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feat(swift-sdk): durable wallet presence marker readable while the device is locked - #4992

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@romchornyi romchornyi commented Sep 24, 2026 •

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Issue being fixed or feature implemented

WalletStorage stores mnemonics and metadata as kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly. A process launched while the device is locked (a BGAppRefresh launch) cannot enumerate them: listWalletIdsWithMnemonic() throws, and an app that folds that error into false concludes "no wallet" and shows its Create/Recover screen — the defect behind dashpay/dashwallet-ios#1147. The review of dashpay/dashwallet-ios#1088 promised a "non-secret wallet marker" follow-up in the SDK; this is that follow-up.

App-side adoption (calling the new API, SDK pin bump) is a separate dashwallet-ios PR.

What was done?

All in packages/swift-sdk/Sources/SwiftDashSDK/Core/Wallet/WalletStorage.swift:

  • Presence marker item per wallet: kSecClassGenericPassword, account wallet.present.<64-hex-walletId>, service WalletStorage.presenceKeychainService (= <keychainService>.presence, so the DASH_KEYCHAIN_SERVICE override still applies), kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly, payload = the wallet id. No secret. Survives reinstall like the mnemonic (hence keychain, not UserDefaults); never syncs.
  • Coupled to the mnemonic. The marker goes on last and comes off first.
    • storeMnemonic runs in this order: remove the marker, remove the old mnemonic, add the new mnemonic, add the marker.
    • deleteMnemonic removes the marker first, then the mnemonic.
    • An interruption or a throw between any two steps therefore leaves at most a mnemonic without a marker, which the next readable presence read repairs, and never a marker without a mnemonic. A failed final marker write does not fail the store.
    • storeMnemonic, deleteMnemonic and walletPresence() share one static lock, so they are serialised across every WalletStorage instance in the process (including PlatformWalletManager.deleteWallet's own instance). A presence read cannot backfill a marker in the middle of a deletion.
    • Every existing write/delete path goes through these two functions. cleanupLegacyItems is unaffected: it only wipes legacy services and legacy single-item accounts.
  • Presence API: WalletStorage.WalletPresence { present, absent, unknown(OSStatus) }, walletPresence() and the read-only markedWalletIds(). The marker mutators storePresenceMarker(for:) / deletePresenceMarker(for:) are internal lifecycle steps, not SDK operations.
    • If the mnemonic inventory is readable, it is the source of truth: non-empty means .present, empty means .absent. The marker set is reconciled to the inventory in both directions: missing markers are written (the lazy backfill for wallets stored before this change) and markers without a mnemonic are removed. Nothing is written when the two already match.
    • If the inventory is unreadable, the marker stands in: a non-empty marker set means .present, an empty one means .unknown.
    • If the marker set itself is unreadable (before the first unlock since boot, errSecInteractionNotAllowed, …), the result is .unknown(status) and the inventory is not consulted.
    • Invariant: a marker means a mnemonic was stored. Drift only ever goes in the direction mnemonic-without-marker, and every presence read made while the inventory is readable repairs it. A missing marker on its own never means "no wallet"; only a readable, empty inventory does.
  • Why a sibling service and not keychainService itself: a service-wide SecItemCopyMatching over a mix of AfterFirstUnlock and WhenUnlocked items on a locked device either fails as a whole (marker unreadable exactly when needed) or drops the locked rows (the existing listWalletIdsWithMnemonic() would then return [] instead of throwing — a regression for today's callers). Keeping each service homogeneous keeps both answers honest. Documented on presenceKeychainService.
  • listWalletIdsWithMnemonic() now delegates to a private listWalletIds(service:accountPrefix:) shared with markedWalletIds(); behaviour unchanged.
  • Doc comments spell out the security trade-off: someone with access to this app's keychain after the first unlock since boot learns that a wallet exists and its 32-byte wallet id (a hash, not key material).

Not covered on purpose: the legacy DashSync wallet, and the window before the first unlock since boot (the marker itself is unreadable then → .unknown).

How Has This Been Tested?

