🔒️(ci) pin all actions and installs against supply-chain tampering - #683
🔒️(ci) pin all actions and installs against supply-chain tampering#683providenz wants to merge 1 commit into
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Signed-off-by: Laurent Paoletti <lp@providenz.fr>
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✨ Finishing Touches🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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Purpose
CI workflows resolved most of their actions, container images and installed packages through mutable references (branch names, floating tags, unversioned package names). Anyone able to move one of those references could run arbitrary code inside our pipelines, with a write-capable token available in the workspace.
This narrows both the code that CI executes and what that code can reach.
Proposal