rbitcoin is full-node software intended for production server-side use: IBD and tip follow, block/tx relay, and Electrum serving for wallet backends and similar infrastructure—not a desktop GUI or end-user wallet.
A consensus split on mainnet is vanishingly unlikely. The on-disk format
and APIs can still change before 1.0 (a named refuse or wipe, not a
silent wipe), and there is no long-term support window yet. 1.0 is
where that window, further hardening, and signed release binaries are
planned. In-tree is 0.9.99 (pre-0.10.0). 0.9.x (tag 0.9.0) is the
published line. v0.9.x is the patch line.
Occupied 0.6.x stores refuse
(wipe and sync again). Schema 24 and 25 open in place. A published 0.8
directory is schema 26. This binary rewrites that meta to 29, and a 0.9.0
binary then refuses the directory. The runbook is
docs/operator/mainnet.md. Day-to-day flags
are docs/operator/.
--trust-peer stores and serves a chain rbitcoin considers invalid. Do not
point a wallet at that node unless you accept that peer. The fault list is
COMPAT.md.
| Version | Support |
|---|---|
| 0.9.99 (in-tree) | Untagged master toward 0.10.0. Report against the git commit. |
| 0.9.x | Published line (0.9.0). No LTS. Report against the tag. |
| 0.8.x | Previous published line (0.8.0). Report against the tag. |
| 0.7.x | Previous published line (0.7.0). Report against the tag. |
| 0.6.x | Previous published line (0.6.0 / 0.6.1). Report against the tag. |
| 0.5.x | Previous published line (0.5.1 / 0.5.2). Report against the tag. |
| 1.0+ (future) | Will define a clearer support window once the on-disk schema and public surface stabilize. |
Untagged trees: report against a git commit (and binary digest if you built musl static).
Contact: security@reardencode.com
Report security issues privately — do not open a public GitHub issue for unfixed remote, consensus-critical, or data-integrity bugs.
Please include when possible:
- Affected commit (or release tag) and how the binary was built (e.g. musl
static via
nix build .#rbitcoin-musl) - Network: mainnet / signet / regtest
- Impact: consensus acceptance/rejection, P2P DoS, Electrum integrity, crash under adversarial input, etc.
- Minimal reproduction (peer behavior, RPC/Electrum request, store fixture)
We aim to acknowledge receipt promptly and to coordinate disclosure for issues that affect consensus, P2P attack surface, or Electrum/query integrity.
- Consensus and script: pure-Rust verification; bugs can mean accepting invalid chain data or rejecting valid data. Report both.
- P2P: BIP324 v2. A
--net-permission-bind v1@listener also takes plain v1 for a local wallet indexer the operator trusts; it needs its own port and a loopback or private address. DoS parity with Bitcoin Core is not claimed, but mitigations are intentional operator surface: max inbound sessions (--max-inbound, default 200; peers that relay transactions hold at most half), per-session message/byte rate windows, misbehavior score disconnect. Peer AEAD ischacha20-poly13050.1, which crates.iobip3240.11 links (Cargo.toml).noise_sv2uses the renamedchacha20poly1305crate. No version bump until upstream publishes one. - Electrum and Esplora: plain TCP/HTTP; TLS is an operator reverse-proxy
concern. Wallet clients and electrs HTTP (except address-prefix)
(
COMPAT.md). Application DoS limits apply on every bind, including a public address. The caps are request size, idle timeout, Electrum scripthash subscriptions, and broadcast hex length (ServeLimits). Electrum rejects a connection past the cap at accept, and retries a transient accept error instead of dropping the listener. Esplora caps requests in flight (--esplora-max-inflight) and accepted TCP at 8× that cap. A further TCP connection is closed. A connection that never sends headers is closed at the idle timeout. A request that finds the in-flight cap full waits. That wait counts against the request timeout and the answer is then 408 (admit_connection,TimeoutLayer). Health, Esplora, Electrum, and inbound P2P leave a descriptor reserve so the store and RPC can still open files. That reserve is Unix; Windows does not count descriptors and does not apply it. The numbers aredocs/operator/interfaces.md. Esplora is opt-in (--esplora-listen). Internal electrs HTTP (/internal/*) is unix listen only, not the public TCP bind. Its address and scripthash totals skip--max-sh-creates, so a process that can open the socket can start a large join (one at a time under--heavy-sh-creates). Edge TLS, multi-tenant metering, and API keys are still out of process (seedocs/operator/interfaces.md). - Health listener:
--health-listenis opt-in, read-only, and unauthenticated (/healthz,/readyz,/progress, and/metricswith--metrics). It binds before the store opens. At most 64 connections are accepted; a further one is closed, and one that sends no headers is closed at the 5s request timeout. Requests carry no body and time out;/readyzand/metricsrun a capped number of blocking reads and answer 503 past the cap rather than queue./readyzis 503 while the Electrum listener has stopped./progressis uncapped: it reads in-memory counters under one short lock and reveals the bring-up phase (as/readyzdoes) and stage names, counts, and timings./metricsreveals peer counts and mempool size; keep the port on loopback or a probe-only network. - Store / archive: corruption or incorrect spend/scripthash results that mislead a wallet backend are in scope. Truncating a sealed mmap after it is mapped is fatal external corruption (the next read can SIGBUS), not a handled retry.
- No wallet keys in this repository: do not send seed phrases or private keys in reports.
- Feature requests, IBD performance, and non-sensitive crashes → ordinary
issues /
CONTRIBUTING.md - Compromised operator hosts, reverse-proxy misconfiguration, or third-party wallet software outside this tree
100% of the first-party code in this repository was written by AI (Grok, xAI), under the direction and prompting of Brandon Black (@reardencode).
That does not change how to report bugs or how seriously we take consensus/P2P integrity. It does mean:
- Independent review and fuzzing continue. A consensus split on mainnet is vanishingly unlikely. Further hardening and signed release binaries are what 1.0 is for.
- Security reports remain welcome and will be handled through security@reardencode.com.
Use ordinary issue trackers or contribution channels for non-sensitive crashes,
IBD stalls, and documentation errors — see CONTRIBUTING.md.