Skip to content

Security: rbitcoin-org/rbitcoin

SECURITY.md

Security policy

rbitcoin is full-node software intended for production server-side use: IBD and tip follow, block/tx relay, and Electrum serving for wallet backends and similar infrastructure—not a desktop GUI or end-user wallet.

A consensus split on mainnet is vanishingly unlikely. The on-disk format and APIs can still change before 1.0 (a named refuse or wipe, not a silent wipe), and there is no long-term support window yet. 1.0 is where that window, further hardening, and signed release binaries are planned. In-tree is 0.9.99 (pre-0.10.0). 0.9.x (tag 0.9.0) is the published line. v0.9.x is the patch line. Occupied 0.6.x stores refuse (wipe and sync again). Schema 24 and 25 open in place. A published 0.8 directory is schema 26. This binary rewrites that meta to 29, and a 0.9.0 binary then refuses the directory. The runbook is docs/operator/mainnet.md. Day-to-day flags are docs/operator/.

--trust-peer stores and serves a chain rbitcoin considers invalid. Do not point a wallet at that node unless you accept that peer. The fault list is COMPAT.md.

Supported versions

Version Support
0.9.99 (in-tree) Untagged master toward 0.10.0. Report against the git commit.
0.9.x Published line (0.9.0). No LTS. Report against the tag.
0.8.x Previous published line (0.8.0). Report against the tag.
0.7.x Previous published line (0.7.0). Report against the tag.
0.6.x Previous published line (0.6.0 / 0.6.1). Report against the tag.
0.5.x Previous published line (0.5.1 / 0.5.2). Report against the tag.
1.0+ (future) Will define a clearer support window once the on-disk schema and public surface stabilize.

Untagged trees: report against a git commit (and binary digest if you built musl static).

Reporting a vulnerability

Contact: security@reardencode.com

Report security issues privately — do not open a public GitHub issue for unfixed remote, consensus-critical, or data-integrity bugs.

Please include when possible:

  1. Affected commit (or release tag) and how the binary was built (e.g. musl static via nix build .#rbitcoin-musl)
  2. Network: mainnet / signet / regtest
  3. Impact: consensus acceptance/rejection, P2P DoS, Electrum integrity, crash under adversarial input, etc.
  4. Minimal reproduction (peer behavior, RPC/Electrum request, store fixture)

We aim to acknowledge receipt promptly and to coordinate disclosure for issues that affect consensus, P2P attack surface, or Electrum/query integrity.

Scope

  • Consensus and script: pure-Rust verification; bugs can mean accepting invalid chain data or rejecting valid data. Report both.
  • P2P: BIP324 v2. A --net-permission-bind v1@ listener also takes plain v1 for a local wallet indexer the operator trusts; it needs its own port and a loopback or private address. DoS parity with Bitcoin Core is not claimed, but mitigations are intentional operator surface: max inbound sessions (--max-inbound, default 200; peers that relay transactions hold at most half), per-session message/byte rate windows, misbehavior score disconnect. Peer AEAD is chacha20-poly1305 0.1, which crates.io bip324 0.11 links (Cargo.toml). noise_sv2 uses the renamed chacha20poly1305 crate. No version bump until upstream publishes one.
  • Electrum and Esplora: plain TCP/HTTP; TLS is an operator reverse-proxy concern. Wallet clients and electrs HTTP (except address-prefix) (COMPAT.md). Application DoS limits apply on every bind, including a public address. The caps are request size, idle timeout, Electrum scripthash subscriptions, and broadcast hex length (ServeLimits). Electrum rejects a connection past the cap at accept, and retries a transient accept error instead of dropping the listener. Esplora caps requests in flight (--esplora-max-inflight) and accepted TCP at 8× that cap. A further TCP connection is closed. A connection that never sends headers is closed at the idle timeout. A request that finds the in-flight cap full waits. That wait counts against the request timeout and the answer is then 408 (admit_connection, TimeoutLayer). Health, Esplora, Electrum, and inbound P2P leave a descriptor reserve so the store and RPC can still open files. That reserve is Unix; Windows does not count descriptors and does not apply it. The numbers are docs/operator/interfaces.md. Esplora is opt-in (--esplora-listen). Internal electrs HTTP (/internal/*) is unix listen only, not the public TCP bind. Its address and scripthash totals skip --max-sh-creates, so a process that can open the socket can start a large join (one at a time under --heavy-sh-creates). Edge TLS, multi-tenant metering, and API keys are still out of process (see docs/operator/interfaces.md).
  • Health listener: --health-listen is opt-in, read-only, and unauthenticated (/healthz, /readyz, /progress, and /metrics with --metrics). It binds before the store opens. At most 64 connections are accepted; a further one is closed, and one that sends no headers is closed at the 5s request timeout. Requests carry no body and time out; /readyz and /metrics run a capped number of blocking reads and answer 503 past the cap rather than queue. /readyz is 503 while the Electrum listener has stopped. /progress is uncapped: it reads in-memory counters under one short lock and reveals the bring-up phase (as /readyz does) and stage names, counts, and timings. /metrics reveals peer counts and mempool size; keep the port on loopback or a probe-only network.
  • Store / archive: corruption or incorrect spend/scripthash results that mislead a wallet backend are in scope. Truncating a sealed mmap after it is mapped is fatal external corruption (the next read can SIGBUS), not a handled retry.
  • No wallet keys in this repository: do not send seed phrases or private keys in reports.

Out of scope (for security@)

  • Feature requests, IBD performance, and non-sensitive crashes → ordinary issues / CONTRIBUTING.md
  • Compromised operator hosts, reverse-proxy misconfiguration, or third-party wallet software outside this tree

Authorship and review expectations

100% of the first-party code in this repository was written by AI (Grok, xAI), under the direction and prompting of Brandon Black (@reardencode).

That does not change how to report bugs or how seriously we take consensus/P2P integrity. It does mean:

  • Independent review and fuzzing continue. A consensus split on mainnet is vanishingly unlikely. Further hardening and signed release binaries are what 1.0 is for.
  • Security reports remain welcome and will be handled through security@reardencode.com.

Non-security bugs

Use ordinary issue trackers or contribution channels for non-sensitive crashes, IBD stalls, and documentation errors — see CONTRIBUTING.md.

Learn more about advisories related to rbitcoin-org/rbitcoin in the GitHub Advisory Database