bitcoin-tui is a read-mostly terminal client for Bitcoin Core. It holds no
private keys and has no wallet of its own, but it does handle RPC credentials
and can perform node-affecting actions (broadcast transactions, ban peers, stop
the node). Security reports are welcome and taken seriously.
Only the latest release line receives security fixes. Older tags are not patched — upgrade instead.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 0.9.x | yes |
| 0.8.x | yes |
| < 0.8 | no |
Please do not open a public issue for security problems.
Report privately through one of these channels:
- GitHub private vulnerability reporting (preferred) - open a draft advisory on the repository's Security tab.
- Email - bitcoin-tui.vista651@passmail.com. This is a forwarding alias meant for first contact; it reaches the maintainer, who will move the conversation to a more direct or encrypted channel if the report warrants one. Please keep sensitive detail out of the subject line.
Please include:
- affected version (
bitcoin-tui --version) and platform/compiler, - Bitcoin Core version and network (mainnet/testnet/signet/regtest),
- a description of the issue and its impact,
- reproduction steps, a minimal proof of concept, or a crashing input if you have one,
- whether you would like to be credited, and under what name.
| Stage | Target |
|---|---|
| Acknowledgement | within 5 business days |
| Initial assessment | within 10 business days |
| Fix or mitigation | depends on severity; coordinated with you |
| Public disclosure | after a fix ships, or 90 days by default |
This is a volunteer-maintained project — timelines are goals, not guarantees.
We will keep you updated if something takes longer. Reporters are credited in
the advisory and CHANGELOG.md unless they ask otherwise.
Issues in this repository's code, including:
- Credential handling — leaking RPC cookies,
rpcuser/rpcpassword, orbitcoin.confcontents into logs, debug files (--debug-file), the terminal, crash output, or files with unsafe permissions. - Vendored JSON parser (
src/json.hpp) — memory-safety bugs (buffer overreads, unbounded recursion, allocation blowups) triggerable by an RPC response. - RPC transport (
src/rpc_client.*) — HTTP response parsing bugs, request smuggling, or handling of hostile/oversized node replies. - Lua host (
src/tabs/luatab.*,lua/) — escapes from the RPC allowlist (--allow-rpc/ per-taballow_rpc), a Lua tab reaching credentials or RPC methods it was not granted, or path traversal in tab loading. - Config and path resolution (
src/paths.hpp,config.tomlparsing) — unsafe file handling, privilege issues when run undersudo. - Memory safety anywhere — use-after-free, data races, or overflows, particularly across the polling/UI/Lua threads.
- Vulnerabilities in Bitcoin Core itself — report those to the Bitcoin Core security process.
- Vulnerabilities in third-party dependencies (FTXUI, Lua, LuaBridge3, Abseil,
RE2, CLI11, Catch2) — report upstream; we will pick up the fix. Do tell us if
bitcoin-tuiis exploitable through one of them. - Attacks requiring an already-compromised local machine or an attacker who can already read the Bitcoin data directory (they have the cookie file anyway).
- Running
bitcoin-tuiagainst an RPC endpoint you do not trust. The client assumes the node is trusted; a malicious node can feed you bogus chain data by design. Memory-safety bugs reachable from such data are in scope. - Exposing the RPC port to the internet, or a
bitcoin.confwith weak credentials — that is node configuration, not a client bug. - Custom third-party Lua tabs the user chose to install. A Lua tab runs with the privileges the user grants it; escaping the granted allowlist is in scope, abusing a granted permission is not.
- Missing hardening flags, or automated-scanner output with no demonstrated impact.
Users should know what this tool does and does not protect:
- No wallet, no keys.
bitcoin-tuinever handles private keys or seeds. The Tools tab broadcasts already-signed raw transactions supplied by the user. - Credentials. Cookie auth is the default and preferred path; the cookie is
read from the node's data directory. Passing
-u/-Pputs credentials in your shell history and process list (ps), visible to other local users — prefer cookie auth orconfig.tomlwith restrictive permissions. - Plaintext RPC. JSON-RPC is sent over unencrypted HTTP. Use it over loopback, or tunnel remote connections through SSH or a VPN — never across the open internet.
- Destructive actions. Peer ban/disconnect and node shutdown are reachable from the UI. Anyone with access to your terminal has that reach.
- Lua tabs execute code. A Lua tab is arbitrary code running as your user.
Only install tabs you trust, and grant the narrowest
allow_rpcset that works.
Sanitizer builds are used during development and are welcome in reports:
cmake -B build-asan -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Debug \
-DCMAKE_CXX_FLAGS="-fsanitize=address,undefined -fno-omit-frame-pointer"
cmake --build build-asan -j$(nproc)Reproducible builds are available under contrib/guix/ — see that directory
for verifying that a released binary matches this source.