An OHTTP relay and
gateway/target-resource service that facilitates the fungi multiparty
Bitcoin privacy protocol for constrained clients — web wallets (limited to
HTTP / WebSockets / WebRTC, none of which provide transport-layer metadata
privacy; OHTTP is usable from bare fetch) and mobile wallets (for which Tor
is impractical in the background: circuit bootstrap is ~23–27 RTTs, OHTTP
needs ~3–5 per request).
- Relay — forwards encapsulated OHTTP requests to peer gateways (sees ciphertext + client metadata, never plaintext).
- Gateway / target resources — terminates OHTTP and serves:
- broadcast channels — per-topic grow-only replayable message sets.
- key-consistency service — multi-path (and optionally attested) verification that a gateway is not equivocating on its keys.
Clients route through at least one other operator's relay to reach a gateway, so no single operator sees both who is asking and what is asked. When a TEE is available, all key material (HPKE and TLS) is generated inside the enclave and never leaves it — reducing how much a client must trust the operator; attestation is optional hardening, not a protocol requirement.
fungi does not depend on hartig. Full peers use peer-to-peer gossip; hartig is a facultative fast path and bridge for clients that would otherwise struggle to participate, and resilience comes from a mesh of independently operated instances, never any single one. (Hence the name: the Hartig net is the hyphal interface of ectomycorrhizal symbiosis — likewise facultative and external.)
Design and planning are recorded in the commit graph, not in prose files:
tickets are empty WIP: commits whose parent edges are dependencies and
whose messages are the design record. AGENTS.md explains how
to read and work on the graph.