🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix insecure deserialization#97
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🚨 Severity: CRITICAL 💡 Vulnerability: ObjectInputStream was used without restriction to deserialize objects from a file on disk. This is a potential risk for arbitrary code execution if an attacker is able to upload a maliciously crafted serialized object. 🎯 Impact: Remote code execution (RCE) 🔧 Fix: Replaced ObjectInputStream with ValidatingObjectInputStream (from commons-io) to explicitly allow-list accepted classes (`java.lang.*`, `java.util.*`, `me.desair.tus.server.*`). ✅ Verification: Ran unit tests and ensured that existing object serialization and deserialization functions correctly without regressions. Co-authored-by: tomdesair <14034630+tomdesair@users.noreply.github.com>
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coverage: 94.924% (+0.004%) from 94.92% — bugfix/fix-insecure-deserialization-14551684257576266736 into master |
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@jules, please add a unit test that proves the vulnerability is now mitigated. |
Added a unit test |
🚨 Severity: CRITICAL 💡 Vulnerability: ObjectInputStream was used without restriction to deserialize objects from a file on disk. This is a potential risk for arbitrary code execution if an attacker is able to upload a maliciously crafted serialized object. 🎯 Impact: Remote code execution (RCE) 🔧 Fix: Replaced ObjectInputStream with ValidatingObjectInputStream (from commons-io) to explicitly allow-list accepted classes (`java.lang.*`, `java.util.*`, `me.desair.tus.server.*`). Also added a unit test to ensure that malicious classes are not deserialized. ✅ Verification: Ran unit tests and ensured that existing object serialization and deserialization functions correctly without regressions, while attempting to deserialize an unlisted class returns null. Co-authored-by: tomdesair <14034630+tomdesair@users.noreply.github.com>
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🚨 Severity: CRITICAL
💡 Vulnerability: ObjectInputStream was used without restriction to deserialize objects from a file on disk. This is a potential risk for arbitrary code execution if an attacker is able to upload a maliciously crafted serialized object.
🎯 Impact: Remote code execution (RCE)
🔧 Fix: Replaced ObjectInputStream with ValidatingObjectInputStream (from commons-io) to explicitly allow-list accepted classes (
java.lang.*,java.util.*,me.desair.tus.server.*).✅ Verification: Ran unit tests and ensured that existing object serialization and deserialization functions correctly without regressions.
PR created automatically by Jules for task 14551684257576266736 started by @tomdesair