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feat(connect): update DashConnect to v2 one-QR flow - #1604
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…ersion (MO-1067) Platform protocol version 14 (v4.2) lowers the prefunded voting balance a contested username pays from 0.2 to 0.1 DASH, so creating an identity with a contested name drops from 0.25 to 0.15 DASH. ContestedUsernameFees replaces the DASH_PAY_FEE_CONTESTED(_NAME) constants and derives both fees from the protocol version learned via the new PlatformRepo.refreshProtocolVersion() (dash-sdk 4.2.0-SNAPSHOT). The version is refreshed when the username/invite screens open and right before CreateIdentityService sizes the asset lock. Until it is known, the higher pre-v14 fees apply: over-funding only leaves identity credits, while under-funding would make the registration fail. The "You need to have 0.25 DASH" requirement text was hardcoded in every locale; it now takes the fee as an argument (and shows the non-contested fee for non-contested names). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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⛔ Final review complete — 1 blocking finding(s) (commit 0fd4cdc) · triage: critical |
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Heads-up from Yappr, since this one-QR flow is still WIP: we've published an App Connect request profile and test vectors. We hope the iOS and Android flows can share it. Profile: https://github.com/PastaPastaPasta/yappr/blob/staging/docs/APP_CONNECT_PROFILE.md In short, a
The crypto stays the same apart from an HKDF info string and AES-GCM AAD that bind the response to the responding One request: please keep 🤖 Posted autonomously by Claude on behalf of pasta. |
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Thank you @PastaPastaPasta |
OffsetDialog parented from Theme.Design.Light.BottomSheetDialog with no values-night override, so android:textColorPrimary inside every offset bottom sheet stayed the light theme near-black. The sheet background already follows the night palette via @color/background_secondary, which left any view that relies on the theme for its colour dark-on-dark. Most TextViews escaped this because their style sets android:textColor="@color/content_primary", a colour resource that does have a night variant. The confirmation message and the "I accept" label in dialog_confirm_username_request carried no style at all, fell through to the theme, and rendered black on the dark sheet. Base.OffsetDialog now holds the parent and is overridden in values-night with Theme.Design.BottomSheetDialog. The two Material themes carry identical items and differ only in their AppCompat palette, so nothing structural about the sheet changes. Keeping every <item> on OffsetDialog means the two configurations cannot drift apart - duplicating the style per configuration is what invites this bug back. No layout in the app reads theme-attribute colours and none of the 36 offset sheet layouts hardcodes a light background, so there is no white-on-white inverse of this bug to introduce. The theme fix also covers the unstyled CheckBox tint in the same dialog and the same class of bug in the other offset sheets. The two TextViews additionally get style="@style/Body2", matching the convention every sibling dialog already follows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
… fix/contested-username-fee
The devnet app id matched no app in dash-wallet-firebase, so every QA upload for that flavor failed the build and then 404'd: App Distribution halted because it had a problem uploading the APK. (Invalid request, status_code: 404) The flavor builds as org.dash.wallet.devnet, whose app is 1:1039839682638:android:fdff563e24b69c5fea631f. Fixed in the workflow too, which carried the same bad id and would have failed the same way. Note that org.dash.dashpay.devnet is a second, older app with the same "DashPay [devnet]" display name, left over from before the applicationId changed. It is not the one we distribute to. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
… codex/mo-1072-connect # Conflicts: # build.gradle
… codex/mo-1072-connect
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Implemented App Connect v2 in
Verification: 52 focused unit tests pass and Keep this PR draft. The corresponding SDK source changes still need to be landed/published for reproducible CI builds. Live Sakura/PV14 registration, renewal, revocation and response cleanup have not been tested with a funded identity. Device UI verification was blocked by missing Firebase configuration ( |
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Samsung fixes in a03adbf: callback confirmation and budget/revoke details now reuse the existing AdaptiveDialog design and button styles. This removes the colorSurface theme crash on Deny. Sakura now selects rotated LLMQ_DEVNET_DIP0024 (105) and LLMQ_DEVNET_PLATFORM (107); the inherited 60_75 selector caused valid rotated quorum base blocks to fail the non-rotated interval check and stall fresh quorum synchronization. Standard intervals and signature/proof verification remain enabled. Devnet regression suite: 57 passed, 3 testnet-only tests skipped. The fixes are committed in the Documents/dash/dash-wallet checkout as well as pushed here. Live Samsung approval confirmation still needs retesting after rebuilding/restarting; the pending registration record has not been cleared and the initial update may already have been submitted. |
Revoke an attempted request before reporting it as declined, retain uncertain outcomes for retry, and freeze approved terms. Revoke confirmed auth keys without blocking on unrelated pending registrations and recognize irrecoverable key ID conflicts. Use a restorable approval dialog owned by the connections fragment, with no denial on composition disposal. Cover approval/revocation errors, key-state policy, and saved-state recreation in focused regressions.
Keep one-QR login and add a separate explicit token-purchase approval sheet. Validate and display identity, token denomination, quantity and price ceiling, then rebuild through the SDK rather than signing untrusted bytes. Persist scoped submission receipts to prevent uncertain debit retries, retain approval through recreation, and route dash-key and dash-st through Android browsable links and all wallet scanners. Requires kotlin-platform purchase bridge commit 25c83e7. Validation: 74 wallet tests passed with 3 existing flavor skips; 17 JNI/identity tests and 4 Rust parser tests passed. Devnet APK built and native library matched the updated AAR.
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Addressed both purchase blockers and both Tools/callback suggestions in 5ada4ba and f34b2db. SDK dependency e9d3709f70ba364b6b38e900ee5e6866f4be8bc5 is pushed to dashpay/kotlin-platform#41; the wallet pins that exact commit.
