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Summary: every obs-rust build with the browser plugin ships CEF 7871, which is Chromium 150.0.7871.252. obs-browser starts it with settings.no_sandbox = true on every platform. Chromium 150 gets no more security fixes: its last extended-stable update was 150.0.7871.250 on 2026-08-18. Since then Chrome has fixed two V8 bugs that were exploited in the wild, CVE-2026-85046 and CVE-2026-87491, and both are in CISA KEV. With the sandbox off, a renderer exploit in any page a Browser Source or dock loads runs as the OBS user, with no sandbox escape needed.
Affected versions: obs-rust/obs-studio <= 0.1.0-beta.20261014.
- Windows x64/arm64, macOS arm64/x86_64 and the Linux .deb.
CMakePresets.jsonpinscef7871 from the obs-rust/cef mirror, which holds byte-for-byte copies of the archives upstream OBS uses.cef_version.hin the Linux x86_64 archive reads150.0.19+gcf60f42+chromium-150.0.7871.252. The release .deb shipslibcef.so(Chrome/150.0.7871.252),obs-browser-pageandobs-browser.so, because the Ubuntu CI build sets-DENABLE_BROWSER=ON. - Linux AppImage: not affected. It builds with
-DENABLE_BROWSER=OFF, which is still true on master after appimage: Build on a glibc 2.28 base and stop bundling glibc #927. no_sandbox: set in obs-browser submodule 1e313ae,obs-browser-plugin.cpp:296, with no platform#if.
Verified advisories:
| ID | Component | Severity | Fixed in | Exploited | Affects 150.0.7871.252 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-85046 | V8 type confusion | High (Chromium), 8.8 (NVD) | 152.0.7977.82 (2026-09-03) | yes: Chrome Releases ("exploit ... exists in the wild"), CISA KEV 2026-09-04 | yes (the 150 branch had ended; extended stable moved to 152 on 2026-09-09) |
| CVE-2026-87491 | V8 out-of-bounds write | Medium (Chromium), 8.8 (NVD) | 153.0.8010.36 (2026-09-08) | yes: Chrome Releases, CISA KEV 2026-09-09 | yes |
NVD also lists about 1,250 more Chromium CVEs with a fix version above 150.0.7871.250, 41 of them Critical. Some may have been backported into the CEF 150 maintenance build, so treat that count as an upper bound. Chrome stable is now 155.0.8059.84; extended stable is 152.0.7977.169.
Impact on OBS: Browser Sources and browser docks run remote pages (alert overlays, chat widgets, third-party widget sites) for hours inside OBS. Any of these is enough to reach V8:
- a compromised widget provider;
- an injected ad;
- a malicious URL pasted in as a browser source.
With no_sandbox, code execution in the renderer is code execution as the user. That exposes files, stream keys and the OBS websocket password in the profile.
CVSS 3.1: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H = 8.8, for Windows, macOS and .deb users with any remote browser source or dock.
Suggested fix:
- Move to a supported CEF branch: 7977 (Chromium 152, current extended stable) or 8059 (Chromium 155). Build or mirror it into obs-rust/cef, update
CMakePresets.jsondependencies.cef(version and hashes), and fix any obs-browser API breakage. This needs a CEF build and mirror; nothing has been prepared yet. - The structural fix is to re-enable the CEF sandbox wherever the platform allows it:
- Windows: link
obs-browser-page.exewithcef_sandbox. - macOS: give the helper app the sandbox entitlement.
- Linux: set up the
chrome-sandboxhelper or a namespace sandbox.
This is a larger change and a behaviour change, so it needs a design decision.
- Windows: link
- Add a CI check that fails when the pinned CEF's Chromium major is older than the current extended-stable major.
What I tested: no exploit code and no crafted pages.
