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feat(wallet): send from every balance to every destination type in the new Send flow - #1358

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Issue being fixed or feature implemented

The Send flow that pays someone outside the wallet predated the new Payments design, could pay only from Core, Shielded and Platform to Core, Shielded and Platform addresses, could not spend Identity credits and could not pay an Identity ID. This rebuilds it on the new design (Address → Send → Confirm → Sending, with a Select source sheet) with Android parity for MO-1121 (dash-wallet#1680).

Summary, acceptance criteria and known limits: docs/features/external-send/README.md.

What was done?

  • New ExternalSend module (DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/): a SwiftUI screen + ViewModel per step, one flow, one executor over the existing spend seams (WalletSendService, SwiftDashSDKTransactionSender, the Platform/Shielded coordinators, the identity top-up and credit paths). No new way of spending money. ADR-0037
  • Four sources × four destination types decided by one pure policy (SendPairPolicy); unavailable pairs stay in Select source with their reason. ADR-0038
  • Fee estimated on Send, bound on Confirm: Continue authenticates and prepares, Confirm shows the prepared fee and only broadcasts. ADR-0039
  • Three outcomes (sent / not sent with Retry / in progress with no Retry), plus "moved to Platform" for a Shielded → Identity top-up that fails after the unshield. ADR-0040, ADR-0042
  • Identity → Shielded stays unavailable in this release. ADR-0041; the SDK binding for it is a separate dashpay/platform change. ADR-0036
  • Max on every route; on Identity it keeps the DashPay reserve.
  • BIP70 payment requests go through the existing BIP70 send; a failure after the merchant's ACK is reported as in progress, never Retry.
  • Entry points: the Send menu, Scan Dash QR, the address field's scanner, a balance row's Send (pinned source), and a dash: link from another app. A link's sender is called back only when another app opened it (ADR-0007).
  • The old Send screen stays: send to a username and the older Payments screens still use it. Removing it is a follow-up.

Acceptance criteria → where they are covered

AC Code Tests
AC-01, AC-01b SendAmountViewModel, ConfirmViewModel, ExternalSendFeeEstimator SendAmountViewModelTests, ConfirmViewModelTests, ExternalSendFeeEstimatorTests
AC-02, AC-04, AC-15 DestinationParser, AddressViewModel, ExternalSendFlow DestinationParserTests, AddressViewModelTests, ExternalSendFlowTests
AC-03 AddressViewModel (clipboard read only on tap) AddressViewModelTests
AC-05, AC-06, AC-07, AC-10, AC-14 SendPairPolicy, SelectSourceViewModel SendPairPolicyTests, SelectSourceViewModelTests
AC-08, AC-09, AC-11 AmountRules, SendAmountViewModel AmountRulesTests, SendAmountViewModelTests
AC-12, AC-12b, AC-13, AC-13b IdentityLookupService, AddressViewModel, ConfirmViewModel IdentityLookupServiceTests, AddressViewModelTests, ConfirmViewModelTests
AC-16, AC-17, AC-18 SendPairPolicy warnings, ConfirmViewModel SendPairPolicyTests, ConfirmViewModelTests
AC-19 ExternalSendExecutor, SendOutcome, SendOutcomeRouter ExternalSendExecutorTests, SendOutcomeMappingTests, SendOutcomeRouterTests
AC-20 SendMenuRow SendMenuTests

How Has This Been Tested?

dashwallet-dashpay, Debug, iPhone 17 simulator (iOS 26.5): 2295 tests, 0 failures, 1 skipped, on this branch merged with today's develop. SwiftLint clean on the changed lines; scripts/a11y_audit.py --check reports no new findings.

  • Unit/component tests for every screen's ViewModel, the parser, the pair policy, the fee estimator, the flow, the outcome mapping and the executor over fakes
  • The Live adapters up to the SDK edge (destination decoding, credit overflow, the withdrawal minimum, how refusals are reported); the BIP70 send over a scripted wallet and transport
  • Maestro flows for the new screens (Send menu, Address incl. clipboard and scan, Select source with an unavailable pair, Max, the Identity row hidden without a username) — being added to the regression suite against this PR's build
  • A funded testnet send on each route (build, sign, broadcast and the Platform steps are not reachable from the unit-test host)
  • Identity → someone else's Core or Platform address end to end on testnet
  • Timing on the oldest supported iPhone: destination type after paste/scan ≤ 300 ms (p95), fee and total on Confirm ≤ 3 s (p95)

Breaking Changes

None. No schema change, no migration, no new setting; .platform-ref is unchanged.

Known limit: Core → someone else's Platform address, if the app stops after the Core payment and loses its own record of the recipient, is finished by the existing recovery to the sender's own Platform address (the money stays with the sender). The SDK fix is tracked in dashpay/platform#5824.

Checklist:

  • I have performed a self-review of my own code
  • I have commented my code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas
  • I have added or updated relevant unit/integration/functional/e2e tests
  • I have made corresponding changes to the documentation
  • I have assigned this pull request to a milestone

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

…e new Send flow

Rebuilds the address send flow on the new Payments design (Address, Send,
Select source, Confirm, Sending) with Android parity for MO-1121: Core,
Shielded, Platform and the Current identity pay to a Core address or payment
request, a Platform address, a Shielded address or an Identity ID; unavailable
pairs stay visible with their reason. ADR-0036 to ADR-0042.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
SDD-Published-From: 157e49e50215513105988fb95b4dbbf40d55b5db
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Reviewing files that changed from the base of the PR and between 71a9a9d and c513181.

Files ignored due to path filters: 1

  • DashWallet.xcworkspace/xcshareddata/swiftpm/Package.resolved is excluded by !**/Package.resolved
Files selected for processing: 130