  • New packages/swift-sdk/SwiftTests/SwiftDashSDKTests/WalletPresenceTests.swift (17 tests). They run the real storeMnemonic / deleteMnemonic / walletPresence() bodies against an in-memory fake keychain shared by two WalletStorage instances, so the suite never touches the real keychain. Covered:
    • classification: unreadable marker → unknown without an inventory read; marked + unreadable inventory → present with no writes; empty marker + unreadable inventory → unknown, not absent; readable empty inventory → absent;
    • reconciliation: backfill; a marker without a mnemonic is removed and the result is absent; the marker set is rewritten to match the inventory; a failed backfill keeps the verdict;
    • ordering and interruption: store step order; a failed mnemonic write leaves no marker; a rewrite takes the marker off before the delete/add gap; a failed final marker write does not fail the store and heals on the next read; delete removes the marker before the mnemonic; a failed mnemonic delete leaves an unmarked mnemonic rather than a phantom; a failed marker delete leaves the mnemonic in place;
    • interleaving: a presence read on a second instance waits for a paused deletion and ends absent with no marker (fails without the lock);
    • the sibling-service check.
  • Ran locally on macOS: PRUNE_CARGO_TARGETS=1 bash build_ios.sh --target tests --profile dev (CI's path), then swift test → 737 unit tests, 0 failures (3 skipped; the integration target's 14 tests are env-gated). The xcodebuild SwiftExampleApp step of run_tests.sh builds (part of build_ios.sh output) but its simulator test run was not executed locally.

Breaking Changes

None. Existing APIs keep their signatures and semantics; storeMnemonic / deleteMnemonic additionally write / remove one non-secret keychain item. Wallets stored before this change get their marker on the first walletPresence() call made while the inventory is readable.

Overlap note: #4615 (v4.2-dev) restructures the same storeMnemonic / deleteMnemonic bodies into shared primitives; when it is forward-merged the two marker calls need to be carried into the new shape (a small textual conflict, no semantic one).

Checklist:

  • I have performed a self-review of my own code
  • I have commented my code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas
  • I have added or updated relevant unit/integration/functional/e2e tests
  • I have added "!" to the title and described breaking changes in the corresponding section if my code contains any
  • I have made corresponding changes to the documentation if needed
  • If I added or changed GroveDB structure, I described it in the area's structure.rs, regenerated grovedb-structure.json, and checked the structure viewer link posted on this pull request

For repository code-owners and collaborators only

  • I have assigned this pull request to a milestone

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PR Hygiene · 3428934

  • Bots — thepastaclaw ✓
  • Self-review — posted; again after any push
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When every merge requirement is met, the PR Hygiene check passes. Reviewer limits do not block merging; other required GitHub checks and protections still apply.

…vice is locked

The mnemonic and metadata items are WhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly, so a
process launched while the device is locked (background app refresh)
cannot enumerate them; `listWalletIdsWithMnemonic()` throws and an app
that folds that into `false` concludes "no wallet" and shows its setup
screen.

Add a non-secret per-wallet presence marker: a generic-password item at
`wallet.present.<hex-walletId>` under the sibling service
`<keychainService>.presence`, AfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly, payload =
the wallet id. It is written inside `storeMnemonic` and removed inside
`deleteMnemonic`, so every write and delete path (including the
manager's delete-wallet path) keeps the two in step.

`walletPresence()` answers present / absent / unknown(OSStatus): a
non-empty marker set is `present`; an empty one falls back to the
mnemonic inventory, marking every wallet it finds (lazy backfill for
wallets stored before the marker existed) and answering `absent` only
on a readable empty inventory; any read failure is `unknown`.
`markedWalletIds()` exposes the raw marker set.

The marker lives in its own service because a service-wide query over
a mix of AfterFirstUnlock and WhenUnlocked items on a locked device
either fails as a whole (marker unreadable when needed) or drops the
locked rows (the existing inventory would read empty instead of
throwing).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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✅ Final review complete — no blockers (commit 3428934) · triage: critical

@github-actions github-actions Bot added the waiting-bots Waiting for the review bots to report on this head label Sep 24, 2026
@github-actions github-actions Bot added this to the v4.3.0 milestone Sep 24, 2026
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@thepastaclaw review

No review for 4c6051f0 yet, so PR Hygiene is asking once. If nothing arrives, the requirement is dropped for this commit and the pull request is labelled bot-review-skipped.

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Final validation — Phase 1 + Phase 2

Verified the supplied findings against head 4c6051f, the changed tests, and surrounding callers. Interrupted writes and concurrent deletion/backfill can leave persistent false-positive wallet markers, and the public marker mutators bypass the documented lifecycle invariant. These are classified as suggestions under the supplied policy for non-consensus correctness issues; verification was source-based, without independently rerunning the reported harnesses.

