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feat(pmpl-verify): report a warrant level per claim; never a bare OK - #167
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CI note for this stacked PR. Its own check is
None of these has an existing fix PR to port. Because the base isn't Generated by Claude Code |
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- 🪄 Fix CodeRabbit comments on this PR
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Inline comments:
Review comments at @tools/pmpl-verify/src/main.rs:
- Line 88: Escape `self.kind`, `self.subject`, and `self.path.display()` in the
rendered `head` line so control characters cannot alter terminal output or forge
log entries. Keep the original field values unchanged for signature and warrant
checks.
- Around line 198-203: Update the `Level::Epi` existence-only branch before
`report` to require a readable, non-empty signature token and an existing
artefact before issuing the signed-by claim. Keep content-hash verification
optional in this mode.
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.github/workflows/warrant.ymlPROOF-NEEDS.adoctools/README.adoctools/pmpl-verify/src/main.rs
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Source excerpt: Must compile and pass tests Source excerpt: Include SPDX headers
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Files:
tools/README.adoctools/pmpl-verify/src/main.rs
Source excerpt: Rust CLI tools for compliance
📄 CodeRabbit inference engine (CLAUDE.md)
Files:
tools/pmpl-verify/src/main.rs
pmpl-verify recomputed the SHA3-256 content hash and then printed "OK: <path>", and its directory summary counted these as "Verified", although the cryptographic signature is never checked (a TODO since the tool was written). Under spec/PROVENANCE-SPEC.adoc §7 that output is a bare pass for a claim that is at most epi. Each signed file now yields one signed-by claim at its level: - hash matches: epi, "evidence present (signature ..., content hash matches; pmpl-verify does not check <alg> signatures yet), not verified"; - hash differs: FAILED, held at warrant (rule 7: a signature over other content is not a token for this file); - --existence-only: epi, content hash not checked. The summary counts claims by level (sound / epi / warrant), plus failed, unsigned and errored files. Exit codes are unchanged: non-zero when a claim fails, so the CI integration templates behave as before. Level::Sound exists for the day signatures are verified (rule signature-verify, §7.5) and is not produced today. tools/README.adoc no longer says the tool verifies signatures. Tests: a matching hash is epi and renders "not verified"; a mismatch fails at warrant; existence-only is epi; an unsigned file has no claim. Control: making the hash-match path return Sound fails the epi test. Refs #162 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LET2eHeDbN3b4WuxYjMUX9
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…arsed signature Two findings from review on #167: - CWE-117: Signer, Algorithm, Content-Hash and the path come from files an attacker can write, and render() printed them raw. A carriage return or terminal escape in Signer could rewrite the "epi" shown on the line or forge a "sound ... verified" entry in a CI log. render() now escapes every control character (\r, \u{1b}, ...); the values used for checks are unchanged. - CWE-20: with --existence-only, an empty or malformed .sig file produced an epi claim, and so did a .sig beside a missing artefact. §7.3 rule 2 requires a token for epi. The signature block is now read and parsed, and the artefact must exist, before any claim, in both modes. The content hash stays unchecked under --existence-only. Tests: an empty sidecar gives no claim; a signature without its artefact gives no claim; control characters in Signer are escaped and the line still starts with "epi". Controls: dropping the escaping fails the escape test; restoring the old early return fails three tests. Doc comments on the functions this PR touches, for CodeRabbit's docstring-coverage check. cargo test: 13 passed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LET2eHeDbN3b4WuxYjMUX9
