RE010 treats a run-id or attestations permission as artifact provenance #978

The pinned RE010 implementation in lib/rules/research_extensions.ex treats run-id: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.id }} or an attestations: read declaration anywhere in a workflow as sufficient to suppress its finding. A run-id binds a download to a run, but a fork PR can control that run and its artifacts; a permission declaration does not verify an attestation. Neither proves the producer, contents, or trusted use. Conversely, an indirect verified run ID such as steps.source.outputs.run is flagged even when it was checked against GitHub run metadata.

Please model untrusted workflow_run artifacts as a trust crossing independently of run-id, distinguish attribution from provenance/content verification, and avoid treating a permission declaration as verification. Add adversarial tests for a malicious PR producer with direct run-id, mere attestations permission, and an indirectly constrained run ID. Consumer context: hyperpolymath/trope-checker#107.