- Read
include/cef_version.hfrom the obs-rust/cef 7871 Linux archive. - Read the version string from
libcef.soin the release .deb. - Read
no_sandboxfrom the pinned obs-browser commit, and the build flags from obs-rust master (.github/scripts/.build.zsh,build-aux/appimage/build.py). - Checked the CVEs against NVD, including the CISA KEV fields.
- Checked the Chrome Releases blog feed (stable and extended-stable posts, June to October 2026) for the branch end date and the in-the-wild statements.
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vpacher commentedon Oct 17, 2026
Linux sandbox: measurements for the design decision
I measured what
settings.no_sandbox = falsedoes on Linux before proposing a design. I claim the Linux part of the sandbox work (one PR per platform; Linux first, then macOS, then Windows). The CEF upgrade itself (item 1) needs the obs-rust/cef mirror, so I leave it to you.Setup: obs-rust master
f8616875c,-DENABLE_BROWSER=ON, CEF 7871 from obs-rust/cef (cef_version.h:150.0.19+gcf60f42+chromium-150.0.7871.252, archive hash matchesCMakePresets.json). Debian 13 in an unprivileged Proxmox LXC container, kernel 7.0.14,kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone = 1,apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns = 0. A test OBS on Xvfb with its own HOME and websocket port; a Browser Source loads a page whose JavaScript sets a colour, read back throughGetSourceScreenshot. "Sandboxed" means the renderer has its own user and PID namespace and Chromium's seccomp-bpf filter (Seccomp_filters: 2: LXC's plus Chromium's).no_sandboxtrue(today)--no-sandboxfalsecontent::ZygoteHostImpl::Init(zygote_host_impl_linux.cc:104) callsexit()because Chromium does not run sandboxed as root. CEF runs in the OBS process, soexit()ends OBS, and a joinablestd::threadturns it intostd::terminate/abortfalsefalseRestrictNamespaces=~user, same effect as Ubuntu 24.04+'s AppArmor restriction)FATAL:setuid_sandbox_host.cc:166] The SUID sandbox helper binary was found, but is not configured correctly. Rather than run without sandboxing I'm aborting now.Findings:
no_sandbox = falsealone crashes OBS in two common setups (OBS as root; no unprivileged user namespaces). obs-browser must decide beforeCefInitializewhether a sandbox can work.chrome-sandboxnext tolibcef.so, but with normal permissions (install(FILES ...)), so it is never setuid. A non-setuid helper is worse than none: Chromium aborts when it finds one that is not configured, instead of falling back.settings.no_sandbox = true, and OBS 33.0.0-rc2 ships the same CEF 7871. Nothing to take over from upstream here.Proposal (decisions for you):
A. Pre-check before
CefInitialize(always): no sandbox when euid is 0; otherwise a sandbox when a child process can create a user + PID namespace (an actualclone/unshareprobe; sysctls alone miss AppArmor and seccomp restrictions), or whenchrome-sandboxnext tolibcef.sois root-owned with mode 4755. The decision logic is a pure function over the probe results, so it gets a Tier 1 RED → GREEN test; the probes live behind the platform boundary.B. When no sandbox is possible:
no_sandbox = true), with a log line that says why (root, no user namespaces) and a notice in the UI. My default proposal.I propose 1 as the default plus 3, so that nobody loses their overlays after an update, and people who want the guarantee can have it.
C. Packaging (.deb):
chrome-sandbox(finding 2), and ship an AppArmor profile forobs-browser-pagethat allows user namespaces (as Chrome's package does for Ubuntu 24.04+). My proposal.chrome-sandboxsetuid root from the package's postinst.Flatpak needs its own mechanism (
zypak/flatpak-spawn) and the AppImage builds without the browser, so both stay out of the Linux PR.D. OBS as root always gets the fallback from B, with the reason in the log.
If you agree with A + B1/B3 + C1 (or tell me otherwise), I'll start with the pre-check and the fallback in obs-browser, then the packaging change. I can test the sandboxed and the fallback paths here (Debian 13, LXC with and without user namespaces); Ubuntu 24.04's AppArmor path I can test in a separate container.
vpacher commentedon Oct 22, 2026
Claiming: #1092 (Linux sandbox part, as in my comment above)
@zackees, could you decide the design points from the measurement comment?