  • DashWallet.xcodeproj/project.pbxproj
  • DashWallet/Sources/Categories/String+DashWallet.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/Infrastructure/SwiftDashSDK/CoreFundingResumer.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/Infrastructure/SwiftDashSDK/Identity/DWIdentityRegistrationCoordinator.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/Infrastructure/SwiftDashSDK/PaymentNetworkResolver.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/Infrastructure/SwiftDashSDK/PlatformAddressSyncCoordinator.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/Infrastructure/SwiftDashSDK/SwiftDashSDKTransactionSender.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/Models/PaymentProtocol/BIP70Error.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/Models/PaymentProtocol/BIP70PaymentService.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/Models/PaymentProtocol/ScriptAddressCodec.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/Models/Transactions/WalletSendService.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/UI/DashPay/Profile/SDKIdentityProfileSheet.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/UI/Main/MainTabbarController.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Address/AddressScreen.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Address/AddressViewModel.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Confirm/ConfirmSheet.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Confirm/ConfirmViewModel.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Domain/AmountRules.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Domain/ConfirmWarning.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Domain/Destination.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Domain/DestinationParser.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Domain/SendOutcome.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Domain/SendPairPolicy.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Domain/SendRoute.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Domain/SendSource.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/ExternalSendFlow.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/ExternalSendFlowScreen.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/ExternalSendHostController.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/SelectSource/SelectSourceSheet.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/SelectSource/SelectSourceViewModel.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Send/SendAmountStepScreen.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Send/SendAmountViewModel.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Sending/SendFailedSheet.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Sending/SendOutcomeRouter.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Services/ExternalSendExecutor.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Services/ExternalSendFeeEstimator.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Services/IdentityLookupService.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Services/PaymentRequestFetching.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/InternalTransfer/Components/TransferEndpointCards.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/InternalTransfer/Components/TransferEndpointPicker.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/InternalTransfer/IdentityWithdrawViewModel.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/InternalTransfer/InternalTransferScreen.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/InternalTransfer/InternalTransferViewModel.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/InternalTransfer/Shielded/CoreShieldedDrainMaxController.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/InternalTransfer/Shielded/CoreShieldedDrainService.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/InternalTransfer/Shielded/ShieldedTransferCoordinator.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/Landing/Components/PaymentsSendCard.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/Landing/Components/SendMenuRow.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/Landing/PaymentsLandingHostingController.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/Landing/PaymentsLandingScreen.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/Pay/DWBasePayViewController.m
  • DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/Pay/SendScreen.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/Pay/SendViewModel.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/PaymentModels/DWParsedPaymentURI.swift
  • DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/PaymentModels/DWPaymentOutput+DWView.m
  • DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ScanQR/DWQRScanModel.m
  • DashWallet/ar.lproj/Localizable.strings
  • DashWallet/bg.lproj/Localizable.strings
  • DashWallet/ca.lproj/Localizable.strings
  • DashWallet/cs.lproj/Localizable.strings
  • DashWallet/da.lproj/Localizable.strings
  • DashWallet/de.lproj/Localizable.strings
  • DashWallet/el.lproj/Localizable.strings
  • DashWallet/en.lproj/Localizable.strings
  • DashWallet/eo.lproj/Localizable.strings
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  • DashWallet/hr.lproj/Localizable.strings
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  • DashWallet/ja.lproj/Localizable.strings
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  • DashWallet/nl.lproj/Localizable.strings
  • DashWallet/pl.lproj/Localizable.strings
  • DashWallet/pt.lproj/Localizable.strings
  • DashWallet/ro.lproj/Localizable.strings
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  • DashWallet/sq.lproj/Localizable.strings
  • DashWallet/sr.lproj/Localizable.strings
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  • DashWallet/vi.lproj/Localizable.strings
  • DashWallet/zh-Hans.lproj/Localizable.strings
  • DashWallet/zh-Hant-TW.lproj/Localizable.strings
  • DashWallet/zh.lproj/Localizable.strings
  • DashWallet/zh_TW.lproj/Localizable.strings
  • DashWalletTests/ExternalSend/AddressViewModelTests.swift
  • DashWalletTests/ExternalSend/AmountRulesTests.swift
  • DashWalletTests/ExternalSend/ConfirmViewModelTests.swift
  • DashWalletTests/ExternalSend/DestinationParserTests.swift
  • DashWalletTests/ExternalSend/ExternalPlatformFundingResumeTests.swift
  • DashWalletTests/ExternalSend/ExternalSendExecutorTests.swift
  • DashWalletTests/ExternalSend/ExternalSendFeeEstimatorTests.swift
  • DashWalletTests/ExternalSend/ExternalSendFlowTests.swift
  • DashWalletTests/ExternalSend/IdentityLookupServiceTests.swift
  • DashWalletTests/ExternalSend/PreparedExternalSendTxidTests.swift
  • DashWalletTests/ExternalSend/SelectSourceViewModelTests.swift
  • DashWalletTests/ExternalSend/SendAmountViewModelTests.swift
  • DashWalletTests/ExternalSend/SendMenuTests.swift
  • DashWalletTests/ExternalSend/SendOutcomeMappingTests.swift
  • DashWalletTests/ExternalSend/SendOutcomeRouterTests.swift
  • DashWalletTests/ExternalSend/SendPairPolicyTests.swift
  • DashWalletTests/PaymentProtocolTests.swift
  • DashWalletTests/String+DashWalletTests.swift
  • docs/adr/0036-ship-the-ios-screens-and-the-sdk-binding-as-two-surfaces.md
  • docs/adr/0037-build-external-send-as-a-new-module-over-the-existing-spend-seams.md
  • docs/adr/0038-decide-every-source-and-destination-pair-in-one-policy.md
  • docs/adr/0039-estimate-the-fee-on-send-and-recompute-it-on-confirm.md
  • docs/adr/0040-report-three-send-outcomes-and-retry-only-when-nothing-left-the-source.md
  • docs/adr/0041-keep-identity-to-shielded-off-in-this-release.md
  • docs/adr/0042-report-moved-to-platform-when-a-shielded-to-identity-top-up-fails-after-the-unshield.md
  • docs/adr/0043-bind-the-fee-where-the-sdk-can-and-mark-the-rest-as-an-estimate.md
  • docs/adr/0044-top-up-an-identity-from-shielded-in-one-step.md
  • docs/adr/0045-add-an-external-identity-top-up-and-a-non-blocking-identity-read-to-the-sdk.md
  • docs/adr/README.md
  • docs/features/external-send/README.md
  • scripts/core_drain_recovery_harness.py

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@thepastaclaw

thepastaclaw commented Nov 10, 2026 •

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⛔ Final review complete — 9 blocking finding(s) (commit c513181) · triage: critical

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Final validation — Phase 1 + Phase 2

Verified head 0136d8f against the changed source, relevant callers, and the pinned Platform implementation; the simulator and recovery CI logs confirm two compilation regressions. Ten blocking findings remain after consolidating the identity top-up eligibility failures; one lower-priority recovery-marker suggestion concerning the limitation tracked in dashpay/platform#5824 is omitted under the comment budget. This was a static review; no local builds or tests were run.

🔴 10 blocking

10 finding(s) not shown inline (GitHub refused the PR diff as too large)

🔴 Blocking: Qualify the controller presentation call to restore compilation
DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/ExternalSendHostController.swift:130

The local zero-argument closure named present shadows the inherited presentation method, so this expression calls that closure with arguments and does not compile. The exact-head simulator job's Build for testing log confirms ExternalSendHostController.swift:130:20: error: argument passed to call that takes no arguments in Actions run 42916551889. Explicitly invoke the controller method.

            self.present(controller, animated: true)

source: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (phase1-reviewer: general); gpt-6.1-sol (phase2-reviewer: general)

🔴 Blocking: Keep the recovery harness compatible with the confirmation initializer
DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/InternalTransfer/Shielded/CoreShieldedDrainMaxController.swift:226

The new init(context:quote:) is defined in CoreShieldedDrainService.swift, but the recovery harness compiles this controller against the generated CoreShieldedDrainConfirmation in scripts/core_drain_recovery_harness.py. That stub still exposes only the memberwise initializer. The exact-head recovery log in Actions run 42916551972 reports extra argument 'quote' in call and missing memberwise arguments at this line. Update the harness edge to provide the initializer, or retain the constructor supported by both compilation contexts.

                self.confirmation = CoreShieldedDrainConfirmation(
                    context: context, candidateBalanceDuffs: quote.candidateBalanceDuffs,
                    estimatedRecipientCredits: quote.estimatedRecipientCredits,
                    estimatedL1FeeDuffs: quote.estimatedL1FeeDuffs, poolFeeCredits: quote.poolFeeCredits)

source: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (phase1-reviewer: general); gpt-6.1-sol (phase2-reviewer: general, security-auditor); gpt-6-astra (phase2-reviewer: general, security-auditor)

🔴 Blocking: Bind BIP70 confirmation details to the request actually signed
DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Services/ExternalSendExecutor.swift:504-510

ExternalSendFlow.open fetches the payment request and stores its primary address, merchant name, memo, and verification status in Destination. This preparation fetches it again but compares only the total amount before building the new outputs. PreparedPaymentRequestSend returns no replacement recipient or verification information, while ConfirmViewModel continues rendering the original Destination. Equal-total responses with different outputs can therefore produce a transaction whose recipient differs from Confirm; a changed verification status also leaves the original verified-merchant label displayed. Preserve and build the original verified Confirmation, or bind the refreshed outputs and verification context to the confirmation UI and require review of any changes. Add regression coverage for equal totals with different recipients and verification states.

source: gpt-6.1-sol (phase2-reviewer: general, security-auditor); gpt-6-astra (phase2-reviewer: general, security-auditor)

🔴 Blocking: Prepare an executable fee-bound plan for routed sends
DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Services/ExternalSendExecutor.swift:374-376

prepareRouted reruns the Send estimator and stores only the destination; it does not prepare a transaction or constrain the eventual debit. Most live adapters ignore bindingFeeDuffs or bindingFeeCredits when building and submitting. For example, ExternalSendFeeEstimator always prices Shielded spends at two actions, whereas the pinned SDK's select_notes_with_fee computes the fee from the selected note count. A payment requiring more notes can therefore debit more than Confirm's displayed fee and total. Platform transfer reserves and Identity minimum fees likewise are not prepared transaction fees. Obtain and retain an executable plan or enforceable fee bound from the owning spend/SDK layer, then execute that plan. Missing SDK preparation capabilities require an upstream change; another estimate must not be presented as the binding preparation promised by this PR and proposed ADR-0039.

source: gpt-6.1-sol (phase2-reviewer: general, security-auditor); gpt-6-astra (phase2-reviewer: general, security-auditor)

🔴 Blocking: Enforce the SDK's identity top-up prerequisites before confirmation
DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Services/ExternalSendExecutor.swift:824-829

The new identity top-up routes bypass prerequisites enforced by their execution seams:

• Foreign recipients: both calls reach ManagedPlatformWallet.topUpFromAddresses. At pin 1721ca7a8b, IdentityWallet.top_up_from_addresses requires the recipient in the wallet's identity manager and otherwise returns IdentityNotFound before submission. The destination lookup only queries sdk.identityGet and does not populate that manager. A normal foreign identity therefore cannot be paid; Platform reports the local refusal as in progress, while Shielded first unshields funds and then fails.

