Distributed FROST Silent Payments. BlackIce lets a hardware multisig pay a silent-payment address, with every step coordinated over an end-to-end encrypted Marmot group and no server in the middle.
Built at bitcoin++ Seoul 2026 for Best Use of the Marmot Protocol.
Multisig is the safest way to hold bitcoin, but it gives up privacy at every step:
- It can't pay silent payments. Sending to a silent-payment address (BIP 352) needs the combined private key of every input. A multisig split across devices never has that in one place, so until now only single-key wallets could pay one.
- Coordination leaks. Co-signers pass transactions over Signal, email or a coordinator server, which learn phone numbers, amounts, recipients and timing.
- The chain sees the multisig. Script multisig reveals its policy every time it spends.
| Layer | How | Result |
|---|---|---|
| Recipient | Silent payments, with each device contributing its own ECDH share and a BIP 374 DLEQ proof (Frostsnap PR #640) | A hardware multisig can pay a static sp1… address; each payment lands in a fresh output nobody can link to it |
| Signing | FROST threshold keys on Frostsnap devices | Any k-of-n devices produce one Schnorr signature: on-chain it's an ordinary single-key taproot spend |
| Coordination | Marmot: MLS group messaging over Nostr | Every ceremony message is end-to-end encrypted; relays only store ciphertext; no phone numbers, no server |
Frostsnap A ─USB─ bridge A ─ BlackIce A ─┐ ┌─ BlackIce B ─ bridge B ─USB─ Frostsnap B
└─ encrypted Marmot ──┘
group on public
Nostr relays
- Propose. The coordinator's bridge builds the transaction. The silent-payment output can't be computed yet.
- ECDH. Each device asks its owner ("Hold to Contribute") and returns its ECDH share with a DLEQ proof that it used its real key share.
- Derive. Each signer's bridge verifies every proof and derives the payment output. Each signer publishes a hash of the transaction it derived; nobody continues unless they all match.
- Sign. Each device shows the silent-payment address, amount and fee itself; its owner approves ("Hold to Sign") and it returns a FROST signature share.
- Combine. The shares become one Schnorr signature, ready to broadcast.
Private keys never leave the devices, wallet databases and bridge state never leave each laptop, and the laptop is never trusted with what is being paid: the device shows it.
Two Frostsnap devices (2-of-2) on two MacBooks, coordinated only through a Marmot
group on relay.damus.io, nos.lol and relay.primal.net:
- Paid 1,000 sat to a
tsp1…silent-payment address. Transactiondec10c6d…898dconfirmed in Signet block 329,605. - On-chain it's a plain taproot spend: one key-path input, two taproot outputs.
The payment landed at
tb1pvw3u…v3dsr, which nobody can link to thetsp1…address. - The relays learned nothing: 12 Nostr events and 19 KB seen by signer B, none containing the recipient address, the ceremony messages or the wallet IDs.
- Walkthrough: docs/ceremony.mp4 steps through the dashboard from proposal to confirmation.
| The device shows the silent-payment address before signing | Confirmed on Signet |
|---|---|
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- Signet only. Development firmware from Frostsnap PR #640, which is not yet
reviewed; the bridge is pinned to core revision
538b0ec. - An intermittent device serial-decoding crash was seen once during testing and is not yet fixed upstream.
- Not audited. Do not use with real funds.
- Silent-payment ECDH for FROST: Frostsnap PR #640
- Marmot protocol and marmot-ts; White Noise
- The local bridge and firmware tooling: frostsnap/README.md
Each Mac runs one blackice process (bun run vault). It launches that Mac's own
frostsnap_sp_bridge (own state dir, pinned SP firmware digest) and carries
the bridge's opaque payloads through the encrypted Marmot group. Wallet
databases and bridge state never leave the Mac. Protocol: frostsnap-sp-bridge/1.