Validation: 709 passed / 107 conditional skips / zero failures across devnet, testnet and production focused wallet suites; six native Rust purchase tests and 19 JNI/Kotlin SDK tests passed. Both debug APK builds and ktlintCheck passed. ARM64 and x86_64 libraries in both APKs match the rebuilt AAR byte-for-byte. The same verified artifacts are installed in Maven Local for ordinary local wallet builds. No live-device or funded-purchase testing is claimed. Full-PR Sol pre-review of f34b2db, including the exact SDK security diff, found zero blockers and one CI coverage suggestion. The separate final commit adf365c adds that requested native test command to the shared SDK CI script. Its final one-line diff was reviewed, bash -n passed, and the exact cargo command passed all six tests. A third full-PR model review was not run for this CI-only addition. Reasons are documented in docs/app-connect-v2.md and SDK docs/token-purchase-replay.md. Platform 5.0.1 remains planning-only; no Platform revision or budget/expiry policy changes were made. Leaving review-thread resolution to the reviewer. |
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Re-review — Final validation — Phase 1 + Phase 2
One blocking recovery defect remains in the final head: approval allocates identity-global key IDs without checking unresolved registration records belonging to other apps or connection IDs. Such a record can reserve an ID that is absent from the current identity, allowing a later approval to reuse it and making subsequent recovery or revocation ambiguous. The check CI job passed, while the build job covering the changed code was still in progress.
🔴 1 blocking
Review provenance
Source: reviewer 1: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 2: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 3: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); reviewer 4: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 5: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); final verifier: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: sol-verifier, role: final-verifier)
- Triage:
criticalbygpt-6.1-sol(effort low) — This is a large, intricate change that directly modifies cryptographic key exchange, key derivation, identity-key handling, authorization grants, token-purchase signing/submission, and connection security in files including KeyExchangeCrypto.kt, IdentityRepository.kt, AppConnectSession.kt, and PlatformDashConnectRepository.kt. - Phase 1 reviewers:
muse-spark-1.3-contributor— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase1-reviewer - Phase 1 model:
muse-spark-1.3-contributor— not quota-gated; passed overgemini-3.8-flash-high(antigravity quota lookup failed),glm-5.3-flash(not used above high effort; tier asks max) - Single stage: Phase 1 and Phase 2 reviewed this head side by side, with no blocker gate between them (triage tier)
- Fresh final gate: an independent Phase-2 review ran after iterative findings were reconciled
- Fresh verifier:
gpt-6.1-sol— final-verifier; agentsol-verifier - Phase 2 reviewers:
gpt-6.1-sol— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— security-auditor (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— security-auditor (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `wallet/src/de/schildbach/wallet/ui/more/connections/AppConnectSession.kt`:
- [BLOCKING] wallet/src/de/schildbach/wallet/ui/more/connections/AppConnectSession.kt:346-353: Do not allocate key IDs while another grant registration is unresolved
`nextId` is derived from the current identity, but `requireSettled` only examines `oldRecords` after those records have been narrowed to the current app and matching connection ID. A pending or otherwise unresolved grant for a different app or connection can therefore contain an authentication key ID whose registration outcome is unknown and which is absent from the current identity. The next approval can reuse that ID; if the earlier update later lands, the identity update conflicts, while if the newer update lands first, the original record no longer identifies its own registration outcome reliably. Before allocating new identity-global authentication IDs, inspect all same-scope records with unresolved registration outcomes, excluding only the record currently being recovered, or otherwise reserve their IDs.
Poll exact response confirmation up to three times with backoff and redacted outcome diagnostics. Refresh persisted approval terms after failures, block stale retries when refresh fails, and retain group-consent and revocation checks. Show the friendly app name alone on connection cards per MO-1072 testing feedback. Include regression coverage and build code 11090202. Verified with 260 DashConnect tests against the local 5.0.0 SDK and successful response confirmation on emulator-5556.
* feat(connect): accept App Connect requests on dashpay://connect The App Connect DIP (dashpay/dips#181) never allows the dash-key: carrier on mainnet and moves requests to the dashpay:// scheme the wallet already uses for invitations. The Android wallet only knew dash-key:, so a dashpay://connect link from a scan or a tap did nothing. Accept the same request v2 body on dashpay://connect?v=2&n=..&r=..[&cb=..] and hand the decoded bytes to the existing AppConnectParser, so both carriers are processed identically. r is decoded by a strict canonical base64url decoder (java.util.Base64 tolerates padding and trailing bits), with the DIP's size limits checked before decoding. Scheme and host are compared case-insensitively, a repeated v/n/r/cb is invalid, and any dashpay verb the wallet does not implement says the link needs a newer wallet. dashpay://invite still goes to the invitation handler. MainActivity gets a separate dashpay + host connect intent filter; a host on the dash-key/dash-st filter would stop those host-less URIs matching. dash-key:/dash-st: behaviour, mainnet gating and key derivation are unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(connect): report a dashpay:// link with userinfo or a port as invalid dashpay://user@connect?... read 'user' as the verb and told the user to update the wallet. Userinfo or a port makes a malformed link, so it is now refused as an invalid connection link before the verb is looked at. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pass rotation 0 explicitly to the updated application encryption derivation API. Verified merged wallet compilation and all 288 DashConnect tests against SDK 5.0.1. Pixel emulator dashpay://connect testing confirmed response recovery on the second read after backoff.