• Platform Max: LiveSendMaxPlanner subtracts the observed 41,500,000-credit fee from the aggregate balance, but IdentityCreditsTopUp.fromPlatform uses makeInputs, which requires 200,000,000 credits of retained headroom and can exclude addresses that cannot serve as the fee source. Even a single funded address produces an unexecutable Max. Reuse currentCandidates, maxFundableDuffs, and the corresponding typed-amount eligibility check.

• Core minimum: the sibling toIdentity path accepts amounts below 50,500 duffs. The pinned FFI rejects them before building any lock, but lockMayExist classifies that refusal as possibly recorded, producing an in-progress result with nothing to recover.

Use route-aware top-up preflight before enabling Confirm. Add an external-recipient-capable SDK operation or disable foreign-recipient pairs until supported; do not register foreign identities as owned. Reject sub-minimum Core amounts as unsent rather than progress.

source: gpt-6.1-sol (phase2-reviewer: general, security-auditor); gpt-6-astra (phase2-reviewer: general, security-auditor)

🔴 Blocking: Preserve the native-credit amount of a Shielded Max plan
DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Send/SendAmountViewModel.swift:142-146

Dividing plan.amountCredits by 1000 discards its fractional-duff remainder, and SendAmountRequest carries only the resulting duff amount. LiveShieldedPlatformSend reconstructs credits by multiplying that amount by 1000 and passes sweepAll: true. All three Shielded coordinator methods require exact equality with the freshly read sweep plan, so a plan not divisible by 1000 fails as shieldedSweepChanged even when the wallet has not changed; retry repeats the same rounding. The existing SendViewModel preserves shieldedSweepAmountCredits separately for this reason. Carry the exact native-credit amount or sweep plan through preparation and execution, converting only for display, and cover the live coordinator equality check rather than stopping at fake preparation.

source: gpt-6.1-sol (phase2-reviewer: general, security-auditor); gpt-6-astra (phase2-reviewer: general, security-auditor)

🔴 Blocking: Recheck payment-request expiry at the actual send boundary
DashWallet/Sources/Models/PaymentProtocol/BIP70PaymentService.swift:315-317

The split API checks expiry in buildForSend, which ExternalSend now invokes before the user reviews Confirm. postAndBroadcast performs no further expiry check. Leaving Confirm open or backgrounding the app until the request expires therefore still permits the signed payment to be POSTed and broadcast. An unsigned request without a payment URL has no merchant round-trip that could refuse it. Keep the early check, but also validate expiry immediately before releasing signed bytes or broadcasting, and classify a refusal at that point as unsent. Add coverage for expiry between buildForSend and postAndBroadcast.

source: gpt-6-astra (phase2-reviewer: general)

🔴 Blocking: Preserve sender callbacks for ordinary dash links
DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Services/ExternalSendExecutor.swift:282-284

DestinationParser retains a validated callbackScheme for an ordinary dash link opened by another app, but the standard-send plan discards it. The standard execution branch only broadcasts; prepared.opens is called exclusively for BIP70 sends. Since performPayToURL now routes links into ExternalSend, a successful plain-address payment no longer sends the acknowledgement previously produced by DWPaymentProcessor.sendCompletedToAddress. Preserve the callback context for standard sends and construct the URL with CallbackScheme.payAckURL only after successful broadcast, retaining the existing suppression for scanned and pasted links.

source: gpt-6-astra (phase2-reviewer: general)

🔴 Blocking: Move the blocking identity query off the main actor in SwiftDashSDK
DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Services/IdentityLookupService.swift:73-80

Awaiting identityGet does not make this network operation nonblocking. At pin 1721ca7a8b, SDK.identityGet is explicitly @mainactor and directly invokes dash_sdk_identity_fetch; that Rust entry point executes runtime.block_on around the network fetch. Resolving an Identity ID therefore blocks the UI thread for the DAPI request, including slow-network timeout periods, instead of keeping Address responsive in its checking state. Correct the query wrapper in the owning SwiftDashSDK repository and consume the corrected pin. A detached task around this caller alone is insufficient because the SDK method still hops to the main actor.

source: gpt-6.1-sol (phase2-reviewer: general, security-auditor); gpt-6-astra (phase2-reviewer: general, security-auditor)

🔴 Blocking: Bound encoded address lengths before Base58 decoding
DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Domain/DestinationParser.swift:86-88

Every bare candidate reaches decodeAddress without an encoded-length bound, and the Identity ID fallback calls base58Decode without one as well. That decoder allocates a buffer proportional to input length and traverses the entire buffer for each input character, giving quadratic work before checksum or payload-length rejection. These new parsing paths run synchronously on the main actor, including showClipboard and scannedDestination, so oversized external text can make the wallet unresponsive. Apply format-specific encoded-length limits before both Base58 decoding calls, including candidates extracted from clipboard text, while allowing the legitimate Bech32m formats through their own bounded validation. Moving unbounded decoding off-main would not resolve the resource-consumption problem.

source: gpt-6.1-sol (phase2-reviewer: general, security-auditor); gpt-6-astra (phase2-reviewer: general, security-auditor)

Review provenance

Source: reviewer 1: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 2: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); reviewer 3: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 4: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); reviewer 5: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: general); final verifier: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: sol-verifier, role: final-verifier)

  • Triage: critical by gpt-6.1-sol (effort low) — The large, intricate change directly modifies funds movement in ExternalSendExecutor.swift and CoreFundingResumer.swift, including multi-stage transfers, broadcast outcomes, and retry decisions that must prevent duplicate spending.
  • Phase 1 reviewers: muse-spark-1.3-contributor — general (completed, effort xhigh); agent phase1-reviewer
  • Phase 1 model: muse-spark-1.3-contributor — not quota-gated; passed over gemini-3.8-flash-high (antigravity quota lookup failed), glm-5.3-flash (not used above high effort; tier asks max)
  • Single stage: Phase 1 and Phase 2 reviewed this head side by side, with no blocker gate between them (triage tier)
  • Fresh verifier: gpt-6.1-sol — final-verifier; agent sol-verifier
  • Phase 2 reviewers: gpt-6.1-sol — general (completed, effort xhigh); agent phase2-reviewer, gpt-6.1-sol — security-auditor (completed, effort xhigh); agent phase2-reviewer, gpt-6-astra — general (completed, effort xhigh); agent phase2-reviewer, gpt-6-astra — security-auditor (completed, effort xhigh); agent phase2-reviewer
  • Model comparison: every Phase-2 reviewer also ran on gpt-6-astra; the verifier weighed both sets without knowing which model wrote which
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review (PastaClaw). How to work through them:
- Verify each finding against the code; fix only what is real, as narrowly as the finding.
- If a finding is wrong, decline it on its thread in one or two sentences; the bot answers once and stops.
- To defer one, link a tracking issue on its thread (or reply asking the bot to file one).
- Suggestions don't block the merge, but most are worth fixing in this PR; judge each on its merits.
- Keep the PR's scope; don't grow it to satisfy hardening suggestions.
- Carried items were raised in an earlier round: read the thread first, and don't re-fix what you already fixed, declined or deferred there. Disputed and deferred items are already handled and are not listed.

In `DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/ExternalSendHostController.swift`:
- [BLOCKING] DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/ExternalSendHostController.swift:130: Qualify the controller presentation call to restore compilation
  The local zero-argument closure named `present` shadows the inherited presentation method, so this expression calls that closure with arguments and does not compile. The exact-head simulator job's Build for testing log confirms `ExternalSendHostController.swift:130:20: error: argument passed to call that takes no arguments` in Actions run 42916551889. Explicitly invoke the controller method.

