Update dependencies - #889
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No actionable comments were generated in the recent review. 🎉 ℹ️ Recent review info⚙️ Run configurationConfiguration used: Organization UI Review profile: CHILL Plan: Advanced Run ID: ⛔ Files ignored due to path filters (1)
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Included review availability: Your plan provides up to 1 included review per hour; 0 remain after this review. 📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe pull request updates direct and indirect Go dependencies. It also changes the fallback Analyzer Manager version from ChangesDependency and Analyzer Manager Updates
Priority: ⬇️ Low Estimated code review effort: 1 (Trivial) | ~5 minutes Change: Other Suggested reviewers: Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to The changes update dependency versions and the fallback Analyzer Manager release path without evidence of a current failure. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 5✅ Passed checks (5 passed)
✨ Finishing Touches🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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📗 Scan Summary
📦 Vulnerable Dependencies
🔖 Details[ CVE-2026-78662 ] golang.org/x/crypto 0.53.0Vulnerability Details
Previously, a channel registered in the mux's chanList is not usable until it is established. A malicious peer was able flood the channel's incomingRequests, deadlocking the entire connection. Now, we add an atomic established state, set when a channel becomes usable. Until such a time, handlePacket drops every packet other than the open confirmation/failure, without blocking and without tearing down the connection. [ CVE-2026-56855 ] golang.org/x/crypto 0.53.0Vulnerability Details
Previously, after a channel has been established, a malicious peer could send crafted messages that would deadlock the entire connection. Now, we handle all RFC 4254 channel messages; global requests are handled explicitly. Then, treat all other messages as a protocol error and tear the connection down instead of buffering and blocking. [ CVE-2026-56854 ] golang.org/x/crypto 0.53.0Vulnerability Details
The source-address critical option in the Permissions returned by an authentication callback was only enforced for the PublicKeyCallback and VerifiedPublicKeyCallback paths, extending the fix for CVE-2026-46595. Permissions returned by the PasswordCallback, KeyboardInteractiveCallback, NoClientAuthCallback, and GSSAPIWithMICConfig.AllowLogin callbacks were not validated against the client's remote address, so a source-address restriction set by those callbacks was silently ignored. The check is now applied to the Permissions returned by any authentication callback. |


devbranch.go vet ./....go fmt ./....Summary by CodeRabbit