Check every other grant in the wallet/identity/network scope before deriving or allocating new keys and saving a prepared record. Do not narrow the settlement check to the same app or connection; exclude only the request being recovered. Keep revocation targeting unchanged. Add nine regression tests covering cross-app and cross-connection pending grants, scope and current-request exclusions, settled versus unresolved states, storage failure, and approval ordering before record persistence. All 297 testnet DashConnect tests pass against SDK 5.0.1.
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Re-review — Final validation — Phase 1 + Phase 2
The Connect v2 lifecycle, authorization, recovery, persistence, replay, revocation, and network-gating changes are substantially hardened. The required Platform SDK build check fails in CI during :dash-sdk-java:cmakeBuild because the pinned Kotlin Platform and Platform fork generate incompatible JNI bindings, so the wallet build cannot proceed. Two non-blocking display-trust issues also remain because persisted QR labels, including the Yappr branding alias, are shown without an unverified marker or stable contract identity.
🔴 1 blocking | 🟡 2 suggestion(s)
1 carried-forward finding(s) already raised on this PR; not re-posting as new inline comments.
Review provenance
Source: reviewer 1: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 2: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); reviewer 3: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: general); final verifier: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: sol-verifier, role: final-verifier)
- Triage:
criticalbygpt-6.1-sol(effort low) — This large cross-cutting change modifies cryptographic key exchange and derivation, identity key registration, signed responses, authorization grants, and network-facing App Connect protocol handling in files such as KeyExchangeCrypto.kt, IdentityRepository.kt, PlatformDashConnectRepository.kt, and ConnectionsViewModel.kt. - Phase 1 reviewers:
muse-spark-1.3-contributor— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase1-reviewer - Phase 1 model:
muse-spark-1.3-contributor— not quota-gated; passed overgemini-3.8-flash-high(antigravity quota lookup failed),glm-5.3-flash(not used above high effort; tier asks max) - Single stage: Phase 1 and Phase 2 reviewed this head side by side, with no blocker gate between them (triage tier)
- Fresh verifier:
gpt-6.1-sol— final-verifier; agentsol-verifier - Phase 2 reviewers:
gpt-6.1-sol— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— security-auditor (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `.github/scripts/build-platform-sdk.sh`:
- [BLOCKING] .github/scripts/build-platform-sdk.sh:15-19: Align the pinned Platform SDK sources so the CI build can publish the AAR
The required build check for head 7bbebbd6 fails in the new SDK build step at :dash-sdk-java:cmakeBuild. The generated bindings contain `platform_value_value_map_ValueMap`, while the checked-out Platform headers expose `platform_value_ValueMap`, so the script never produces the pinned 5.0.1-SNAPSHOT AAR and the wallet build cannot proceed. Pin the Kotlin Platform revision, ferment-5.0.1 fork, and platform revision to a mutually compatible set, or otherwise update the SDK sources so the generated bindings and headers agree.
In `wallet/src/de/schildbach/wallet/ui/more/connections/PlatformDashConnectRepository.kt`:
- [SUGGESTION] wallet/src/de/schildbach/wallet/ui/more/connections/PlatformDashConnectRepository.kt:58-65: Do not persist the unauthenticated QR label as the trusted connection name
The QR label is attacker-controlled and is persisted at `AppConnectSession.kt:339` before being projected here. `connectionDisplayName()` only removes control and format characters and maps the exact label `Login to Yappr` to `Yappr`; it does not identify the name as unverified or bind it to the app contract ID. A different contract can therefore obtain approved bounded access while leaving a saved connection that looks like the official app. Keep QR branding visibly unverified and include the stable contract ID in current-flow connection rows and approval-success cards.
- [SUGGESTION] wallet/src/de/schildbach/wallet/ui/more/connections/PlatformDashConnectRepository.kt:67-69: Mark legacy-only connection names as unverified
(existing thread: https://github.com/dashpay/dash-wallet/pull/1604#discussion_r4395678171)
Retained `StoredConnection` rows are projected with `it.label` directly, so an old QR-controlled label can still appear as trusted branding in the Connections list. Disabling the legacy flow in production does not remove existing rows or make this projection safe in development and test builds. Apply the same visibly unverified treatment and stable contract identity used for any retained unauthenticated connection label, or remove the rows through an explicit migration.
Use bb3eeae17cccfbd7d70ae1d077770e19e8b36ebc so CI declares ValueMap before generated header use regardless of definition order. The SDK fix passed reordered-header regression checks, a clean native C++ rebuild and seven JNI Value tests. Platform fork/revision remain unchanged.
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Re-review — Final validation — Phase 1 + Phase 2
Updated after discussion: 1 finding(s) of this review were settled in the inline threads; no blocking finding remains.
- ✅ Withdrawn: 🔴 Align the pinned Platform SDK sources so the CI build can publish the AAR
The PR still has a blocking CI bootstrap defect: the pinned Platform SDK commit is available from the upstream pull-request ref but the build script clones normal refs and checks it out without fetching that commit, so a clean CI runner cannot publish the SDK. The two previously identified QR-branding findings also remain valid because attacker-controlled labels are persisted and displayed as friendly connection names without an unverified marker or visible contract identity; build and check jobs are still queued.
🔴 1 0 blocking | 🟡 2 suggestion(s)
3 carried-forward finding(s) already raised on this PR; not re-posting as new inline comments.