In `DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/InternalTransfer/Shielded/CoreShieldedDrainMaxController.swift`:
- [BLOCKING] DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/InternalTransfer/Shielded/CoreShieldedDrainMaxController.swift:226: Keep the recovery harness compatible with the confirmation initializer
  The new `init(context:quote:)` is defined in CoreShieldedDrainService.swift, but the recovery harness compiles this controller against the generated CoreShieldedDrainConfirmation in scripts/core_drain_recovery_harness.py. That stub still exposes only the memberwise initializer. The exact-head recovery log in Actions run 42916551972 reports `extra argument 'quote' in call` and missing memberwise arguments at this line. Update the harness edge to provide the initializer, or retain the constructor supported by both compilation contexts.

In `DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Services/ExternalSendExecutor.swift`:
- [BLOCKING] DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Services/ExternalSendExecutor.swift:504-510: Bind BIP70 confirmation details to the request actually signed
  ExternalSendFlow.open fetches the payment request and stores its primary address, merchant name, memo, and verification status in Destination. This preparation fetches it again but compares only the total amount before building the new outputs. PreparedPaymentRequestSend returns no replacement recipient or verification information, while ConfirmViewModel continues rendering the original Destination. Equal-total responses with different outputs can therefore produce a transaction whose recipient differs from Confirm; a changed verification status also leaves the original verified-merchant label displayed. Preserve and build the original verified Confirmation, or bind the refreshed outputs and verification context to the confirmation UI and require review of any changes. Add regression coverage for equal totals with different recipients and verification states.
- [BLOCKING] DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Services/ExternalSendExecutor.swift:374-376: Prepare an executable fee-bound plan for routed sends
  prepareRouted reruns the Send estimator and stores only the destination; it does not prepare a transaction or constrain the eventual debit. Most live adapters ignore bindingFeeDuffs or bindingFeeCredits when building and submitting. For example, ExternalSendFeeEstimator always prices Shielded spends at two actions, whereas the pinned SDK's select_notes_with_fee computes the fee from the selected note count. A payment requiring more notes can therefore debit more than Confirm's displayed fee and total. Platform transfer reserves and Identity minimum fees likewise are not prepared transaction fees. Obtain and retain an executable plan or enforceable fee bound from the owning spend/SDK layer, then execute that plan. Missing SDK preparation capabilities require an upstream change; another estimate must not be presented as the binding preparation promised by this PR and proposed ADR-0039.
- [BLOCKING] DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Services/ExternalSendExecutor.swift:824-829: Enforce the SDK's identity top-up prerequisites before confirmation
  The new identity top-up routes bypass prerequisites enforced by their execution seams:

  • Foreign recipients: both calls reach ManagedPlatformWallet.topUpFromAddresses. At pin 1721ca7a8b, IdentityWallet.top_up_from_addresses requires the recipient in the wallet's identity manager and otherwise returns IdentityNotFound before submission. The destination lookup only queries sdk.identityGet and does not populate that manager. A normal foreign identity therefore cannot be paid; Platform reports the local refusal as in progress, while Shielded first unshields funds and then fails.

  • Platform Max: LiveSendMaxPlanner subtracts the observed 41,500,000-credit fee from the aggregate balance, but IdentityCreditsTopUp.fromPlatform uses makeInputs, which requires 200,000,000 credits of retained headroom and can exclude addresses that cannot serve as the fee source. Even a single funded address produces an unexecutable Max. Reuse currentCandidates, maxFundableDuffs, and the corresponding typed-amount eligibility check.

  • Core minimum: the sibling toIdentity path accepts amounts below 50,500 duffs. The pinned FFI rejects them before building any lock, but lockMayExist classifies that refusal as possibly recorded, producing an in-progress result with nothing to recover.

  Use route-aware top-up preflight before enabling Confirm. Add an external-recipient-capable SDK operation or disable foreign-recipient pairs until supported; do not register foreign identities as owned. Reject sub-minimum Core amounts as unsent rather than progress.
- [BLOCKING] DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Services/ExternalSendExecutor.swift:282-284: Preserve sender callbacks for ordinary dash links
  DestinationParser retains a validated callbackScheme for an ordinary dash link opened by another app, but the standard-send plan discards it. The standard execution branch only broadcasts; prepared.opens is called exclusively for BIP70 sends. Since performPayToURL now routes links into ExternalSend, a successful plain-address payment no longer sends the acknowledgement previously produced by DWPaymentProcessor.sendCompletedToAddress. Preserve the callback context for standard sends and construct the URL with CallbackScheme.payAckURL only after successful broadcast, retaining the existing suppression for scanned and pasted links.

In `DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Send/SendAmountViewModel.swift`:
- [BLOCKING] DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Send/SendAmountViewModel.swift:142-146: Preserve the native-credit amount of a Shielded Max plan
  Dividing plan.amountCredits by 1000 discards its fractional-duff remainder, and SendAmountRequest carries only the resulting duff amount. LiveShieldedPlatformSend reconstructs credits by multiplying that amount by 1000 and passes sweepAll: true. All three Shielded coordinator methods require exact equality with the freshly read sweep plan, so a plan not divisible by 1000 fails as shieldedSweepChanged even when the wallet has not changed; retry repeats the same rounding. The existing SendViewModel preserves shieldedSweepAmountCredits separately for this reason. Carry the exact native-credit amount or sweep plan through preparation and execution, converting only for display, and cover the live coordinator equality check rather than stopping at fake preparation.

In `DashWallet/Sources/Models/PaymentProtocol/BIP70PaymentService.swift`:
- [BLOCKING] DashWallet/Sources/Models/PaymentProtocol/BIP70PaymentService.swift:315-317: Recheck payment-request expiry at the actual send boundary
  The split API checks expiry in buildForSend, which ExternalSend now invokes before the user reviews Confirm. postAndBroadcast performs no further expiry check. Leaving Confirm open or backgrounding the app until the request expires therefore still permits the signed payment to be POSTed and broadcast. An unsigned request without a payment URL has no merchant round-trip that could refuse it. Keep the early check, but also validate expiry immediately before releasing signed bytes or broadcasting, and classify a refusal at that point as unsent. Add coverage for expiry between buildForSend and postAndBroadcast.

In `DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Services/IdentityLookupService.swift`:
- [BLOCKING] DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Services/IdentityLookupService.swift:73-80: Move the blocking identity query off the main actor in SwiftDashSDK
  Awaiting identityGet does not make this network operation nonblocking. At pin 1721ca7a8b, SDK.identityGet is explicitly @MainActor and directly invokes dash_sdk_identity_fetch; that Rust entry point executes runtime.block_on around the network fetch. Resolving an Identity ID therefore blocks the UI thread for the DAPI request, including slow-network timeout periods, instead of keeping Address responsive in its checking state. Correct the query wrapper in the owning SwiftDashSDK repository and consume the corrected pin. A detached task around this caller alone is insufficient because the SDK method still hops to the main actor.

In `DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Domain/DestinationParser.swift`:
- [BLOCKING] DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Domain/DestinationParser.swift:86-88: Bound encoded address lengths before Base58 decoding
  Every bare candidate reaches decodeAddress without an encoded-length bound, and the Identity ID fallback calls base58Decode without one as well. That decoder allocates a buffer proportional to input length and traverses the entire buffer for each input character, giving quadratic work before checksum or payload-length rejection. These new parsing paths run synchronously on the main actor, including showClipboard and scannedDestination, so oversized external text can make the wallet unresponsive. Apply format-specific encoded-length limits before both Base58 decoding calls, including candidates extracted from clipboard text, while allowing the legitimate Bech32m formats through their own bounded validation. Moving unbounded decoding off-main would not resolve the resource-consumption problem.

