docs: document how to pin this action, and what pinning doesn't cover - #5
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This action receives production deploy credentials, so the ref a consumer pins decides who can run code with them. The README had no guidance on that and used the floating @v2 tag in every example, including a Quick start that targets `server: production`. Adds a Pinning section covering: - SHA / @v2.0.0 / @v2 trade-offs, described by actual mutability rather than by a promise about maintainer behaviour. Git tags can always be moved; saying otherwise is an unverifiable claim in a doc whose whole job is to help readers calibrate trust. - The limit of SHA pinning here. install-cli.sh downloads the dhq binary at run time and verifies it against a checksums.txt fetched from the same release, so pinning fixes the installer, not the CLI bytes. Documenting a control while omitting the hole it leaves converts an unknown risk into false confidence. - Secret scoping and job permissions, which bound the blast radius regardless of ref and are a stronger control than pinning alone. - A Dependabot config to keep SHA pins current, flagged to merge into an existing dependabot.yml rather than replace it, and to stay out of any auto-merge rule (auto-merged bumps reintroduce implicit upgrades). Also cross-references Pinning from the Quick start, so readers who copy the first snippet see the production caveat without scrolling. Reviewed by Review Council (Claude, Google Antigravity; Codex skipped on quota). The runtime-CLI gap and the Quick start contradiction came from that review. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012LYiKY8Hp3aUVRG2mzNGPd
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Included review availability: 3 reviews are currently available. Your included PR review attempts over the past 7 days set your current allowance at 5 reviews per hour. WalkthroughREADME.md adds production workflow security guidance for GitHub Action SHA pinning, runtime CLI limitations, credential protection, job permissions, and Dependabot maintenance. ChangesWorkflow security documentation
Estimated code review effort: 1 (Trivial) | ~2 minutes Merge Risk: 🔵 Low · up to This documentation-only change improves pinning guidance, but the production example still omits the environment and contents:read permission controls described elsewhere, which could lead consumers to copy an incomplete security configuration. It is mergeable with explicit owner follow-up. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
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Inline comments:
In `@README.md`:
- Line 152: Update the README guidance to remove the claim that running on a
runner with a preinstalled dhq CLI provides an immutable end-to-end chain. State
only the separately vendored CLI option, unless the action gains a documented
skip-install mode; do not imply that the preinstalled binary is used while
install-cli.sh runs.
- Line 158: Update the README guidance for DEPLOYHQ_* secrets to state that
access is limited to jobs referencing the protected production environment and
passing its required reviewers or other protection rules, rather than claiming
other workflows cannot read them.
- Around line 131-135: Update the production deployment example around the
DeployHQ action so it is clearly labeled as a step fragment unless the
surrounding job is made self-contained. For a complete workflow, add
environment: production and permissions with contents: read at the workflow or
job level, keeping both settings outside the uses step.
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README.md
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CodeRabbit flagged both on #5; verified against the scripts before acting. The preinstalled-CLI advice was wrong. action.yml runs install-cli.sh unconditionally and the script never consults PATH — it downloads its own copy and appends the install dir to $GITHUB_PATH, which the runner prepends, shadowing any dhq already on the runner. Say that, and point at the real escape hatch (vendor the CLI and call dhq outside this action). Keep the one genuine exception the review missed: install-cli.sh:32 skips the download when a binary already sits at the exact cache path, so a self-hosted runner can pre-seed it. Note the version format, since VERSION has its leading `v` stripped at line 11 and the check is an exact match. Environment secrets don't stop other workflows reading them. Any job declaring `environment: production` can request them; release is gated on the environment's protection rules passing. Required reviewers and deployment branch policies are the actual control, so say to set them — an environment without rules buys the scoping and none of the protection. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YZFLxNBpAH1FDzXgUPPXKZ
Why
This action receives production deploy credentials, so the ref a consumer pins decides who can run code with them. The README had no guidance on that, and used the floating
@v2tag in every example — including a Quick start that passessecrets.DEPLOYHQ_API_KEYand targetsserver: production.Our own consumer (
deployhq/website) already SHA-pins with a comment explaining why. This writes that reasoning down for everyone else.What's in it
A
## Pinningsection covering four things:1. The ref trade-off, described by actual mutability. The first draft said
@v2.0.0was "movable in principle, never moved in practice" — an unverifiable promise about future maintainer behaviour, in a document whose entire job is helping readers calibrate trust. Now it just says git tags can always be moved.2. What SHA pinning does not cover.
scripts/install-cli.shdownloads thedhqbinary at run time and verifies it against achecksums.txtfetched from the same release:That catches a corrupted download, not anyone able to replace the release assets. So pinning fixes the installer and the default
cli-version, not the CLI bytes. Documenting a security control while omitting the hole it leaves is worse than not documenting it — it turns an unknown risk into false confidence.3. Bounding the blast radius — environment-scoped secrets and
permissions: contents: read. These are arguably a stronger control than pinning for "who can deploy to production", and they compose with it.4. Keeping pins current with Dependabot, with two caveats that make the difference between the advice working and backfiring: merge it into an existing
dependabot.ymlrather than replacing the file, and keep this action out of any auto-merge rule (an auto-merged bump is@v2's implicit upgrade wearing a SHA pin's clothes).Plus a cross-reference under Quick start, so readers who copy the first snippet see the production caveat without scrolling to it.
Review
Ran through Review Council — Claude and Google (Antigravity); Codex skipped (workspace out of credits). Both independently flagged the Quick start contradiction and the weak
@v2.0.0wording. The runtime-CLI gap came from Claude's review and I verified it againstinstall-cli.shbefore acting on it.One bug caught during verification rather than review: the draft's SHA-lookup command used
git/ref/tags, which returns the tag object (d78edc1e…) for an annotated tag, not the commit (ffe9caa1…). A reader following it would have pinned a ref that doesn't resolve. Now uses thecommitsendpoint, tested:Notes
action.ymlorscripts/.v2.0.0's commit. It becomes stale once v2.0.1 ships, which is why the resolve-it-yourself command sits directly beneath it.🤖 Generated with Claude Code
https://claude.ai/code/session_012LYiKY8Hp3aUVRG2mzNGPd
Summary by CodeRabbit
PATHinstallations are ignored, while specifically pre-seeded self-hosted runner caches may be reused.