CefInitialize.chrome-sandboxand add an AppArmor profile forobs-browser-page.I am starting with A now, because every option needs it: the decision as a pure function, with a failing test first, in obs-rust/obs-browser. B and C wait for your answer.
vpacher commentedon Oct 22, 2026
Correction to C1 in my measurement comment, after a test on Ubuntu 24.04 (details in the draft PR obs-rust/obs-browser#3):
An AppArmor profile with
usernsforobs-browser-pageis not enough. Chromium still aborts ("No usable sandbox!"). The user namespaces are created by the process that hosts CEF, so the profile has to cover the OBS executable. With the profile on the main binary, the sandbox works.Test setup: Ubuntu 24.04.5, kernel 6.8,
kernel.apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns = 1. A minimal CEF 7871 host with a separate subprocess binary, as obs-browser uses. The probe from #3 agrees with Chromium in all five cases I ran: stock with achrome-sandboxthat is not setuid, stock withoutchrome-sandbox,no_sandbox, a profile on the subprocess only, and a profile on the main binary. Without such a profile, the probe gives "off", so the .deb keeps working as today on Ubuntu 24.04.So C1 becomes: in the .deb, drop the
chrome-sandboxthat is not setuid, and ship an AppArmor profile for the OBS executable that allowsuserns.zackees commentedon Oct 23, 2026
The CEF upgrade (item 1 here) is now tracked on its own in #1864. The browser source in the AppImage (#1865) waits on #1864 and on the Linux sandbox work here.
vpacher commentedon Oct 24, 2026
The CEF 8078 rerun from my comment in #1864 is done: obs-rust/obs-browser#3 gives the same results on 8078 as on 7871, in the container matrix and in all five Ubuntu 24.04 AppArmor cases (details in the PR description). No code change was necessary.
#1865 (the browser source in the AppImage) now waits only on the fallback policy here.
Decision needed: @zackees, could you decide B and D from my comment above?
#3 stays a draft until then. If you agree with these defaults, I will mark #3 ready and do B in a follow-up PR.
vpacher commentedon Oct 24, 2026
Decision needed: B and D of the Linux sandbox fallback, as in my comment above (#1092 (comment)). obs-rust/obs-browser#3 stays a draft until then, and #1865 waits on it.
I repeat the question here so that the new
decision-neededlabel (#2069) picks it up. The earlier comment was posted before #2069 merged.zackees commentedon Oct 24, 2026
Coordinator: I'm escalating this one to
human-review-neededinstead of deciding it. B and D set the default security posture of the browser sandbox, which is a security design choice, and the coordinator leaves those to the maintainer.For what it's worth, my recommendation is to accept both as proposed. Today the sandbox is off everywhere, so a fail-open fallback with a log line, a UI notice and an opt-in "Require the browser sandbox" setting is a strict improvement. It also keeps Browser Sources working on systems where no sandbox can start, and those users would otherwise lose them. D follows from the same logic, since Chromium can't sandbox as root anyway.
zackees commentedon Oct 24, 2026
Decision:
warn user with 3 second progress countdown to auto accept "Accept anyway"
log the error to stderr stream
make this a policy for similar issues in the future and warn the user this may be become a hard error in the future.
use terminology that is standard for this and don't fear rewriting the warning prompt for similar warnings/errors
zackees commentedon Oct 24, 2026
Decided: accepted as proposed, with a warning that auto-accepts after a countdown.