- Compile on CI's Xcode 26.6 (a closure shadowed present) and keep the
  core-drain recovery harness in step with the confirmation initializer.
- Sign the payment request Confirm shows: the verified request travels from
  the link to the send, Retry fetches it again, expiry is checked at the tap.
- Call an app's dash: link sender back after a plain send as well.
- Refuse words too long to be a Base58 destination before decoding them.
- Send a Shielded Max with the sweep plan's exact credits.
- Refuse a Core identity top-up below the SDK minimum as not sent; size a
  Platform to Identity Max by what the top-up can fund.
- Top up an identity from Shielded in one transition (any identity); the
  moved-to-Platform outcome is gone. ADR-0044 supersedes ADR-0042.
- Mark the Confirm fee as an estimate where the SDK does not bind it.
  ADR-0043 supersedes ADR-0039; ADR-0045 plans the SDK changes still open.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
SDD-Published-From: 6d2c16ded93de46e5c8fa7fe481825a4c4773e21

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Re-review — Final validation — Phase 2 only (queue backlog)

At head 54dd5dd, seven prior findings are fixed; this verification also confirms missing recipient-safe Core-to-Shielded recovery and full-recipient inspection. The current simulator CI run fails before the app build because the extracted top-up helper breaks the compatibility harness added on develop; accessibility, workflow lint, target membership, and recovery checks pass. Verification was static only, and funded end-to-end validation remains outstanding.

🔴 5 blocking | 🟡 1 suggestion(s)

6 finding(s) not shown inline (GitHub refused the PR diff as too large)

🔴 Blocking: Move the blocking identity query off the main actor in SwiftDashSDK
DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Services/IdentityLookupService.swift:73-80

At the pinned platform commit 1721ca7a8b, both identityGet and dpnsGetUsername are explicitly @mainactor and directly invoke synchronous FFI. Their Rust implementations wait for network responses with runtime.block_on. These awaits therefore block the UI during both queries, including retries and timeouts; the non-main-actor app adapter does not change the SDK methods' isolation. Identity-ID scans automatically enter this path, so navigation and cancellation can freeze before authentication. Move both reads onto SwiftDashSDK's lifecycle-safe performBlockingQuery mechanism and consume the updated SDK revision. ADR-0045 describes that work but does not implement it, and wrapping the existing methods in an app-side detached task would still hop back to the main actor.

source: gpt-6.1-sol (phase2-reviewer: general)

🔴 Blocking: Enforce the SDK's identity top-up prerequisites before confirmation
DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Services/ExternalSendExecutor.swift:859-867

The policy offers Platform-to-foreign-Identity payments, but this adapter calls IdentityCreditsTopUp.fromPlatform, which delegates to wallet.topUpFromAddresses. At the pinned SDK revision, IdentityWallet::top_up_from_addresses first resolves the recipient through this wallet's identity manager and returns IdentityNotFound when it is not managed locally, before submitting anything. A valid external recipient therefore passes lookup and confirmation but cannot receive the payment. The returned error also falls through SendOutcome's default mapping to inFlight, incorrectly telling the user it will finish automatically. Integrate an external-identity top-up operation in rs-platform-wallet and consume it through the bindings, or make this source/destination pair unavailable before confirmation. Do not register the recipient as an owned identity.

source: gpt-6.1-sol (phase2-reviewer: general, ffi-engineer)

🔴 Blocking: Prepare an executable fee-bound plan for routed sends
DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Services/ExternalSendExecutor.swift:395-400

For Shielded-source sends, preparation still retains only the destination, amount, and estimate—not selected inputs or an executable fee-bound plan. ExternalSendFeeEstimator always requests two Shielded actions, while the pinned Rust select_notes_with_fee computes the authoritative fee from the actual selected-note count during execution. A multi-note payment can pass requireFits here but later debit a larger fee or fail because amount plus the real fee exceeds the balance, even without an intervening wallet change. The new '~' labels correctly disclose estimates, but the executable Shielded preparation chosen in ADR-0043 remains absent. Add preparation in the owning Rust wallet layer, expose the resulting plan and authoritative fee through SwiftDashSDK, and execute that plan or refuse it when stale; update the SDK pin before enabling that contract.

source: gpt-6.1-sol (phase2-reviewer: general, ffi-engineer)

🔴 Blocking: Keep an unfinished Core-to-Shielded send resumable to its recipient
DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Services/ExternalSendExecutor.swift:613-618

After a non-Max Core-to-Shielded send records an asset lock but fails or becomes unconfirmed before completion, this adapter returns only an outcome and discards the coordinator's outpoint/recipient continuation. The executor converts that outcome to inFlight, and the flow closes with 'It will finish on its own.' Shared recovery is user-initiated, however, and calls resumeAssetLock without the external recipient. For a non-drain lock, that method falls back to env.shieldedRecipient; the pinned SDK accepts that supplied recipient, so recovery can return the funds to the sender instead of paying the payee. Develop's f69f35c adds same-recipient Resume only to the old Send sheet, not this executor. Preserve a same-outpoint continuation here and integrate the SDK-persisted recipient support from dashpay/platform#5762 into shared recovery. Updating the SDK alone does not make this flow finish automatically or supply the correct resume recipient.

source: gpt-6.1-sol (phase2-reviewer: general)

🔴 Blocking: Update the top-up compatibility harness for the extracted helper
DashWallet/Sources/UI/DashPay/Profile/SDKIdentityProfileSheet.swift:703-710

This extraction removes IdentityTopUpViewModel.topUpFromShielded and replaces it with IdentityCreditsTopUp.fromShielded, but the compatibility harness added by develop's f69f35c still extracts 'private func topUpFromShielded(' from this file and assembles only the previous ViewModel-based implementation. The head-triggered simulator CI run 43007501297 fails on its PR merge checkout in 'Test recovery bookkeeping and uncertain top-up outcomes': scripts/test_identity_top_up_compatibility.py reaches production.index(marker) and raises 'ValueError: substring not found'. Consequently, the app build and DashWalletTests are skipped. Update the harness and fixtures to exercise the extracted shared helper while preserving the current base's uncertain-outcome coverage. This is a semantic integration failure despite the reported conflict-free merge.

source: gpt-6.1-sol (phase2-reviewer: general, ffi-engineer, security-auditor)

🟡 Suggestion: Provide a full-recipient inspection control before confirming
DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Send/SendAmountViewModel.swift:550-554

Send displays this shortened address, and ConfirmViewModel.toText uses the same helper; neither screen offers a full-address disclosure. For Platform and Shielded addresses, much or all of the displayed prefix identifies the network/type rather than the recipient, leaving very little recipient-specific text to verify. Scanned and externally opened destinations can also enter Send without populating the Address field, so navigating back does not reliably expose the full destination. Keep the compact summary, but add an accessible control on Send or Confirm that reveals the complete recipient before authorization to send.

source: gpt-6.1-sol (phase2-reviewer: security-auditor)

Review provenance

Source: reviewer 1: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 2: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: ffi-engineer); reviewer 3: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); final verifier: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: sol-verifier, role: final-verifier)

  • Triage: critical by gpt-6.1-sol (effort low) — The large, intricate change directly implements funds-movement orchestration in ExternalSendExecutor.swift and adds external funding and identity top-up paths in PlatformAddressSyncCoordinator.swift and ShieldedTransferCoordinator.swift, including fee binding, partial completion, and retry safety.
  • Phase 1 reviewers: not run (skipped for throughput: 18 PRs queued, above the 10 limit)
  • Fresh verifier: gpt-6.1-sol — final-verifier; agent sol-verifier
  • Phase 2 reviewers: gpt-6.1-sol — general (completed, effort xhigh); agent phase2-reviewer, gpt-6.1-sol — ffi-engineer (completed, effort xhigh); agent phase2-reviewer, gpt-6.1-sol — security-auditor (completed, effort xhigh); agent phase2-reviewer
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review (PastaClaw). How to work through them:
- Verify each finding against the code; fix only what is real, as narrowly as the finding.
- If a finding is wrong, decline it on its thread in one or two sentences; the bot answers once and stops.
- To defer one, link a tracking issue on its thread (or reply asking the bot to file one).
- Suggestions don't block the merge, but most are worth fixing in this PR; judge each on its merits.
- Keep the PR's scope; don't grow it to satisfy hardening suggestions.
- Carried items were raised in an earlier round: read the thread first, and don't re-fix what you already fixed, declined or deferred there. Disputed and deferred items are already handled and are not listed.