🟡 3 suggestion(s)

Review provenance

Source: reviewer 1: gemini-3.8-flash-high (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 2: gemini-3.8-flash-high (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: architecture-layering); reviewer 3: gemini-3.8-flash-high (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: security-auditor); reviewer 4: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 5: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: architecture-layering); reviewer 6: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); final verifier: gpt-6-astra (agent: astra-verifier, role: final-verifier)

  • Triage: critical by gpt-6-astra (effort low) — The substantial and intricate change modifies WalletStorage keychain handling and mnemonic write/delete coupling, directly affecting wallet key-material persistence and accessibility semantics.
  • Phase 1 reviewers: gemini-3.8-flash-high — general (completed, effort high); agent phase1-reviewer, gemini-3.8-flash-high — architecture-layering (completed, effort high); agent phase1-reviewer, gemini-3.8-flash-high — security-auditor (completed, effort high); agent phase1-reviewer
  • Phase 1 model: gemini-3.8-flash-high — antigravity quota: weekly 75% left, 5h 58% left
  • Fresh verifier: gpt-6-astra — final-verifier; agent astra-verifier
  • Phase 2 reviewers: gpt-6-astra — general (completed, effort xhigh); agent phase2-reviewer, gpt-6-astra — architecture-layering (completed, effort xhigh); agent phase2-reviewer, gpt-6-astra — security-auditor (completed, effort xhigh); agent phase2-reviewer
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.

In `packages/swift-sdk/Sources/SwiftDashSDK/Core/Wallet/WalletStorage.swift`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/swift-sdk/Sources/SwiftDashSDK/Core/Wallet/WalletStorage.swift:109: Persisting the marker first leaves a phantom wallet after interruption
  On a first mnemonic write, this call persists the marker before the mnemonic exists. If the process terminates before the mnemonic's SecItemAdd succeeds, the error-handler cleanup never executes. Subsequent walletPresence() calls return .present from the marker without consulting the empty mnemonic inventory, even after unlocking or restarting. Rewriting an existing mnemonic has the same failure window between its deletion and replacement. An application following the documented rule that only .absent permits setup can therefore suppress Create/Recover indefinitely despite having no stored mnemonic. Make persistence interruption-safe: establish the mnemonic before publishing its marker, and ensure rewrites cannot retain a marker across a delete/add gap. A mnemonic without a marker already has a safe inventory fallback. Add regression coverage for interruption at these persistence boundaries.
- [SUGGESTION] packages/swift-sdk/Sources/SwiftDashSDK/Core/Wallet/WalletStorage.swift:453-464: Backfill can recreate a marker during a successful mnemonic deletion
  The inventory read and marker backfill are not coordinated with mnemonic mutations. With independently created WalletStorage instances, deleteMnemonic() can remove a wallet's marker and pause before removing its mnemonic; walletPresence() can then observe an empty marker list, inventory the still-existing mnemonic, and recreate its marker. Deletion subsequently removes the mnemonic and succeeds, leaving a marker that makes future presence calls return .present without checking the now-empty inventory. WalletStorage has no shared synchronization or actor isolation preventing this schedule, and PlatformWalletManager.deleteWallet creates its own storage instance. Coordinate the complete inventory-read/backfill sequence with mnemonic writes and deletes across storage instances sharing the service. Add an interleaving regression at the Keychain-operation boundary; the current scripted classification tests do not exercise this lifecycle.
- [SUGGESTION] packages/swift-sdk/Sources/SwiftDashSDK/Core/Wallet/WalletStorage.swift:350-355: Keep raw marker mutation out of the public SDK contract
  The new public storePresenceMarker(for:) can create a marker for a wallet ID with no stored mnemonic. walletPresence() then reports .present without consulting the empty mnemonic inventory, violating its documented marker-implies-wallet invariant. The comments explicitly discourage independent marker mutation, and no production caller outside WalletStorage needs these mutators. Keep storePresenceMarker and deletePresenceMarker internal or private lifecycle helpers rather than exposing unsupported independent writes as public SDK operations. Internal visibility preserves the override seam used by the @testable test target without publishing it to applications.

Review follow-up on the wallet presence marker. Three ways a marker
could assert a wallet that has no mnemonic:

- storeMnemonic wrote the marker before the mnemonic, so a process
  killed in between left a phantom; a rewrite kept the marker across
  its delete/add gap. The steps now run marker-off, mnemonic-off,
  mnemonic-on, marker-on: an interruption at any point leaves at most
  a mnemonic without a marker. A failed trailing marker write no
  longer fails the store — the mnemonic is stored and the next
  unlocked presence read backfills the marker.
- The backfill in walletPresence() was an uncoordinated read-then-
  write, so it could re-mark a wallet while deleteMnemonic (on its own
  WalletStorage instance) was between its two steps. storeMnemonic,
  deleteMnemonic and walletPresence() now share one static lock, and
  deleteMnemonic removes the mnemonic before the marker.
- A non-empty marker set was never re-validated. When the inventory
  is readable it is now the source of truth: the verdict comes from
  it and the marker set is rewritten to match, so any phantom heals on
  the first unlocked read. The marker only stands in while the
  inventory is unreadable.