Review provenance
Source: reviewer 1: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 2: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 3: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); reviewer 4: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 5: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); final verifier: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: sol-verifier, role: final-verifier)
- Triage:
criticalbygpt-6.1-sol(effort low) — This large cross-cutting change directly modifies cryptographic key exchange and derivation, identity key registration and signing, encrypted App Connect approval flows, and network-facing URI/request handling in files such as KeyExchangeCrypto.kt, IdentityRepository.kt, and PlatformDashConnectRepository.kt. - Phase 1 reviewers:
muse-spark-1.3-contributor— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase1-reviewer - Phase 1 model:
muse-spark-1.3-contributor— not quota-gated; passed overgemini-3.8-flash-high(antigravity quota lookup failed),glm-5.3-flash(not used above high effort; tier asks max) - Single stage: Phase 1 and Phase 2 reviewed this head side by side, with no blocker gate between them (triage tier)
- Fresh final gate: an independent Phase-2 review ran after iterative findings were reconciled
- Fresh verifier:
gpt-6.1-sol— final-verifier; agentsol-verifier - Phase 2 reviewers:
gpt-6.1-sol— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— security-auditor (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— security-auditor (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `.github/scripts/build-platform-sdk.sh`:
- [BLOCKING → WITHDRAWN in discussion; do not fix] .github/scripts/build-platform-sdk.sh:13-14: Align the pinned Platform SDK sources so the CI build can publish the AAR
(existing thread: https://github.com/dashpay/dash-wallet/pull/1604#discussion_r4417833352)
The script clones the normal kotlin-platform repository refs and immediately checks out `bb3eeae17cccfbd7d70ae1d077770e19e8b36ebc`. The pinned commit is reachable from `refs/pull/41/head`, while the upstream `main` ref points to a different commit; a normal clone does not fetch pull-request refs. Consequently, all clean CI jobs invoking this action fail at checkout before publishing the Android SDK artifacts. Fetch the exact revision explicitly after cloning, or use a repository ref that contains the commit.
In `wallet/src/de/schildbach/wallet/ui/more/connections/PlatformDashConnectRepository.kt`:
- [SUGGESTION] wallet/src/de/schildbach/wallet/ui/more/connections/PlatformDashConnectRepository.kt:58-65: Do not persist the unauthenticated QR label as the trusted connection name
(existing thread: https://github.com/dashpay/dash-wallet/pull/1604#discussion_r4417833361)
The saved connection row uses `connectionDisplayName(latest.optString("label"))`, and that label originated in the QR request. Sanitization removes control characters and `DashConnectBranding` maps the attacker-controlled value `Login to Yappr` to `Yappr`, but neither establishes that the label belongs to the contract recorded in `app`. The stable contract ID exists as `DAppConnection.id` but is not shown in the list or details title, so two different contracts can present the same trusted-looking name and users cannot reliably distinguish the app they are revoking. Keep the label visibly unverified and display the stable contract identity unless branding is authenticated by an allowlisted contract.
In `wallet/src/de/schildbach/wallet/ui/more/connections/AppConnectSession.kt`:
- [SUGGESTION] wallet/src/de/schildbach/wallet/ui/more/connections/AppConnectSession.kt:337-340: Do not persist the unauthenticated QR label as the trusted connection name
(existing thread: https://github.com/dashpay/dash-wallet/pull/1604#discussion_r4378173808)
Approval writes `request.label` directly into the durable grant record before any branding authentication exists. That persisted value is later projected into the saved connection name and the approval-success connection object, so display-time sanitization does not bind the name to the authenticated contract ID and leaves future projections dependent on attacker-controlled QR branding. Persist the contract identity alongside an explicitly unverified label and render both, or derive the friendly name only from authenticated contract metadata.
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Re-review after discussion — commit ab8762f
Standing review was CHANGES_REQUESTED; this re-review is COMMENT: no blocking findings remain.
Not approved: 2 non-blocking finding(s) from the full review of ab8762fb (run 7634) still stand.
No longer blocking:
- Align the pinned Platform SDK sources so the CI build can publish the AAR
Same commit as the standing review; the inline threads above carry the per-finding outcome. This follow-up exists only to correct the verdict.
Review provenance
Source: conversation lane gpt-6.1-sol (agent: conversation); no reviewer or verifier lanes ran for this follow-up
- Verdict moved because the inline discussion withdrew or deferred findings of the standing review of this commit; the code was not re-reviewed
Merge origin/master at 9c69c06. Preserve master's CrowdNode removal while retaining the DashConnect URI parser import and revoke-access resource. Verified testnet wallet compilation and all 297 DashConnect tests.
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Re-review — Final validation — Phase 1 + Phase 2
Revalidated all 49 prior findings and the supplied reviewer claims against head 38554e5. Most prior authorization and recovery issues are addressed; one CI blocker and two nonblocking security concerns remain. This was static review only: the exact-head check job passed, but the build runner exhausted disk during wallet testing after successfully completing the newly added SDK build, so successful wallet validation is not established for this head.
🔴 1 blocking | 🟡 2 suggestion(s)
1 carried-forward finding(s) already raised on this PR; not re-posting as new inline comments.
