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POST /v1/action, /facts, /documents, and /memory/search were left off the require_control list, so an anonymous caller could approve a parked run or inject tenant memory. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
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Session 16 — graded ✅Score: +100. HITL actions and memory writes bypassed the control plane, so state-changing operations were reachable without the credential every neighbouring route required. First to file (2026-08-13 16:44). |
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What breaks
require_controlalready guards subscriptions, events, runs, and resume. Four other write paths were left off that list:POST /v1/action— HITL approve / reject / rerun of a parked nodePOST /v1/agent/facts— inject a fact into tenant memoryPOST /v1/agent/documents— index a document into tenant memoryPOST /v1/agent/memory/search— recall across a tenant chosen in the JSON bodytests/test_control_plane_auth.pyonly enumerated the first four. An anonymous caller on the agent port could approve a waiting run or write memory asPrincipal("gateway","gateway"). The control token on the other routes does not help if these stay open.Reproduction
On current
main, both of these fail (they return 200 / 404 instead of 503 / 401):Without the test: unset
S16_CONTROL_TOKENandPOST /v1/agent/factswith any tenant. Before this change the fact is stored. After it, the route answers 503 until a token is configured, then 401 for the wrong bearer.Fix
Add
dependencies=[Depends(require_control)]on those four routes. ExtendWRITE_PATHSso the fail-closed and wrong-token cases cover them.uv run pytest tests/test_control_plane_auth.py tests/test_runtime.pypasses (24). Runtime tests already send the control token via theapp_clientfixture.