storePresenceMarker / deletePresenceMarker are internal now; they are
lifecycle steps, not SDK operations. The two raw mnemonic keychain
steps are internal primitives too, so the ordering, the interruption
points and the interleaving are covered by tests against an in-memory
keychain shared between two storage instances.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

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Re-review — Final validation — Phase 1 + Phase 2

The complete diff at bccb27b addresses all three prior findings: marker mutation is internal, lifecycle operations share a process-wide lock, and mnemonic writes use interruption-safe ordering. One non-consensus correctness suggestion remains: interrupted deletion can leave a stale marker that produces a false presence result while the inventory is unreadable. Verification was based on source, caller, and test inspection; tests were not rerun.

🟡 1 suggestion(s)

Review provenance

Source: reviewer 1: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 2: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: architecture-layering); reviewer 3: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: security-auditor); reviewer 4: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 5: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: architecture-layering); reviewer 6: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); reviewer 7: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 8: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: architecture-layering); reviewer 9: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); final verifier: gpt-6-astra (agent: astra-verifier, role: final-verifier)

  • Triage: critical by gpt-6-astra (effort low) — The diff is large and intricate and changes WalletStorage.swift, which handles mnemonic key material and Keychain persistence, a critical key-handling and storage surface.
  • Phase 1 reviewers: muse-spark-1.3-contributor — general (completed, effort xhigh); agent phase1-reviewer, muse-spark-1.3-contributor — architecture-layering (completed, effort xhigh); agent phase1-reviewer, muse-spark-1.3-contributor — security-auditor (completed, effort xhigh); agent phase1-reviewer
  • Phase 1 model: muse-spark-1.3-contributor — not quota-gated; passed over gemini-3.8-flash-high (antigravity below 15% reserve: weekly 35% left, 5h 0% left), glm-5.3-flash (not used above high effort; tier asks max)
  • Fresh final gate: an independent Phase-2 review ran after iterative findings were reconciled
  • Fresh verifier: gpt-6-astra — final-verifier; agent astra-verifier
  • Phase 2 reviewers: gpt-6-astra — general (completed, effort xhigh); agent phase2-reviewer, gpt-6-astra — architecture-layering (completed, effort xhigh); agent phase2-reviewer, gpt-6-astra — security-auditor (completed, effort xhigh); agent phase2-reviewer, gpt-6-astra — general (completed, effort xhigh); agent phase2-reviewer, gpt-6-astra — architecture-layering (completed, effort xhigh); agent phase2-reviewer, gpt-6-astra — security-auditor (completed, effort xhigh); agent phase2-reviewer
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.

In `packages/swift-sdk/Sources/SwiftDashSDK/Core/Wallet/WalletStorage.swift`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/swift-sdk/Sources/SwiftDashSDK/Core/Wallet/WalletStorage.swift:283-284: Deleting the mnemonic before its marker can leave a phantom wallet
  These are independent keychain operations. If the process stops after mnemonic deletion, or the subsequent marker deletion throws, the durable marker survives without its mnemonic. When the mnemonic inventory is unreadable, `walletPresence()` trusts that marker and returns `.present` at line 485. There is a concrete affected caller: the example app's `deleteStoredMnemonics()` skips metadata cleanup when `deleteMnemonic()` throws, leaving protected metadata under the inventory service that can make a later locked inventory query fail even though the mnemonic is gone. Unlocked reconciliation repairs this state, but cannot prevent the false result during a locked launch.

  Remove the marker first under the existing mutation lock, then delete the mnemonic. The lock already prevents same-process backfill between those steps; an interruption then leaves at most an unmarked mnemonic rather than a phantom marker. Update the lifecycle comments and `testDeleteRemovesTheMnemonicBeforeTheMarker`, and add coverage for failure or interruption between the two deletions.

Review follow-up. deleteMnemonic removed the mnemonic first and the
marker second, so a process killed between the two steps, or a marker
delete that threw, left a marker with no mnemonic behind it — and a
locked presence read trusts the marker. The ordering was chosen to
keep a concurrent backfill from re-marking the wallet, which the
shared mutation lock now prevents on its own.