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## Summary PR E of the PMP-01 stack, **stacked on #167**. It meets the acceptance criterion "No README or press text describes a consent claim as verified". I searched `README.adoc`, `README.nl.adoc`, `press-lobby-kit/`, `campaigns/press/`, `OUTREACH/`, `PRESENTATION/` and `docs/` for consent described as verified, validated, proven or guaranteed. The only README or press text that did so is `press-lobby-kit/video-scripts/technical-deep-dive-30min.adoc`. Three passages change: - The learning objective "*Deploy* Haskell validators for consent verification" now reads "*Deploy* Haskell validators that report each consent claim at its warrant level (a declared consent is evidence, never verified consent)". - In the code walkthrough, the `Granted` reason "Creator has granted consent for AI training" (read straight from a metadata field) becomes "Metadata declares consent for AI training (evidence, not verified)". - The voiceover "The creator allows AI training" becomes "The metadata declares that the creator allows AI training. That declaration is evidence, not verification: the validator reports it as 'evidence present, not verified', never as verified consent." The rest of the script is unchanged: `Denied` and `Pending`, the registry stub, and the timing. ## Type of Change - [x] Documentation update ## Related Issues #162 ## Files Updated `press-lobby-kit/video-scripts/technical-deep-dive-30min.adoc` ## Provenance Notes - Basis: `spec/PROVENANCE-SPEC.adoc` §7.3 rule 4 (no rule entails `consented-for-training`) and rule 5 (no bare pass below `sound`). ## Checklist - [x] AsciiDoc validated (`asciidoctor --failure-level=WARN`) - [x] Commit message follows schema ## Additional Context **Left for the owner to decide:** `campaigns/consent-layer/*` uses "verify consent" for a proposed registry lookup. Examples are `GET /consent/verify` and "Block API access if consent not verified". These are design documents for a system that isn't built yet, not README or press text, so I haven't changed them. Under §7, a registry receipt is `epi` for consent; only its signature can make `signed-by` sound. Whether to reword them is the owner's call. **Stack:** #163 (merged) → #164 (merged) → #165 (merged) → #166 B2 → #167 D → E (this). 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) https://claude.ai/code/session_01LET2eHeDbN3b4WuxYjMUX9 --- _Generated by [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/code/session_01LET2eHeDbN3b4WuxYjMUX9)_ Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>



Summary
PR D of the PMP-01 stack. #166 has merged, so this PR's base is now
main. It meets the acceptance criterion "pmpl-verifyemitslevelfor every claim" and the new §5 MUST.Before this PR:
pmpl-verifyrecomputed the SHA3-256 content hash, then printedOK: <path>, and its directory summary counted these as "Verified". It never checks the cryptographic signature. ATODO: Verify cryptographic signature when PQC libs are integratedhas been there since the tool was written. Under §7, that output is a bare pass for a claim that is at mostepi.Now each signed file yields one
signed-byclaim at its level:epi, printed asevidence present (signature …, content hash matches; pmpl-verify does not check ML-DSA-65 signatures yet), not verified.warrant. A signature over other content is not a token for this file.--existence-only:epi, with the content hash not checked. This needs a parseable signature block and an existing artefact. An empty or malformed.siggives no claim.Level::Soundexists for when signatures are verified (rulesignature-verify). Nothing produces it today.\ror terminal escape can't rewrite the level shown on the line.tools/README.adocno longer says the tool verifies signatures. A CI job,warrant.yml / pmpl-verify reports a level per claim, runscargo test. It was added becauseci.ymlruns only for PRs intomain, which this PR wasn't until now.Type of Change
Related Issues
#162
Files Updated
tools/pmpl-verify/src/main.rs,tools/README.adoc,.github/workflows/warrant.yml,PROOF-NEEDS.adoc.Provenance Notes
PROOF-NEEDS.adocforpmpl-verify("Signature verification is correct") describes a check the tool doesn't perform yet. This PR makes the output say so; it doesn't add PQC verification.Checklist
Additional Context
Local gate
What the tests cover:
epiand renders "not verified".warrant.--existence-onlygivesepifor a parsed block.Signerare escaped.Negative controls, each reverted after the run:
Soundfor a matching hash fails theepitest.Review (CodeRabbit): both Major findings are fixed in
8122605and their threads resolved. The replies in those threads nameed843f7; that was the same commit before I rebased it onto the branch after it was rebased on GitHub.epiwithout a parsed signature.The docstring-coverage pre-merge warning is addressed by doc comments on the functions this PR touches.
cargo clippyreports one warning,&PathBufinstead of&Path, in a function signature that predates this PR. The original file wasn't rustfmt-clean either, so I didn't reformat lines I hadn't touched.Status row: WL-9 → TESTED.
Stack: #163, #164, #165 and #166 are merged → D (this) → #168 E press text.
🤖 Generated with Claude Code
https://claude.ai/code/session_01LET2eHeDbN3b4WuxYjMUX9