[martin-mat]

Closes #665.

The chart ran the container as privileged: true by default and documented the capability set NET_ADMIN, SYS_ADMIN, SYS_RESOURCE, BPF, PERFMON as an alternative. This makes the capability set the default and privileged: true the documented fallback.

Why: the capability set is what the data plane uses (BPF and PERFMON to load and attach programs, NET_ADMIN for XDP and routes, SYS_RESOURCE for RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, SYS_ADMIN for the bpffs and debugfs mounts in the entrypoint). A privileged container is every capability, no device cgroup, unmasked /proc and /sys, and no seccomp or AppArmor profile. The reasoning in full is in #665.

Where the fallback is needed: environments that deny the entrypoint's mounts even with SYS_ADMIN, listed in the README with the remedy: an AppArmor profile that forbids mount (the runtime's default profile on Ubuntu and Debian; securityContext.appArmorProfile: {type: Unconfined} lifts it on Kubernetes 1.30+), a custom seccomp profile that blocks mount or bpf, or a runtime that rejects BPF and PERFMON on a kernel before 5.8.

Verified on a three-node kind cluster with net.ipv4.ip_forward allowed on the kubelets: the pod starts, the mounts succeed, the UPF serves on :8080 and :9090, and it comes back after scaling and after a node drain.

Trivy: the config scan flags SYS_ADMIN (AVD-KSV-0005, HIGH); the rule joins .trivyignore with its reason next to KSV-0118, whose comment no longer says "privileged". trivy config --config trivy.yaml --ignorefile .trivyignore --severity HIGH,CRITICAL . reports 0 findings; helm lint passes.

Changes: values.yaml (the default and its comment), the chart README.md, NOTES.txt, .trivyignore.

[martin-mat]

The red scan-fs, scan-image and scan-result checks here come from CVE-2026-78669 in golang.org/x/net, which fails the same scans on main; this PR changes no Go code. #667 fixes it and is green, so once it's merged I'll update this branch and the scans should pass.