Review provenance
Source: reviewer 1: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 2: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); reviewer 3: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 4: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 5: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); final verifier: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: sol-verifier, role: final-verifier)
- Triage:
criticalbygpt-6.1-sol(effort low) — This large, intricate change directly modifies authentication-key registration and wallet signing authorization in IdentityRepository.kt and introduces grant/key lifecycle handling in AppConnectSession.kt, meeting the critical key-handling surface criterion. - Phase 1 reviewers:
muse-spark-1.3-contributor— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase1-reviewer - Phase 1 model:
muse-spark-1.3-contributor— not quota-gated; passed overgemini-3.8-flash-high(antigravity quota lookup failed),glm-5.3-flash(not used above high effort; tier asks max) - Single stage: Phase 1 and Phase 2 reviewed this head side by side, with no blocker gate between them (triage tier)
- Fresh final gate: an independent Phase-2 review ran after iterative findings were reconciled
- Fresh verifier:
gpt-6.1-sol— final-verifier; agentsol-verifier - Phase 2 reviewers:
gpt-6.1-sol— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— security-auditor (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— security-auditor (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `.github/scripts/build-platform-sdk.sh`:
- [BLOCKING] .github/scripts/build-platform-sdk.sh:58-63: Release SDK build products before starting wallet validation
The SDK action leaves its Cargo target directory, both source/build workspaces, and extracted native libraries allocated when the wallet workflow starts restoring caches and testing. Subsequent wallet steps consume the published Maven repository, not these disposable build products. On this exact head, job 126762972542 completed the SDK action successfully and then terminated during Test; its check annotation reports System.IO.IOException: No space left on device, and the job log is unavailable. Reclaim the disposable SDK build products after the SDK checks while preserving the isolated Maven repository, or build the SDK in a separate job and transfer the published artifacts. The current same-runner arrangement has not left enough space to complete wallet validation.
In `wallet/src/de/schildbach/wallet/ui/more/connections/protocol/DashConnectUri.kt`:
- [SUGGESTION] wallet/src/de/schildbach/wallet/ui/more/connections/protocol/DashConnectUri.kt:182: Do not include scanned QR contents in parse errors
The earlier cause redaction is effective for dash-key and dash-st, but parseConnectRequest() attaches the original parser exception again. AppConnectParser constructs URI(callback); an otherwise valid request with an encoded callback such as "https://example.org/private-token bad" throws URISyntaxException containing the decoded callback. ConnectionsViewModel.prepareRequest() logs that exception and its causes, and WalletApplication configures a rolling file logger, so callback paths or query tokens can enter diagnostic logs despite the generic outer message. Drop the cause for this carrier as well and extend the existing sensitive-parser-cause regression to dashpay://connect. This remains a nonblocking privacy concern: it requires malformed input and log access and does not bypass consent or authorization.
In `wallet/src/de/schildbach/wallet/ui/more/connections/PlatformDashConnectRepository.kt`:
- [SUGGESTION] wallet/src/de/schildbach/wallet/ui/more/connections/PlatformDashConnectRepository.kt:58-65: Do not persist the unauthenticated QR label as the trusted connection name
(existing thread: https://github.com/dashpay/dash-wallet/pull/1604#discussion_r4417833361)
The intentional name-only design preserves contract-bound authorization, but it removes the app identity users need when managing saved access. Grants are grouped by contract ID internally, while connectionDisplayName() displays only the unauthenticated saved label and aliases "Login to Yappr" to "Yappr" without checking the contract. Two different contracts can therefore leave identically named cards, and the Revoke dialog uses that same friendly name without identifying the app contract. The initial consent warning does not help users later identify which grant to retain or revoke. Keeping the raw label as audit metadata is fine; restore visible unverified treatment or a stable app identifier in the saved presentation. If the design work is intended to address this separately, link a concrete tracking issue; the existing reply acknowledges the limitation but supplies no tracked follow-up.
| ) | ||
| return AppConnectParser.parse(body, network, query["cb"]) | ||
| } catch (e: DashConnectUriException) { throw e } | ||
| catch (e: Exception) { throw DashConnectUriException("Invalid connection request", e) } |
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🟡 Suggestion: Do not include scanned QR contents in parse errors
The earlier cause redaction is effective for dash-key and dash-st, but parseConnectRequest() attaches the original parser exception again. AppConnectParser constructs URI(callback); an otherwise valid request with an encoded callback such as "https://example.org/private-token bad" throws URISyntaxException containing the decoded callback. ConnectionsViewModel.prepareRequest() logs that exception and its causes, and WalletApplication configures a rolling file logger, so callback paths or query tokens can enter diagnostic logs despite the generic outer message. Drop the cause for this carrier as well and extend the existing sensitive-parser-cause regression to dashpay://connect. This remains a nonblocking privacy concern: it requires malformed input and log access and does not bypass consent or authorization.
| catch (e: Exception) { throw DashConnectUriException("Invalid connection request", e) } | |
| catch (e: Exception) { throw DashConnectUriException("Invalid connection request") } |
source: gpt-6.1-sol (phase2-reviewer: general, security-auditor)
Remove the native SDK bootstrap script, composite action and source revision pin, remove its calls from all three wallet workflows, and drop the isolated repository override. Resolve dash-sdk-java, dash-sdk-kotlin (dpp) and dash-sdk-android 5.0.1 from the published Maven artifacts. Verified testnet compilation and all 297 DashConnect tests with SDK resolution restricted to Maven Central, valid workflow YAML, and required Connect/purchase JNI exports in both published Android ABIs.
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Re-review — Final validation — Phase 1 + Phase 2
Verified the complete change range at 0fd4cdc and revalidated all 51 prior findings. One blocking defect remains: unsupported encryption storage modes can pass preparation and register keys before login fails; two nonblocking concerns remain around parser-cause logging and saved connection identity. Current build and check jobs pass; validation here was static, with no local builds or tests.
🔴 1 blocking | 🟡 2 suggestion(s)
2 carried-forward finding(s) already raised on this PR; not re-posting as new inline comments.