In `DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Services/IdentityLookupService.swift`:
- [BLOCKING] DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Services/IdentityLookupService.swift:73-80: Move the blocking identity query off the main actor in SwiftDashSDK
  At the pinned platform commit 1721ca7a8b, both identityGet and dpnsGetUsername are explicitly @MainActor and directly invoke synchronous FFI. Their Rust implementations wait for network responses with runtime.block_on. These awaits therefore block the UI during both queries, including retries and timeouts; the non-main-actor app adapter does not change the SDK methods' isolation. Identity-ID scans automatically enter this path, so navigation and cancellation can freeze before authentication. Move both reads onto SwiftDashSDK's lifecycle-safe performBlockingQuery mechanism and consume the updated SDK revision. ADR-0045 describes that work but does not implement it, and wrapping the existing methods in an app-side detached task would still hop back to the main actor.

In `DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Services/ExternalSendExecutor.swift`:
- [BLOCKING] DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Services/ExternalSendExecutor.swift:859-867: Enforce the SDK's identity top-up prerequisites before confirmation
  The policy offers Platform-to-foreign-Identity payments, but this adapter calls IdentityCreditsTopUp.fromPlatform, which delegates to wallet.topUpFromAddresses. At the pinned SDK revision, IdentityWallet::top_up_from_addresses first resolves the recipient through this wallet's identity manager and returns IdentityNotFound when it is not managed locally, before submitting anything. A valid external recipient therefore passes lookup and confirmation but cannot receive the payment. The returned error also falls through SendOutcome's default mapping to inFlight, incorrectly telling the user it will finish automatically. Integrate an external-identity top-up operation in rs-platform-wallet and consume it through the bindings, or make this source/destination pair unavailable before confirmation. Do not register the recipient as an owned identity.
- [BLOCKING] DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Services/ExternalSendExecutor.swift:395-400: Prepare an executable fee-bound plan for routed sends
  For Shielded-source sends, preparation still retains only the destination, amount, and estimate—not selected inputs or an executable fee-bound plan. ExternalSendFeeEstimator always requests two Shielded actions, while the pinned Rust select_notes_with_fee computes the authoritative fee from the actual selected-note count during execution. A multi-note payment can pass requireFits here but later debit a larger fee or fail because amount plus the real fee exceeds the balance, even without an intervening wallet change. The new '~' labels correctly disclose estimates, but the executable Shielded preparation chosen in ADR-0043 remains absent. Add preparation in the owning Rust wallet layer, expose the resulting plan and authoritative fee through SwiftDashSDK, and execute that plan or refuse it when stale; update the SDK pin before enabling that contract.
- [BLOCKING] DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Services/ExternalSendExecutor.swift:613-618: Keep an unfinished Core-to-Shielded send resumable to its recipient
  After a non-Max Core-to-Shielded send records an asset lock but fails or becomes unconfirmed before completion, this adapter returns only an outcome and discards the coordinator's outpoint/recipient continuation. The executor converts that outcome to inFlight, and the flow closes with 'It will finish on its own.' Shared recovery is user-initiated, however, and calls resumeAssetLock without the external recipient. For a non-drain lock, that method falls back to env.shieldedRecipient; the pinned SDK accepts that supplied recipient, so recovery can return the funds to the sender instead of paying the payee. Develop's f69f35c5a adds same-recipient Resume only to the old Send sheet, not this executor. Preserve a same-outpoint continuation here and integrate the SDK-persisted recipient support from dashpay/platform#5762 into shared recovery. Updating the SDK alone does not make this flow finish automatically or supply the correct resume recipient.

In `DashWallet/Sources/UI/DashPay/Profile/SDKIdentityProfileSheet.swift`:
- [BLOCKING] DashWallet/Sources/UI/DashPay/Profile/SDKIdentityProfileSheet.swift:703-710: Update the top-up compatibility harness for the extracted helper
  This extraction removes IdentityTopUpViewModel.topUpFromShielded and replaces it with IdentityCreditsTopUp.fromShielded, but the compatibility harness added by develop's f69f35c5a still extracts 'private func topUpFromShielded(' from this file and assembles only the previous ViewModel-based implementation. The head-triggered simulator CI run 43007501297 fails on its PR merge checkout in 'Test recovery bookkeeping and uncertain top-up outcomes': scripts/test_identity_top_up_compatibility.py reaches production.index(marker) and raises 'ValueError: substring not found'. Consequently, the app build and DashWalletTests are skipped. Update the harness and fixtures to exercise the extracted shared helper while preserving the current base's uncertain-outcome coverage. This is a semantic integration failure despite the reported conflict-free merge.

In `DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Send/SendAmountViewModel.swift`:
- [SUGGESTION] DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Send/SendAmountViewModel.swift:550-554: Provide a full-recipient inspection control before confirming
  Send displays this shortened address, and ConfirmViewModel.toText uses the same helper; neither screen offers a full-address disclosure. For Platform and Shielded addresses, much or all of the displayed prefix identifies the network/type rather than the recipient, leaving very little recipient-specific text to verify. Scanned and externally opened destinations can also enter Send without populating the Address field, so navigating back does not reliably expose the full destination. Keep the compact summary, but add an accessible control on Send or Confirm that reveals the complete recipient before authorization to send.
Out-of-scope follow-up suggestions (1)

These are valid observations, but they are outside this PR's scope and should be handled in separate issues or author/maintainer-requested PRs rather than blocking this review.

  • Reject overflowing BIP70 output totals — BIP70PaymentService.prepareForConfirmation sums merchant-controlled output amounts with unchecked UInt64 addition, so an overflowing total can terminate request preparation. The same aggregation and reachable payment-request path exist at the merge base; this PR does not introduce the defect.
    • Follow-up: Address this in a separate PR using checked aggregation and valid amount bounds, with regression coverage for malformed merchant output totals.

- Address: the field and Show clipboard sit in one card; the clipboard
  address shows the way the design does.
- Send: laid out as the design does, without the fee row.
- Select source: sources listed by name with a radio; an unavailable one
  is dimmed and explains why on tap.
- Continue authenticates and prepares the send, then opens Confirm.
- Confirm: a send from Shielded to Core shows From "Shielded balance" and
  two notices inside the card (not instant; amount and destination become
  public, with the design system's public icon); no Processing time there.
  Shielded to any non-Shielded destination keeps its notices in the card.
  DashUIKit bumped to 41ff490.
- After a successful send: the transaction-details receipt for Core sends
  with a txid; otherwise the sheet closes on a success "Sent" toast. The
  inline Sent sheet is removed.
- Typing an amount on a route whose fee ignores the amount (Platform and
  Identity sources) reuses the known fee instead of showing progress.
- Confirm drops the estimate note, the withdrawal-delay and reserve
  explanations and the identity-balance notes; Platform to someone else's
  Identity ID is unavailable until the SDK can make it.
- dash: links with a Platform or Shielded address or an Identity ID and
  amount= open Send with that destination and amount, scanned, pasted or
  opened from another app.

Fixes #1383

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
SDD-Published-From: d3af919bd6391cfca7599b2c551400b9ac02de0a

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Re-review — Final validation — Phase 1 + Phase 2

This exact head still has a pre-Confirm preparation leak and leaves new Core-routed sends outside the existing restore-sync and in-flight lifecycle guards; external asset-lock recovery can also lose the confirmed recipient. Exact-head CI has no build or test result (only PR-title and CodeRabbit checks succeeded), and the branch is seven commits behind develop with localization conflicts. One additional valid suggestion about the Identity-to-Core withdrawal warning is omitted under the ten-finding cap.