A (coordinator + share 1) B (share 2)
prepare ──► fs.proposal ───────────► ecdh (device approval) ─► offer
ecdh ─► offer ─► fs.offer ◄───────── fs.offer
── 2/2 offers: MILESTONE-1 GATE (type `sign`) ──
fs.sign_request (same offers) ─────► sign (verify proofs, derive SP output, device approval)
sign ─► shares ─► fs.shares ◄─────── shares
combine ─► signed tx (not broadcast) ─► fs.complete
git clone git@github.com:rademenezbtc/blackice.git && cd blackice
bun install && bun test# Signer B
bun run vault init --name B --device <B_DEVICE_ID> \
--bridge ~/Downloads/Frostsnap-SP-Bridge-mac-arm64/frostsnap_sp_bridge \
--state ~/frostsnap-sp-bridge-state
# Signer A (coordinator)
bun run vault init --name A --role coordinator --device <A_DEVICE_ID> \
--bridge <path>/frostsnap_sp_bridge --state ~/frostsnap-sp-bridge-stateinit creates a Marmot identity in ~/.marmot-vault/<name>/, asks the bridge
(offline) for the Signet wallet, pins key id + access structure, finds this
Mac's share index from --device, and prints the npub to share.
# on A
bun run vault member --name A <B_NPUB> 2
# on B
bun run vault member --name B <A_NPUB> 1
bun run vault coordinator --name B <A_NPUB>bun run vault run --name B # waits for A's invite (accepts only A)
bun run vault run --name A # creates the group and invites Bvault run serves a dashboard at http://127.0.0.1:8787 (--port N to change,
--no-dashboard to disable; it listens on localhost only). It shows the payment,
the ceremony steps, both devices' progress, the "both devices derived the identical
transaction" check, the signed txid with Broadcast to Signet / mempool.space,
and a live "What the relays see" feed of every Nostr event this Mac sent or
received, with a counter that flags any plaintext (recipient address, ceremony JSON,
wallet ids) found in it. On the coordinator it also has Propose / Request signatures /
Cancel buttons. No external fonts or scripts, so it works on venue Wi-Fi.
Rehearse it without hardware (MOCK_APPROVE_MS simulates the time to press the device):
bun run relay 7777
MOCK_DEVICE=devB MOCK_SHARE=2 MOCK_APPROVE_MS=6000 bun run vault run --name B --port 8788
MOCK_DEVICE=devA MOCK_APPROVE_MS=2500 bun run vault run --name A(with mock-bridge configs from vault init --bridge scripts/mock-bridge.sh … --home /tmp/rehearsal).
propose proposal.json # proposal.json: see below
# both devices: approve ECDH → A prints "2 hardware-approved ECDH offers collected"
sign # only when ready to go further: devices verify + derive output, then approve{
"inputs": [{ "txid": "<funding txid>", "vout": 0, "internal": false, "index": 0 }],
"recipients": [{ "address": "tsp1…", "amount_sat": 1000 }],
"change": { "index": 0, "amount_sat": 8700 }
}The previous transaction is fetched from mempool.space/signet when only txid is
given. Inputs must be confirmed, default-account P2TR wallet UTXOs; index is the
address index. The signed transaction is printed, not broadcast.
REPL: status, invite [npub], propose <file>, sign, retry, cancel, quit.
Default: relay.damus.io, nos.lol, relay.primal.net (edit relays in
~/.marmot-vault/<name>/config.json). If public relays misbehave on venue Wi-Fi,
run one on A and point both configs at it (relay still sees only ciphertext):
bun run relay 7777 # on A → ws://<A's LAN IP>:7777 in both configsscripts/mock-bridge.sh mirrors the real bridge's wire shapes (events, statuses,
results from frostsnap/sp_bridge/src/{main,lib}.rs); set MOCK_DEVICE/MOCK_SHARE
and use it as --bridge with bun run relay to run A and B locally.
test/app.test.ts covers the flow, the milestone gate, sender binding, wallet
pinning, a swapped-offer attack, mismatched derivations and a device rejection.
test/node.test.ts guards against a marmot-ts 0.9 message-loss race (sends
overlapping ingests), which VaultNode avoids by queueing all MLS operations.
- Marmot sender (MLS-authenticated; marmot-ts rejects rumor/sender mismatch) is bound to a configured share index.
- Wallet key id, access structure and protocol are pinned; proposals for anything else are refused.
- Invites accepted only from the configured coordinator; joining grants no signing authority.