Review provenance
Source: reviewer 1: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 2: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); reviewer 3: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 4: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 5: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); final verifier: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: sol-verifier, role: final-verifier)
- Triage:
criticalbygpt-6.1-sol(effort low) — This large, intricate change directly modifies cryptography in KeyExchangeCrypto.encryptAppConnect and authentication-key registration and signing authorization in IdentityRepository.ensureCriticalAuthenticationKey. - Phase 1 reviewers:
muse-spark-1.3-contributor— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase1-reviewer - Phase 1 model:
muse-spark-1.3-contributor— not quota-gated; passed overgemini-3.8-flash-high(antigravity quota lookup failed),glm-5.3-flash(not used above high effort; tier asks max) - Single stage: Phase 1 and Phase 2 reviewed this head side by side, with no blocker gate between them (triage tier)
- Fresh final gate: an independent Phase-2 review ran after iterative findings were reconciled
- Fresh verifier:
gpt-6.1-sol— final-verifier; agentsol-verifier - Phase 2 reviewers:
gpt-6.1-sol— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— security-auditor (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— security-auditor (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `wallet/src/de/schildbach/wallet/ui/more/connections/AppConnectSession.kt`:
- [BLOCKING] wallet/src/de/schildbach/wallet/ui/more/connections/AppConnectSession.kt:242-246: Reject encryption storage modes that have no current-key index
These Boolean opt-in checks accept storage mode 1 (Multiple), even though this flow requires mode 0 (Unique) or 2 (MultipleReferenceToLatest). The published SDK 5.0.1 DataContract exposes only Booleans, and its native DataContractFFI constructs both flags with is_some(), losing the storage-mode distinction. In the SDK's pinned Platform source, Multiple stores individual key entries but creates no current-key alias. Consequently, a first approval with a selected encryption/decryption binding can register its authentication and encryption keys, then fail publish() because getCurrentContractKeyId() remains null. Retrying omits that encryption key and fails the saved-key-set comparison, leaving recovery/revocation necessary after a successful identity mutation. Preserve the actual storage mode in the owning dashpay/kotlin-platform contract API and reject mode 1 during preparation, before deriving or registering keys. Cover both purposes and modes 0, 1, and 2.
In `wallet/src/de/schildbach/wallet/ui/more/connections/protocol/DashConnectUri.kt`:
- [SUGGESTION] wallet/src/de/schildbach/wallet/ui/more/connections/protocol/DashConnectUri.kt:182: Do not include scanned QR contents in parse errors
(existing thread: https://github.com/dashpay/dash-wallet/pull/1604#discussion_r4472045886)
The dashpay://connect carrier still preserves input-bearing parser exceptions, unlike parseKeyRequest(). With a valid v2 body and a percent-encoded callback such as https://example.org/private-token%20bad, AppConnectParser reaches URI(callback), whose URISyntaxException includes the decoded callback. ConnectionsViewModel.prepareRequest() logs the exception and its cause chain, so the generic outer message does not prevent callback tokens from reaching diagnostic logs. Remove the underlying cause here and extend the existing sensitive-error regression to this carrier, checking the complete exception chain. This is retained as a nonblocking suggestion rather than the fresh review's blocking classification: the verified exposure is diagnostic logging of malformed input, not an authorization or signing bypass.
In `wallet/src/de/schildbach/wallet/ui/more/connections/PlatformDashConnectRepository.kt`:
- [SUGGESTION] wallet/src/de/schildbach/wallet/ui/more/connections/PlatformDashConnectRepository.kt:58-65: Do not persist the unauthenticated QR label as the trusted connection name
(existing thread: https://github.com/dashpay/dash-wallet/pull/1604#discussion_r4417833361)
The interim friendly-name-only decision leaves a concrete access-management ambiguity. AppConnectSession stores request.label and uses connectionDisplayName(request.label) for its approval result; this projection restores the same name after restart, with an empty URL. The list renders connection.name, and the details dialog uses that name without exposing the app contract. Two separately approved contracts can therefore appear as indistinguishable Yappr connections when the user decides which access to revoke. Contract-bound authorization and the preparation warning correctly constrain consent, but do not distinguish these saved identities. Retaining the label as untrusted metadata is reasonable; keep its unverified provenance and a stable contract identifier visible in the resulting management presentation. The design acknowledgement is not a technical resolution, and the supplied discussion contains no linked follow-up tracking the remaining presentation concern.
| request.requireAppConnect().encryption.forEach { | ||
| check(it.contractId.contentEquals(request.contractId)) { "Encryption must be bound to the app contract" } | ||
| check(if (it.purpose == 1) app.requiresIdentityEncryptionBoundedKey else app.requiresIdentityDecryptionBoundedKey) { | ||
| "App contract has not opted into this encryption key" | ||
| } |
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🔴 Blocking: Reject encryption storage modes that have no current-key index
These Boolean opt-in checks accept storage mode 1 (Multiple), even though this flow requires mode 0 (Unique) or 2 (MultipleReferenceToLatest). The published SDK 5.0.1 DataContract exposes only Booleans, and its native DataContractFFI constructs both flags with is_some(), losing the storage-mode distinction. In the SDK's pinned Platform source, Multiple stores individual key entries but creates no current-key alias. Consequently, a first approval with a selected encryption/decryption binding can register its authentication and encryption keys, then fail publish() because getCurrentContractKeyId() remains null. Retrying omits that encryption key and fails the saved-key-set comparison, leaving recovery/revocation necessary after a successful identity mutation. Preserve the actual storage mode in the owning dashpay/kotlin-platform contract API and reject mode 1 during preparation, before deriving or registering keys. Cover both purposes and modes 0, 1, and 2.
source: gpt-6.1-sol (phase2-reviewer: general)
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Tracking this finding and the proposed SDK/wallet fix in #1684: #1684
We also checked Yappr specifically: its staging anchor contract explicitly uses encryption storage mode 2 (MultipleReferenceToLatest), with no decryption opt-in. Its deployment documentation describes the same setting for testnet and Sakura. This is source/deployment-record verification, not a fresh on-chain query. Those deployments should not hit this particular mode-1 failure, but that does not resolve the compatibility bug for other contracts.
