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Walk will own managed code-indexer lifecycle and MCP provisioning as specified by Walk #90. Leash must enforce the resulting capability boundary without becoming a code-indexer provider or consumer.
This contract must work identically whether the sandbox workload is BME or a direct agent such as Codex, Claude, or extcc.
Required enforcement contract
For a target sandbox, Leash permits only the single code-indexer MCP endpoint or process channel explicitly supplied by Walk. That channel is restricted to retrieval-only operations against the repository and revision selected for the run.
Leash must prevent:
starting or reaching duplicate or otherwise unapproved code-indexer/MCP servers;
indexing, re-indexing, deletion, configuration changes, or other mutation through the approved retrieval channel;
access to another repository or revision through that channel;
exposure of raw host code-indexer configuration, stores, database credentials, provider credentials, or unrelated indexes to the sandbox;
broad filesystem or network authority being inferred merely because code-indexer retrieval was requested.
Denied attempts and the effective approved capability must be auditable. All endpoint/process-channel grants and supporting resources must be removed on success, failure, cancellation, and signal.
Acceptance criteria
Leash accepts a bounded, machine-readable capability description for exactly one Walk-provided code-indexer MCP endpoint or process channel per target sandbox.
The approved channel permits only retrieval operations for the declared repository and revision; indexing and every other mutation operation are denied.
A request for a different repository or revision is denied, including same-host and same-service cross-repository attempts.
A second, undeclared, or substituted code-indexer/MCP server cannot be started or reached from the sandbox.
The target receives no raw host code-indexer configuration, backing-store path, backing-store credentials, provider credentials, or unrelated index data.
The policy is fail-closed when the capability description is absent, malformed, ambiguous, stale, or cannot be enforced.
Effective grants and denials identify the sandbox, operation class, repository/revision scope, and endpoint/channel without logging secrets or retrieved source contents.
Endpoint/process-channel access and every temporary enforcement resource are cleaned up on success, startup failure, workload failure, cancellation, and signal.
Equivalent integration tests prove the contract for both BME-mediated execution and a direct MCP-capable agent; neither path receives broader authority.
Existing default-deny filesystem, network, process, and credential protections remain unchanged when code-indexer is not requested.
Documentation clearly assigns lifecycle/index freshness/MCP provisioning to Walk and enforcement only to Leash.
Non-goals
Installing, starting, indexing, or refreshing code-indexer in Leash.
Selecting repository context or deciding whether retrieval is required.
Implementing BME-specific retrieval behavior.
Coordination
Provider-side lifecycle, exact-revision freshness, and MCP injection are tracked in Walk #90. This issue defines the corresponding Leash enforcement boundary.
Context
Walk will own managed code-indexer lifecycle and MCP provisioning as specified by Walk #90. Leash must enforce the resulting capability boundary without becoming a code-indexer provider or consumer.
This contract must work identically whether the sandbox workload is BME or a direct agent such as Codex, Claude, or extcc.
Required enforcement contract
For a target sandbox, Leash permits only the single code-indexer MCP endpoint or process channel explicitly supplied by Walk. That channel is restricted to retrieval-only operations against the repository and revision selected for the run.
Leash must prevent:
Denied attempts and the effective approved capability must be auditable. All endpoint/process-channel grants and supporting resources must be removed on success, failure, cancellation, and signal.
Acceptance criteria
Non-goals
Coordination
Provider-side lifecycle, exact-revision freshness, and MCP injection are tracked in Walk #90. This issue defines the corresponding Leash enforcement boundary.