Until the first release, fixes go to main and the edge image. After it, the latest release receives security fixes; older releases are fixed only when a fix applies without an upgrade path change.

Please do not open a public issue. Report it privately with GitHub's Report a vulnerability form on this repository (Security → Advisories). Helpful to include: the affected version or commit, the configuration involved, steps or packets to reproduce, and what an attacker gains.

• You get an answer within 7 days, and an assessment with a plan for a fix within 30 days.
• The fix is released before the advisory is published; we agree the disclosure date with you and credit you unless you prefer otherwise.

Anything that lets an attacker bypass authentication or authorization, forge or replay accepted packets, read or change accounting records or replicated state, lose acknowledged accounting records, crash or stall a gateway or a member with crafted input, reach the management API without its token, or recover secrets or passwords.

• Weaknesses of the RADIUS protocols themselves: MD5-based authenticators and attribute hiding (RFC 2865), DES in MS-CHAP (RFC 2433/2759), the MILENAGE functions of EAP-AKA. They are implemented as specified; the mitigations below apply.
• Findings that need a NAS shared secret, a management token or access to the hosts and their files.
• Denial of service by volume from an address the NAS registry accepts; gateways drop what they cannot handle rather than queue it.

• Message-Authenticator (Blast-RADIUS, CVE-2024-3596): required on Access-Requests by default (nas.<name>.access.message-authenticator=required, always with EAP), and answers of home servers without it are ignored (proxy.require.message-authenticator=true). Relax it only for a NAS that cannot send it.
• Transport: RADIUS over UDP relies on the shared secret; use long random secrets, one per NAS, and keep UDP RADIUS on trusted networks. Where devices support it, use RadSec (TLS) or DTLS, which protect the whole packet.
• Management port (/health, /ready, /state, /metrics, the CoA and reload APIs): bound to 127.0.0.1 by default; the CoA and reload APIs exist only with a token (coa.api.token, reload.api.token, at least 16 characters). Do not expose the port beyond the monitoring network.
• Secrets in properties files can come from the environment (${env:NAS_SECRET}), so they stay out of files and images; the Helm chart reads them from Kubernetes Secrets.
• Stored passwords: prefer bcrypt, SHA-crypt or yescrypt over cleartext; NT hashes and cleartext are needed only where the method requires them (MS-CHAP, CHAP).
• Input handling: malformed or unauthentic packets are silently discarded (RFC 2865 §3); the decoder is fuzz-tested, and container images are built with an SBOM and provenance.