 (pulled in by PyInstaller for the dev/build environment) as vulnerable; 84.1.0 is the first fixed release. Only the setuptools entry was swapped in place rather than re-running pipenv lock, so the rest of the build toolchain doesn't drift as a side effect of a low-severity security bump. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
requirements.txt is a hashed export of the lock, and the previous commit only updated the lock, so anyone installing from requirements.txt would still get the vulnerable setuptools 84.0.0 flagged by GHSA-xmj3-9gf7-h52w. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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secondfry
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October 27, 2026 15:53
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secondfry
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## Summary Fixes Dependabot alerts #57 (Pipfile.lock) and #58 (requirements.txt), both critical: certifi `>= 2019.03.09, < 2026.10.18` ships emSign root CAs whose intermediate CA keys were compromised. ## Context Short Circuit trusts certifi's bundle (through requests) for Tripwire, Eve Scout and ESI. A forged certificate chained to those roots could intercept Tripwire credentials and ESI tokens. ## Approach Only the `certifi` entry in `Pipfile.lock` changes, edited by hand to 2026.10.23 (latest; above the fixed 2026.10.18) with the PyPI sha256 hashes. That avoids a full `pipenv lock`, which would also move every unpinned package. `requirements.txt`, the hashed export of the lock, gets the same change. ## Testing - `pipenv verify`: `Pipfile.lock is up-to-date.` - `pipenv requirements --dev --hash | grep ^certifi` matches `requirements.txt` exactly. - Not done: running the app or rebuilding binaries. Manual check: build, then fetch from Tripwire and Eve Scout and log in to ESI. ## Risks Low. Only the CA bundle changes. Released binaries keep the old bundle until they're rebuilt. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
mogglemoss
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Nov 8, 2026
Upstream (secondfry/shortcircuit) bumped these in PRs secondfry#58 and secondfry#59 and we were still on the vulnerable pins: - certifi 2026.1.4 -> 2026.10.23: removes trust in emSign root CAs following their compromise. We do TLS to EVE SSO and every mapper API through this bundle, so shipping with the compromised roots trusted is a real exposure, not a hygiene bump. - setuptools 80.10.2 -> 84.2.1: fixes GHSA-xmj3-9gf7-h52w. Only present at build time, but the Linux AppImage job installs it on every build. Only requirements.txt changes: it is the sole pinned manifest CI still reads (the Linux job). The Windows/macOS jobs install unpinned packages and already pick up current certifi transitively; Pipfile/Pipfile.lock are stale pre-fork leftovers (still naming PySide2) that no workflow consumes, so updating them would only imply they are maintained. setuptools 84.2.1 requires Python >=3.10, which matches the Linux job's 3.10. Verified both exact versions exist on PyPI; certifi downloads cleanly. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Summary
Dependabot's weekly digest flagged
setuptools84.0.0 inPipfile.lock(GHSA-xmj3-9gf7-h52w, low severity, fixed in 84.1.0). This PR bumps it to 84.2.1, the latest release.Approach
setuptools is a transitive dev dependency (pulled in by PyInstaller, which only needs
>=42). Re-runningpipenv lockwould also move every other unpinned package, so I edited only the setuptools entry: the version plus the sha256 hashes from PyPI. The same line is updated inrequirements.txt, which is a hashedpipenv requirements --devexport of the lock. The Pipfile is untouched, so the lock's_metahash is still valid.Testing
pipenv verifysays the lock is up to date.requirements.txtmatchespipenv requirements --dev --hashoutput exactly.pipenv install --dev --deployand PyInstaller build. Worth doing locally before merging.Risks
Low. setuptools is only used in the build environment. The shipped app doesn't import it.
🤖 Generated with Claude Code