The marker now comes off first: an interruption leaves at most an
unmarked mnemonic, which a locked read reports as unknown and an
unlocked read re-marks. The section and lifecycle comments say so, the
delete-order test is renamed, and two tests cover a throw at either
step between the deletions.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

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Re-review — Final validation — Phase 1 + Phase 2

The complete diff and relevant lifecycle callers contain no confirmed in-scope defects; all four prior findings are fixed. Marker ordering, internal mutators, and the shared lock address the interruption and backfill scenarios without weakening mnemonic protection. All 17 WalletPresenceTests passed using the existing XCTest bundle; the full SDK was not rebuilt, and physical-device locked-keychain behavior was not independently exercised.

🔴 0 blocking | 🟡 0 suggestion(s) | 💬 0 nitpick(s)

Review provenance

Source: reviewer 1: gemini-3.8-flash-high (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 2: gemini-3.8-flash-high (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: architecture-layering); reviewer 3: gemini-3.8-flash-high (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: security-auditor); reviewer 4: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 5: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: architecture-layering); reviewer 6: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); reviewer 7: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 8: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: architecture-layering); reviewer 9: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); final verifier: gpt-6-astra (agent: astra-verifier, role: final-verifier)

  • Triage: critical by gpt-6-astra (effort low) — WalletStorage.swift intricately changes mnemonic storage and deletion in storeMnemonic/deleteMnemonic, coupling key-material lifecycle operations to durable marker reconciliation with shared locking, interruption ordering, and partial-failure handling.
  • Phase 1 reviewers: gemini-3.8-flash-high — general (completed, effort high); agent phase1-reviewer, gemini-3.8-flash-high — architecture-layering (completed, effort high); agent phase1-reviewer, gemini-3.8-flash-high — security-auditor (completed, effort high); agent phase1-reviewer
  • Phase 1 model: gemini-3.8-flash-high — antigravity quota: weekly 33% left, 5h 96% left
  • Fresh final gate: an independent Phase-2 review ran after iterative findings were reconciled
  • Fresh verifier: gpt-6-astra — final-verifier; agent astra-verifier
  • Phase 2 reviewers: gpt-6-astra — general (completed, effort xhigh); agent phase2-reviewer, gpt-6-astra — architecture-layering (completed, effort xhigh); agent phase2-reviewer, gpt-6-astra — security-auditor (completed, effort xhigh); agent phase2-reviewer, gpt-6-astra — general (completed, effort xhigh); agent phase2-reviewer, gpt-6-astra — architecture-layering (completed, effort xhigh); agent phase2-reviewer, gpt-6-astra — security-auditor (completed, effort xhigh); agent phase2-reviewer
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review. Verify the current code and confirm that no unresolved issues remain.

No unresolved findings remain from the prior review on this head.
Out-of-scope follow-up suggestions (1)

These are valid observations, but they are outside this PR's scope and should be handled in separate issues or author/maintainer-requested PRs rather than blocking this review.

  • Example app metadata cleanup error handling — Routine pre-existing cleanup outside this PR's scope. ContentView.deleteStoredMnemonics() intentionally tolerates metadata deletion failure after successful mnemonic deletion. The current marker-first deletion has already removed the presence marker, so surviving metadata cannot recreate the reported phantom-marker condition.
    • Follow-up: Consider creating a separate issue or author/maintainer-requested PR for this.

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/self-reviewed

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@coderabbitai review

No review for 3428934e yet, so PR Hygiene is asking once. If nothing arrives, the requirement is dropped for this commit and the pull request is labelled bot-review-skipped.

@github-actions github-actions Bot added waiting-self-review Waiting for the author to post /self-reviewed bot-review-skipped A required review bot did not report; it was skipped by the window or by a person. and removed waiting-bots Waiting for the review bots to report on this head labels Sep 26, 2026
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/self-reviewed

@github-actions github-actions Bot removed waiting-self-review Waiting for the author to post /self-reviewed bot-review-skipped A required review bot did not report; it was skipped by the window or by a person. labels Sep 28, 2026
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github-actions Bot commented Oct 2, 2026

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Policy satisfied — this can merge.
Full checklist in the description.

@github-actions github-actions Bot added the bot-review-skipped A required review bot did not report; it was skipped by the window or by a person. label Oct 2, 2026
@github-actions github-actions Bot removed the bot-review-skipped A required review bot did not report; it was skipped by the window or by a person. label Oct 27, 2026
@romchornyi romchornyi modified the milestones: v5.1.0, v5.2.0 Nov 12, 2026
@romchornyi
romchornyi changed the base branch from v5.1-dev to v5.2-dev November 13, 2026 09:16

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