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Bump certifi to 2026.10.23 (emSign root CA compromise) - #59
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certifi 2019.03.09 through 2026.10.17 bundles emSign root CAs whose intermediate CA keys were compromised (Dependabot alert #58, critical). The app uses this bundle via requests for every Tripwire, Eve Scout and ESI call, so a forged certificate chained to those roots could intercept mapper credentials and ESI tokens. Only the certifi entry is changed, by hand, so the other unpinned packages are not moved by a full re-lock. requirements.txt is the hashed export of the lock and is updated to match. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Upstream (secondfry/shortcircuit) bumped these in PRs secondfry#58 and secondfry#59 and we were still on the vulnerable pins: - certifi 2026.1.4 -> 2026.10.23: removes trust in emSign root CAs following their compromise. We do TLS to EVE SSO and every mapper API through this bundle, so shipping with the compromised roots trusted is a real exposure, not a hygiene bump. - setuptools 80.10.2 -> 84.2.1: fixes GHSA-xmj3-9gf7-h52w. Only present at build time, but the Linux AppImage job installs it on every build. Only requirements.txt changes: it is the sole pinned manifest CI still reads (the Linux job). The Windows/macOS jobs install unpinned packages and already pick up current certifi transitively; Pipfile/Pipfile.lock are stale pre-fork leftovers (still naming PySide2) that no workflow consumes, so updating them would only imply they are maintained. setuptools 84.2.1 requires Python >=3.10, which matches the Linux job's 3.10. Verified both exact versions exist on PyPI; certifi downloads cleanly. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Summary
Fixes Dependabot alerts #57 (Pipfile.lock) and #58 (requirements.txt), both critical: certifi
>= 2019.03.09, < 2026.10.18ships emSign root CAs whose intermediate CA keys were compromised.Context
Short Circuit trusts certifi's bundle (through requests) for Tripwire, Eve Scout and ESI. A forged certificate chained to those roots could intercept Tripwire credentials and ESI tokens.
Approach
Only the
certifientry inPipfile.lockchanges, edited by hand to 2026.10.23 (latest; above the fixed 2026.10.18) with the PyPI sha256 hashes. That avoids a fullpipenv lock, which would also move every unpinned package.requirements.txt, the hashed export of the lock, gets the same change.Testing
pipenv verify:Pipfile.lock is up-to-date.pipenv requirements --dev --hash | grep ^certifimatchesrequirements.txtexactly.Risks
Low. Only the CA bundle changes. Released binaries keep the old bundle until they're rebuilt.
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