The issue records the already-shipped-build impact, early rejection before identity mutation, SDK publication requirements, and regression coverage for both purposes. This reply is tracking/context, not a claim that the blocker is fixed.
…#1670, #1674) (#1687) * chore: remove CrowdNode integration (#1664) * chore: remove CrowdNode integration (MO-1114) Remove the CrowdNode integration module and every reference to it: staking entry points (Explore menu item, Staking shortcut, StakingActivity), CrowdNode validations and messaging, the leftover-balance check on sends (LeftoverBalanceException, checkSendingConditions, MinimumBalanceDialog), and CrowdNode transaction grouping in wallet history. Upgrade handling for users who had CrowdNode: - Room onOpen callback deletes cached crowdnode rows from tx_group_cache and tx_display_cache so history is rebuilt (no schema version bump) - the saved Staking shortcut id (10) is ignored and refilled - obsolete crowdnode Configuration keys, the crowdnode DataStore file and the pending CrowdNode.WORK job are removed on startup ServiceName.CrowdNode is kept so existing transaction metadata still reads. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: rebuild history without waiting for sync; keep scan_qr translations Clear both transaction caches when they hold CrowdNode rows instead of only deleting those rows, so history is rebuilt from the wallet on load rather than after sync completes. Move the scan_qr translations from the removed CrowdNode module to common, and drop the now-unused button_show_qr. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: use JUnit assertions in DatabaseMigrationTest Kotlin assert is a no-op unless assertions are enabled at runtime, so the migration and CrowdNode cache cleanup tests could pass without checking anything. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: index-friendly CrowdNode cache probe; restore group details heading Probe tx_group_cache by groupId, which the primary key indexes, so the startup check no longer scans the whole cache for wallets without CrowdNode. The CoinJoin group details sheet showed the explainer text as both heading and body. Restore the "Why do I see all these transactions?" heading it had before, moved from the removed CrowdNode module with its translations. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: drop unused analytics from ExploreEntryViewModel logEvent lost its last callers with the CrowdNode Staking entry. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: drop orphaned CrowdNode test fixtures and stale APY KDoc TransactionWrapperHelperTest lost its only test with the CrowdNode grouping; BlockchainStateProvider no longer provides Masternode APY. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(connect): update DashConnect to v2 one-QR flow (#1604) * feat(dashpay): contested username fee follows the Platform protocol version (MO-1067) Platform protocol version 14 (v4.2) lowers the prefunded voting balance a contested username pays from 0.2 to 0.1 DASH, so creating an identity with a contested name drops from 0.25 to 0.15 DASH. ContestedUsernameFees replaces the DASH_PAY_FEE_CONTESTED(_NAME) constants and derives both fees from the protocol version learned via the new PlatformRepo.refreshProtocolVersion() (dash-sdk 4.2.0-SNAPSHOT). The version is refreshed when the username/invite screens open and right before CreateIdentityService sizes the asset lock. Until it is known, the higher pre-v14 fees apply: over-funding only leaves identity credits, while under-funding would make the registration fail. The "You need to have 0.25 DASH" requirement text was hardcoded in every locale; it now takes the fee as an argument (and shows the non-contested fee for non-contested names). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(connect): remove second QR registration path * chore: update Platform SDK to 5.0.0-SNAPSHOT * fix: refresh username affordability and amounts when protocol fees change * fix: refresh invitation labels without delaying non-contested invites * Use DIP-13 DashConnect session key derivation * feat: configure wallet devnet flavor for Sakura * fix(dashpay): dark mode text in the create username confirmation dialog OffsetDialog parented from Theme.Design.Light.BottomSheetDialog with no values-night override, so android:textColorPrimary inside every offset bottom sheet stayed the light theme near-black. The sheet background already follows the night palette via @color/background_secondary, which left any view that relies on the theme for its colour dark-on-dark. Most TextViews escaped this because their style sets android:textColor="@color/content_primary", a colour resource that does have a night variant. The confirmation message and the "I accept" label in dialog_confirm_username_request carried no style at all, fell through to the theme, and rendered black on the dark sheet. Base.OffsetDialog now holds the parent and is overridden in values-night with Theme.Design.BottomSheetDialog. The two Material themes carry identical items and differ only in their AppCompat palette, so nothing structural about the sheet changes. Keeping every <item> on OffsetDialog means the two configurations cannot drift apart - duplicating the style per configuration is what invites this bug back. No layout in the app reads theme-attribute colours and none of the 36 offset sheet layouts hardcodes a light background, so there is no white-on-white inverse of this bug to introduce. The theme fix also covers the unstyled CheckBox tint in the same dialog and the same class of bug in the other offset sheets. The two TextViews additionally get style="@style/Body2", matching the convention every sibling dialog already follows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(ci): point devnet distribution at the real Firebase app The devnet app id matched no app in dash-wallet-firebase, so every QA upload for that flavor failed the build and then 404'd: App Distribution halted because it had a problem uploading the APK. (Invalid request, status_code: 404) The flavor builds as org.dash.wallet.devnet, whose app is 1:1039839682638:android:fdff563e24b69c5fea631f. Fixed in the workflow too, which carried the same bad id and would have failed the same way. Note that org.dash.dashpay.devnet is a second, older app with the same "DashPay [devnet]" display name, left over from before the applicationId changed. It is not the one we distribute to. