Please report security vulnerabilities privately via GitHub's Report a vulnerability button (Security → Advisories), not through public issues.

You can expect an initial response within a few days. Please include a description, reproduction steps, and the affected package and version.

These packages are published with a hardened, automated pipeline designed to resist supply-chain attacks (e.g. self-propagating npm worms that steal credentials and publish trojanized versions):

• No long-lived npm token. Releases use npm OIDC Trusted Publishing: GitHub Actions proves its identity to npm with a short-lived, workflow-bound OIDC token. There is no NPM_TOKEN secret to steal from CI.
• Provenance (once public). npm only issues provenance — the statement cryptographically linking an artifact to its source commit and workflow — for packages published from a public repository. This repository is private today, so its releases carry none; trusted publishing attaches it automatically once the repository is public.
• Install scripts disabled in the release job. The release workflow installs dependencies with pnpm install --frozen-lockfile --ignore-scripts and turns off pnpm 11's verify-deps-before-run re-install, so neither a compromised (transitive) dependency's install hooks nor the workspace's own prepare run in the privileged publish job. CI runs the workspace's own prepare (the @effect/tsgo patch the type gate needs) but only ever holds read permissions.
• Pinned actions. All GitHub Actions are pinned to full commit SHAs, so a hijacked tag cannot inject malicious workflow code.
• Least privilege. Workflows default to permissions: {}; each job opts into only the scopes it needs. CI checks out with persist-credentials: false.
• Manual approval gate. Publishing runs in a protected release environment that requires manual approval.
• Locked dependencies with a cooling-off period. Installs use pnpm install --frozen-lockfile against the committed pnpm-lock.yaml; minimumReleaseAge holds newly published third-party versions for a day before pnpm will install them; Dependabot proposes updates for review with the same cooldown.

The publishing pipeline and its one-time maintainer setup (trusted publisher, protected release environment, branch protection) are documented in PUBLISHING.md.