docs(service-messaging): name the sys_webhook edit check behind the redeliver door

packages/services/service-messaging/src/http-outbox-parked-record.integration.test.ts

@@ -11,7 +11,9 @@
  * nothing. The obvious fix (write the discarded event as a `dead` row) is
  * *actively unsafe on its own*: `redeliver()` reset ANY terminal row to
  * `pending` with no signature check, behind `POST /api/v1/webhooks/redeliver`
- * which any authenticated user can reach. A parked row has no signature —
+ * (admitted to a caller with edit access to `sys_webhook`, as decided by
+ * `packages/plugins/plugin-webhooks/src/redeliver-entitlement.ts`). A parked
+ * row has no signature —
  * the signature is computed at enqueue from the very secret that could not be
  * resolved — so redelivering one would put the payload on the wire UNSIGNED,
  * reopening #7799 through a door nobody would think to audit.

packages/services/service-messaging/src/http-outbox.ts

@@ -487,8 +487,10 @@ export class HttpRedeliverError extends Error {
  * ## Why this is a security refusal and not a tidiness one
  * A parked row has no {@link HttpDelivery.signature}, because the signature is
  * computed at enqueue from the very secret that could not be resolved (#7722,
- * #7799). `POST /api/v1/webhooks/redeliver` is reachable by any authenticated
- * user. Without this refusal, making the drop durable would hand that user a
+ * #7799). `POST /api/v1/webhooks/redeliver` admits a caller with edit
+ * (`update`) access to `sys_webhook`, as decided by
+ * `packages/plugins/plugin-webhooks/src/redeliver-entitlement.ts`. Without this
+ * refusal, making the drop durable would hand any such webhook administrator a
  * button that delivers the webhook UNSIGNED — reopening #7799 through a door
  * nobody would think to audit. **An unsigned redelivery is strictly worse than
  * an unrecorded drop**, which is why this guard lands with — and logically

packages/services/service-messaging/src/messaging-service.ts

@@ -387,8 +387,10 @@ export class MessagingService {
      *
      * [#10740] `options.tenantId` is the REQUESTING caller's organization, and
      * it is the whole reason this method takes a second argument: the door in
-     * front of it (`POST /api/v1/webhooks/redeliver`) is open to any
-     * authenticated user, and `sys_http_delivery` is tenant-scoped. The
+     * front of it (`POST /api/v1/webhooks/redeliver`) admits any caller with
+     * edit (`update`) access to `sys_webhook`, as decided by
+     * `packages/plugins/plugin-webhooks/src/redeliver-entitlement.ts` — a caller
+     * in any organization — and `sys_http_delivery` is tenant-scoped. The
      * outbox applies it to the rows it reads and the row it writes, so a
      * caller can only replay deliveries in its own organization; a row
      * elsewhere is `RESOURCE_NOT_FOUND`. ⛔ There is no tenant-audit bypass