Verbatim from the maintainer's decision comment above (2026-10-24T20:11:13Z). This comment repeats it starting with
Decided:because the claim bot only recognises that spelling: the wording of the original ("Decision: …") matches neither itsDecision needed:nor itsDecided:pattern, so the decision was invisible to it.@vpacher — this lifts the block on the Linux fallback work: obs-rust/obs-browser#3 can come out of draft, and #1865 (browser source in the AppImage) can proceed once it lands.
claim-blockedclears on your next comment here.human-review-neededhas been removed by hand: the claim bot has no command that clears it, and none of its sweeps touch it, so the escalation would otherwise sit in the maintainer queue forever. Tracked in #2212.17 remaining items
frontend: RED obs_frontend_warn_fallback(), the fallback warning API (o…
frontend: Show fallback warnings on the main window, and document them (
frontend: Shared fallback warning with a countdown (obs_frontend_warn…
Warn when the CEF sandbox cannot work (#8)
obs-browser: Update to 4583599 (sandbox, fallback warning, audio fixe…
vpacher commentedon Oct 25, 2026
Claiming: #1092 (macOS sandbox part). The Linux part is done.
Linux, done: browser sources and panels use the CEF sandbox where it can work (user namespaces, or a setuid-root
chrome-sandbox), and where it can't, OBS logs the error and shows the shared fallback warning with the cause and what to change, as decided above.obs_frontend_warn_fallback(), frontend: Shared warning with an "Accept anyway" countdown for fallbacks that lower security #2218)macOS, next (this claim): measure first, as for Linux, then one PR in obs-browser.
cef_sandbox, the helper bootstrap) and what the four helper bundles (OBS Helper, GPU, Plugin, Renderer) need: the sandbox context in the helpermain()before the framework loads, and the entitlements incmake/macos/.no_sandbox = falseon macOS (Apple Silicon and Intel; signed and unsigned builds): which pages render, what the helpers' sandbox state is, and where it can't work.browser-sandbox(today macOS has no probe and stays off), and the same fallback warning where the sandbox can't work.Moved out of this issue: the CEF version (item 1) is #1864. The Windows sandbox (item 2) is #2379 and the CEF age check in CI (item 3) is #2380, so they can be claimed on their own. This issue then closes with the macOS PR.
Use the CEF sandbox on macOS (obs-rust/obs-studio#1092) (#12)
vpacher commentedon Oct 25, 2026
Done: the macOS part is in master with #2402 (
6a7ef1742), the bump to obs-rust/obs-browser63fd678.macOS: each helper sandboxes itself (Seatbelt) with
libcef_sandbox.dylibfrom the CEF framework in the app (obs-rust/obs-browser#12). Without the library, the helpers run without the sandbox, and OBS logs the error and shows the shared fallback warning, as on Linux.Measured on macOS 26.7.1, Apple Silicon, CEF 7871, ad-hoc signed local build, with a page that turns green only if HTTPS fetch, WebAudio, and WebM recording and playback all work:
The helpers needed no extra entitlements for this.
Not tested:
Linux: done earlier (obs-rust/obs-browser#3 and #8, #2238, #2378).
Elsewhere: the Windows sandbox is #2379 (maintainer decision on
bootstrap.exe), the CEF version is #1864, and the CEF age check in CI is #2380. With those tracked there, this issue can close.obs-browser: Update to 63fd678 (macOS sandbox, no hang on quit) (obs-…
zackees commentedon Oct 31, 2026
Closing: every part of this report has landed or been split into its own tracked issue, so this one no longer has work of its own.
obs_frontend_warn_fallback()) and obs-browser: Update to 4583599 (sandbox, fallback warning, audio fixes) #2378 (the obs-browser bump), all in master since 2026-10-25.63fd678); each helper sandboxes itself withlibcef_sandbox.dylib.cef_sandbox.libis not in the CEF archive; it would need OBS to be rebuilt as a DLL launched through CEF'sbootstrap.exe), and stays off asdocs/features.mdrecords.ready, P1). That is the remaining risk from this report — a supported Chromium — not a sandbox gap.docs/features.md:273already documents the sandbox state per platform. Reopen this issue only if the Windows decision is revisited.