🔴 9 blocking | 🟡 1 suggestion(s)

10 finding(s) not shown inline (GitHub refused the PR diff as too large)

🟡 Suggestion: Provide a full-recipient inspection control before confirming
DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Send/SendAmountViewModel.swift:546-551

Confirm still derives toText from shortAddress, which exposes only the first six and last five characters or a payment-request host. Neither Send nor Confirm provides an accessible expansion, copy action, or full-recipient details view, so the holder cannot verify the complete destination at the final decision point.

source: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (phase1-reviewer: general); gpt-6.1-sol (phase2-reviewer: general, security-auditor)

🔴 Blocking: Keep an unfinished Core-to-Shielded send resumable to its recipient
DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Services/ExternalSendExecutor.swift:613-618

The non-Max Core-to-Shielded path passes the external Orchard recipient only to a temporary coordinator. If the asset lock is recorded but the second leg is not confirmed, the executor returns an in-flight outcome and generic recovery later calls resumeAssetLock without recipientOverride; the current non-drain row resolves to the wallet's own Shielded recipient. The related Core-to-Platform external route has the same recovery hazard in CoreFundingResumer: when its UserDefaults recipient record is missing or undecodable and the row is not marked external, recovery falls through to resumeOwn. Preserve the external recipient in the owning recovery/SDK layer and refuse recovery when intent is unknown rather than paying the sender's address.

source: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (phase1-reviewer: general); gpt-6.1-sol (phase2-reviewer: general)

🔴 Blocking: Prepare an executable fee-bound plan for routed sends
DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Services/ExternalSendExecutor.swift:380-400

Routed preparation stores only destination, amount, the estimated fee, and optional sweep credits in PreparedExternalSend.Plan.routed. Confirm therefore does not retain the selected Shielded notes or an executable fee-bound plan, and the live adapters select inputs and recompute capacity at the Confirm tap. The displayed estimate is marked with ~, but that does not prevent a typed Platform withdrawal or Shielded spend from being accepted through aggregate-balance checks and then rejected after confirmation, nor does it constrain a later fee change. Use the SDK-owned route-specific quote/plan through preparation and execution, or reject/reconfirm whenever the executable capacity or fee plan differs.

source: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (phase1-reviewer: general); gpt-6.1-sol (phase2-reviewer: general)

🔴 Blocking: Enforce the SDK's identity top-up prerequisites before confirmation
DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Services/ExternalSendExecutor.swift:470-480

The known Core-to-Identity minimum is checked only in runRouted, after Confirm has already been prepared and shown. A positive amount below DWIdentityRegistrationCoordinator.minimumCoreTopUpDuffs can pass Send's aggregate balance and fee checks, authenticate, and open a ready Confirm model before the executor refuses it. Apply this prerequisite during amount validation or preparation, while keeping the execution-time check as a backstop.

source: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (phase1-reviewer: general); gpt-6.1-sol (phase2-reviewer: general)

🔴 Blocking: Move the blocking identity query off the main actor in SwiftDashSDK
DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Services/IdentityLookupService.swift:73-80

IdentityLookupService awaits SwiftDashSDKIdentityPlatformReader, but the pinned SDK's identityGet and dpnsGetUsername methods remain main-actor-isolated and synchronously wait for their network-backed FFI calls. A syntactically valid Identity ID from a scan or link can therefore freeze the Address UI, including cancellation and navigation, for the DAPI request duration. Fix the actor isolation in the SDK and consume that pin; moving only the app-side wrapper to an async service does not remove the main-thread block.

source: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (phase1-reviewer: general); gpt-6.1-sol (phase2-reviewer: general)

🔴 Blocking: Bound encoded address lengths before Base58 decoding
DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Domain/DestinationParser.swift:102-103

The 44-character bound applies only to the Base58 paths. An arbitrarily long candidate still reaches DashAddressClassifier.decodeBech32m(text), and find(in:) first tries the complete clipboard string before splitting it into words. Bound the UTF-8 length of Bech32m candidates before calling the decoder so hostile pasted or linked input cannot force an unbounded decode on the UI path.

source: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (phase1-reviewer: general); gpt-6.1-sol (phase2-reviewer: general, security-auditor)

🔴 Blocking: Preserve sender callbacks for ordinary dash links
DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Services/ExternalSendExecutor.swift:270-285

Although the parser reads an app-opened link's sender scheme, it retains callbackScheme only for Core destinations. Platform, Shielded, and Identity destinations are reconstructed without that provenance, and the routed branch of send never opens a callback URL. An ordinary dash: link opened by another app and paid to a non-Core destination therefore leaves the sender without the callback required by the payment-link contract.

source: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (phase1-reviewer: general); gpt-6.1-sol (phase2-reviewer: general, security-auditor)

🔴 Blocking: Recheck payment-request expiry at the actual send boundary
DashWallet/Sources/Models/PaymentProtocol/BIP70PaymentService.swift:329-367

postAndBroadcast checks expiry before starting postPayment, but it does not check again after the merchant round-trip completes. If the request expires while the POST is in flight, the code proceeds directly to wallet.broadcast(prepared), so an expired payment request can still be broadcast.

source: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (phase1-reviewer: general); gpt-6.1-sol (phase2-reviewer: general, security-auditor)

🔴 Blocking: Route Core asset-lock sends through the existing restore and in-flight guards
DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Services/ExternalSendExecutor.swift:367-400

The new routed preparation has no equivalent of WalletSendService.isBlockedByInitialRestoreSync, so Core-to-Shielded, Core-to-Platform, and Core-to-Identity sends can proceed during a restored wallet's initial historical sync once some coins are visible. The external Core-to-Platform execution also calls fundExternalFromCore directly and only records a local Boolean; unlike the sibling coordinator path, it does not call ShieldedAssetLocksInFlight.beginFundingCall/endFundingCall or claim the built outpoint. Wallet removal/reload or a concurrent recovery can therefore race an active external asset-lock operation. Apply the shared restore gate at the Core-funded boundary and use the owning coordinator's funding lifecycle and built-lock claim for the external-recipient variant.

Raised on code unchanged since the last review, and confirmed by an independent pass: During an initial restored-wallet sync, ExternalSend's SendAmountViewModel still enables Continue and prepareRouted proceeds; Core→Shielded's BIP44 path and the direct Core→Platform/Core→Identity calls can therefore build or broadcast from a partial UTXO view instead of refusing the spend. For Core→Platform, fundExternalFromCore only updates the local AssetLockRecord, so wallet removal or recovery can be admitted while the asset-lock call is active and can reload the wallet or concurrently resume the same lock.

source: gpt-6.1-sol (phase2-reviewer: general, security-auditor)

🔴 Blocking: Discard preparations abandoned by navigation
DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/ExternalSendFlow.swift:302-320

openConfirm now builds and signs while Send remains interactive. If the user opens Select source, presses Back, or otherwise changes the flow while confirm.start() is suspended, the post-await guard returns without calling confirm.cancel() or recorder.discard on a successful preparation. For BIP70 this leaves the confirmation's single-use claim held even though no POST or broadcast occurred; the next attempt with the same request can fail as already sent. Give preparation explicit cancellation/generation ownership and discard any result that no longer belongs to the active Send state.

source: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (phase1-reviewer: general); gpt-6.1-sol (phase2-reviewer: general)

Review provenance

Source: reviewer 1: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 2: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); reviewer 3: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: general); final verifier: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: sol-verifier, role: final-verifier)

  • Triage: critical by gpt-6.1-sol (effort low) — The large, intricate change directly alters funds movement in ExternalSendExecutor.swift through preparation, broadcasting, multi-step transfers, Identity credit spending, and failure/retry classification across multiple payment routes.
  • Phase 1 reviewers: muse-spark-1.3-contributor — general (completed, effort xhigh); agent phase1-reviewer
  • Phase 1 model: muse-spark-1.3-contributor — not quota-gated; passed over gemini-3.8-flash-high (antigravity quota lookup failed), glm-5.3-flash (not used above high effort; tier asks max)
  • Single stage: Phase 1 and Phase 2 reviewed this head side by side, with no blocker gate between them (triage tier)
  • Code unchanged since the last final review (54dd5ddf): 1 new blocker(s) went to an independent confirmation pass (the final verifier's model in a fresh session, without its reasoning): 1 confirmed
  • Fresh verifier: gpt-6.1-sol — final-verifier; agent sol-verifier
  • Phase 2 reviewers: gpt-6.1-sol — general (completed, effort xhigh); agent phase2-reviewer, gpt-6.1-sol — security-auditor (completed, effort xhigh); agent phase2-reviewer
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review (PastaClaw). How to work through them:
- Verify each finding against the code; fix only what is real, as narrowly as the finding.
- If a finding is wrong, decline it on its thread in one or two sentences; the bot answers once and stops.
- To defer one, link a tracking issue on its thread (or reply asking the bot to file one).
- Suggestions don't block the merge, but most are worth fixing in this PR; judge each on its merits.
- Keep the PR's scope; don't grow it to satisfy hardening suggestions.
- Carried items were raised in an earlier round: read the thread first, and don't re-fix what you already fixed, declined or deferred there. Disputed and deferred items are already handled and are not listed.

