[dmoliveira]

Summary

• anchor state lock operations to validated private directory descriptors
• reject symlink, hardlink, special-file, ownership, permission, and identity-race hazards before using locks
• revalidate successful and busy locks before status/PID effects and make PID writes complete/fail closed
• preserve TUI fail-closed behavior through an OSError integrity subtype

Threat model

Protects against unsafe preexisting lock entries and namespace manipulation by other users/groups. The configured state-root ancestry, malicious processes sharing the effective UID, and non-local filesystem locking semantics remain trusted/out of scope.

Validation

• full suite: 453 passed, 85% coverage
• Python 3.11 focused state/lifecycle/service/TUI suite: 148 passed
• state security suite: 49 passed
• repeated concurrent creation: 20/20 plus independent 10/10
• touched Ruff, format, compile, and diff checks passed
• final security review: GO; no critical/high/medium findings

Runtime-Session: ses_057afdc3effemiOJ2zfmjJiDqe