- Fresh 32-byte session id per attempt, never reused; one open session per bridge; messages de-duplicated.
- Subset frozen at the first sign request; each signer checks every offer in it equals the one that signer actually sent.
- After
sign, each signer publishes a hash of its bridge'scompleted_task; signature shares are released only when every signer derived the identical transaction. - Proposals are refused if the local bridge's core revision differs from the pinned one, or if the device isn't connected with the expected SP firmware.
- Cancellation (
cancel, device rejection, 20-min timeout) reaches every bridge.
bun install
bun test # BIP352 + BIP374 official vectors, 2-of-2 ceremony checks
bun run demo # coordinator + 2 devices over an in-memory relayThe demo uses software stand-ins for the devices. SP math is real; FROST
nonces and signature shares are opaque placeholders (frost fields), which
the Frostsnap bridge fills in.
| # | Message | From | Contents |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | sp.ecdh_request |
coordinator | Sparrow PSBT, inputs, recipients (list), inputHash, scanKeys (≈ RequestSpEcdh) |
| 2 | sp.offer |
device | per scan key: x_j·B_scan + full BIP374 DLEQ proof vs its share image, message = input_hash; opaque FROST offer (≈ SpOffer) |
| 3 | sp.sign_request |
coordinator | subset, proof bundle (account polynomial, input hash, subset's shares), completed task with SP scripts (≈ RoundConfirmed.sp + RequestSpSign) |
| 4 | sign.shares |
device | opaque FROST signature shares |
| 5 | session.complete / session.abort |
either | txid / reason + culprit |
Device checks (mirrors #640):
- before an ECDH share: input hash and scan keys match its own derivation; inputs are vault keys.
- before signing: polynomial is its access structure; every proof verifies against the rebuilt share image; ≥ threshold distinct share indices per scan key; re-derived SP scripts equal the task's, else refuse; refuse SP outputs without proofs, or proofs for a plain send.
Coordinator math (src/sp.ts, src/ceremony.ts):
x·B = Σ λ_j·share_j → C = (Σg_i)·x·B + (Σt_i)·B over input tweak contexts
a_i = g_i·x + t_i → S = input_hash·C → P_k = B_spend + hash(S‖k)·G.
k follows transaction output order (Sparrow's), recipients sharing a scan key
count up together.
| File | What |
|---|---|
src/cli.ts |
bun run vault — init / member / coordinator / run (one process per Mac) |
src/vault-app.ts |
Bridge-backed session logic: proposal → offers → gate → sign → shares → combine |
src/fs-schema.ts |
Marmot messages carrying opaque frostsnap-sp-bridge/1 payloads |
src/frostsnap-bridge.ts |
Re-export of frostsnap/sp_bridge/client.ts (local bridge process adapter) |
src/net-pool.ts |
marmot-ts network over real relays (applesauce-relay, NIP-42 auth) |
src/file-store.ts |
On-disk MLS group state so restarts resume the group |
src/dashboard/ |
Live ceremony dashboard (server.ts SSE + self-contained index.html) |
src/tap.ts |
Records every event crossing the wire, for the relay view |
scripts/ |
local-relay.ts (LAN relay), mock-bridge.ts/.sh (hardware stand-in) |
src/schema.ts |
Reference ceremony messages (TypeScript SP math path, not used with hardware) |
src/sp.ts |
BIP374 DLEQ, BIP352 input hash / outputs / addresses, share images, Lagrange |
src/ceremony.ts |
Coordinator (build requests, verify + combine) and device checks |
src/node.ts |
Marmot participant (marmot-ts): key packages, invite/join, send/receive |
src/mem-relay.ts |
In-memory relay implementing marmot-ts NostrNetworkInterface |
src/fixture.ts |
Trusted-dealer 2-of-2 + vault inputs (demo/test only) |
test/ |
Official BIP352/374 vectors + ceremony tests |
- Import transactions from Sparrow (PSBT) instead of a JSON proposal
- k-of-n vaults beyond 2-of-2, e.g. 2-of-3
- Receive to the vault's own silent-payment address
- Get the Frostsnap PR #640 firmware reviewed and the intermittent device crash fixed upstream