In `DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Send/SendAmountViewModel.swift`:
- [SUGGESTION] DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Send/SendAmountViewModel.swift:546-551: Provide a full-recipient inspection control before confirming
  Confirm still derives `toText` from `shortAddress`, which exposes only the first six and last five characters or a payment-request host. Neither Send nor Confirm provides an accessible expansion, copy action, or full-recipient details view, so the holder cannot verify the complete destination at the final decision point.

In `DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Services/ExternalSendExecutor.swift`:
- [BLOCKING] DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Services/ExternalSendExecutor.swift:613-618: Keep an unfinished Core-to-Shielded send resumable to its recipient
  The non-Max Core-to-Shielded path passes the external Orchard recipient only to a temporary coordinator. If the asset lock is recorded but the second leg is not confirmed, the executor returns an in-flight outcome and generic recovery later calls `resumeAssetLock` without `recipientOverride`; the current non-drain row resolves to the wallet's own Shielded recipient. The related Core-to-Platform external route has the same recovery hazard in `CoreFundingResumer`: when its UserDefaults recipient record is missing or undecodable and the row is not marked external, recovery falls through to `resumeOwn`. Preserve the external recipient in the owning recovery/SDK layer and refuse recovery when intent is unknown rather than paying the sender's address.
- [BLOCKING] DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Services/ExternalSendExecutor.swift:380-400: Prepare an executable fee-bound plan for routed sends
  Routed preparation stores only `destination`, `amount`, the estimated fee, and optional sweep credits in `PreparedExternalSend.Plan.routed`. Confirm therefore does not retain the selected Shielded notes or an executable fee-bound plan, and the live adapters select inputs and recompute capacity at the Confirm tap. The displayed estimate is marked with `~`, but that does not prevent a typed Platform withdrawal or Shielded spend from being accepted through aggregate-balance checks and then rejected after confirmation, nor does it constrain a later fee change. Use the SDK-owned route-specific quote/plan through preparation and execution, or reject/reconfirm whenever the executable capacity or fee plan differs.
- [BLOCKING] DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Services/ExternalSendExecutor.swift:470-480: Enforce the SDK's identity top-up prerequisites before confirmation
  The known Core-to-Identity minimum is checked only in `runRouted`, after Confirm has already been prepared and shown. A positive amount below `DWIdentityRegistrationCoordinator.minimumCoreTopUpDuffs` can pass Send's aggregate balance and fee checks, authenticate, and open a ready Confirm model before the executor refuses it. Apply this prerequisite during amount validation or preparation, while keeping the execution-time check as a backstop.
- [BLOCKING] DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Services/ExternalSendExecutor.swift:270-285: Preserve sender callbacks for ordinary dash links
  Although the parser reads an app-opened link's `sender` scheme, it retains `callbackScheme` only for Core destinations. Platform, Shielded, and Identity destinations are reconstructed without that provenance, and the routed branch of `send` never opens a callback URL. An ordinary `dash:` link opened by another app and paid to a non-Core destination therefore leaves the sender without the callback required by the payment-link contract.
- [BLOCKING] DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Services/ExternalSendExecutor.swift:367-400: Route Core asset-lock sends through the existing restore and in-flight guards
  The new routed preparation has no equivalent of `WalletSendService.isBlockedByInitialRestoreSync`, so Core-to-Shielded, Core-to-Platform, and Core-to-Identity sends can proceed during a restored wallet's initial historical sync once some coins are visible. The external Core-to-Platform execution also calls `fundExternalFromCore` directly and only records a local Boolean; unlike the sibling coordinator path, it does not call `ShieldedAssetLocksInFlight.beginFundingCall/endFundingCall` or claim the built outpoint. Wallet removal/reload or a concurrent recovery can therefore race an active external asset-lock operation. Apply the shared restore gate at the Core-funded boundary and use the owning coordinator's funding lifecycle and built-lock claim for the external-recipient variant.

  _Raised on code unchanged since the last review, and confirmed by an independent pass: During an initial restored-wallet sync, ExternalSend's SendAmountViewModel still enables Continue and prepareRouted proceeds; Core→Shielded's BIP44 path and the direct Core→Platform/Core→Identity calls can therefore build or broadcast from a partial UTXO view instead of refusing the spend. For Core→Platform, fundExternalFromCore only updates the local AssetLockRecord, so wallet removal or recovery can be admitted while the asset-lock call is active and can reload the wallet or concurrently resume the same lock._

In `DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Services/IdentityLookupService.swift`:
- [BLOCKING] DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Services/IdentityLookupService.swift:73-80: Move the blocking identity query off the main actor in SwiftDashSDK
  `IdentityLookupService` awaits `SwiftDashSDKIdentityPlatformReader`, but the pinned SDK's `identityGet` and `dpnsGetUsername` methods remain main-actor-isolated and synchronously wait for their network-backed FFI calls. A syntactically valid Identity ID from a scan or link can therefore freeze the Address UI, including cancellation and navigation, for the DAPI request duration. Fix the actor isolation in the SDK and consume that pin; moving only the app-side wrapper to an async service does not remove the main-thread block.

In `DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Domain/DestinationParser.swift`:
- [BLOCKING] DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/Domain/DestinationParser.swift:102-103: Bound encoded address lengths before Base58 decoding
  The 44-character bound applies only to the Base58 paths. An arbitrarily long candidate still reaches `DashAddressClassifier.decodeBech32m(text)`, and `find(in:)` first tries the complete clipboard string before splitting it into words. Bound the UTF-8 length of Bech32m candidates before calling the decoder so hostile pasted or linked input cannot force an unbounded decode on the UI path.

In `DashWallet/Sources/Models/PaymentProtocol/BIP70PaymentService.swift`:
- [BLOCKING] DashWallet/Sources/Models/PaymentProtocol/BIP70PaymentService.swift:329-367: Recheck payment-request expiry at the actual send boundary
  `postAndBroadcast` checks expiry before starting `postPayment`, but it does not check again after the merchant round-trip completes. If the request expires while the POST is in flight, the code proceeds directly to `wallet.broadcast(prepared)`, so an expired payment request can still be broadcast.

In `DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/ExternalSendFlow.swift`:
- [BLOCKING] DashWallet/Sources/UI/Payments/ExternalSend/ExternalSendFlow.swift:302-320: Discard preparations abandoned by navigation
  `openConfirm` now builds and signs while Send remains interactive. If the user opens Select source, presses Back, or otherwise changes the flow while `confirm.start()` is suspended, the post-await guard returns without calling `confirm.cancel()` or `recorder.discard` on a successful preparation. For BIP70 this leaves the confirmation's single-use claim held even though no POST or broadcast occurred; the next attempt with the same request can fail as already sent. Give preparation explicit cancellation/generation ownership and discard any result that no longer belongs to the active Send state.
Out-of-scope follow-up suggestions (1)

These are valid observations, but they are outside this PR's scope and should be handled in separate issues or author/maintainer-requested PRs rather than blocking this review.

  • Update the top-up compatibility harness when integrating current develop — The exact reviewed head does not contain scripts/test_identity_top_up_compatibility.py, so the extracted helper cannot fail that absent script in this tree. Current develop adds the harness after this branch diverged, and its extraction marker/scaffold must be updated during integration because it still expects the old private helper declaration.

@romchornyi

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This PR is being split into a stack so each part can be reviewed on its own (merge in order):

# PR What
0 #1405 chore(l10n): drop unused keys and sort the catalogs
1 #1406 Domain: destinations, parser, pair policy, amount rules, outcomes
2 #1407 Services: executor, fee estimates, identity lookup, asset-lock recovery, BIP70 checks
3 #1408 DashSpend: a payment the merchant acknowledged before it failed shows as in progress
4 #1409 The new Send screens and entry points
5 this PR Routes that need dashpay/platform #5860, #5863, #5865 and the pin bump — this branch will be rebuilt on top of #1409 once those merge

The open review findings from this PR are fixed in the stack; I'll answer them here when this branch is rebuilt.

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