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: prevent crashes if google-service.json is missing * revert: devnet flavor app id * docs: update sakura-devnet.md * chore: update dashj to 24.0.0-SNAPSHOT * revert: use 22.0.5 dashj * feat: add PV14 App Connect v2 wallet flow * fix: prevent DashConnect only on mainnet * fix: reuse wallet dialogs and select Sakura quorums * fix: reconcile Connect cancellation and restore approval state Revoke an attempted request before reporting it as declined, retain uncertain outcomes for retry, and freeze approved terms. Revoke confirmed auth keys without blocking on unrelated pending registrations and recognize irrecoverable key ID conflicts. Use a restorable approval dialog owned by the connections fragment, with no denial on composition disposal. Cover approval/revocation errors, key-state policy, and saved-state recreation in focused regressions. * feat: approve dash-st token purchases and handle operation links Keep one-QR login and add a separate explicit token-purchase approval sheet. Validate and display identity, token denomination, quantity and price ceiling, then rebuild through the SDK rather than signing untrusted bytes. Persist scoped submission receipts to prevent uncertain debit retries, retain approval through recreation, and route dash-key and dash-st through Android browsable links and all wallet scanners. Requires kotlin-platform purchase bridge commit 25c83e7. Validation: 74 wallet tests passed with 3 existing flavor skips; 17 JNI/identity tests and 4 Rust parser tests passed. Devnet APK built and native library matched the updated AAR. * fix: confirm Connect grants and restore reconnect actions * fix(connect): preserve revocation after key limit and storage changes * fix: address Connect grant recovery and signing review findings * fix: require wallet unlock for Connect approvals * fix: batch Connect revocation and retain recovery audits * fix: permanently revoke expired Connect keys * fix: separate request revocation from app disconnect confirmation * Fix Connect authentication and cold-start lifecycle blockers * Trigger PR synchronization * fix: prevent DashConnect on 32-bit devices * fix: reject unsupported Connect requests before identity initialization * fix: refresh DashConnect status at expiry and on resume * fix: preserve responses for independent app connections * fix: reject unverified group grants and redact QR errors * fix: reject disabled Connect networks before identity initialization * fix: use dashj 24.0.0-SNAPSHOT * fix: fail closed on grant storage and require explicit signing-key setup * fix: invalidate Connect signing authorization when the wallet locks * fix: reject legacy DashConnect login requests before granting access * Restore Yappr group grants with verified scope and renewed consent The owner-only bridge led to a blanket group rejection that broke Yappr's CRITICAL login grants. Consume the full proof-verified SDK snapshot, disclose current and future scope and administrators, persist approved scope, and recheck before registration and response publication. Refresh consent explicitly when configuration changes while retaining recovery and revocation controls. Pin SDK 9fdfe17, include regression tests, and document the rationale and Pixel 9 test evidence. * Require renewed group-scope consent when recovering Connect grants Decode the persisted approved scope and compare it with the current verified authorization scope across process restarts. Changed or missing prior metadata requires a visible unchecked acknowledgement; direct session approval enforces it before secrets and binds the plan to the saved record. Preserve frozen grants, revocation and error recovery, reset consent on refresh, and leave malformed metadata fail-closed. Cover prepared/pending/confirmed/active recovery and document test limits. * Invalidate Connect signing authority when its UI leaves the foreground Cancel sensitive jobs and invalidate captured authorization on pause, stop, destroy or screen-off. Require an interactive unlocked device, preserve uncertain-outcome recovery and require a fresh explicit action after return. Cover lifecycle wiring on API 28/34 and all sensitive operation types. Also correct the 2 DASH preset, keep QR names explicitly unverified, refresh state-change timestamps and export workflow support email only after external SDK builds. * Refresh Connect timestamps when revocation confirmation changes A disabled grant can move from request-only revocation to confirmed app-wide disconnect without changing its state string. Refresh the status timestamp on confirmation changes and preserve it for identical repeated settlements. * Pin the published DashJ build and complete Connect status follow-ups Use the exact timestamped DashJ 24 publication across direct and transitive dependencies and pin the corresponding SDK revision. Derive expiry status dates from the final auth-key expiry while retaining later state changes. Retain failed approval status and offer the established ac=failed callback only after explicit end-recovery and confirmed revocation; preserve scanner and uncertain-outcome safeguards. * Keep unavailable Connect scope distinct from an empty grant list Propagate wallet and identity scope failures. Keep records loading during pending identity initialization, report failures as unavailable, and restart observation on initialization or identity changes. Clear stale rows while reloading and retain Retry without initiating identity setup. Cover real repository/ViewModel cold start, failure, recovery, identity loss and valid empty results. * Serialize Connect availability and connection-row updates Keep state writes inside the same cancellable identity observation instead of forwarding buffered lists to a separate READY consumer. Check the collecting coroutine before updates and error handling so cancelled observers cannot overwrite newer refresh state. Reproduce emit-then-fail and cover initialization changes and late cancelled-observer failures. * Reload missing Connect identity metadata on explicit Retry Route Retry through the existing identity loader after failed or successful-but-empty initialization. Use the injected application scope so screen closure cannot strand the shared loader, coalesce pending retries, and preserve read-only automatic refresh. Cover actual storage rereads, cached missing identity recovery, startup/healthy guards, duplicate taps and ViewModel disposal. * Settle cancelled identity loads without swallowing cancellation Publish an ordinary retryable interrupted-load failure before rethrowing cancellation. Serialize metadata initialization owners so cancelled or queued attempts cannot overwrite a newer result, and check cancellation after storage reads. Cover owner cancellation, queue ordering, reload and real owner-to-ViewModel Retry recovery without key registration. * Preserve selected grant expiry and fresh consent editing * Reject Unicode formatting characters in Connect labels * Normalize group consent and restore trusted quick sends * Keep Connect recovery reachable without username metadata * Restore saved grant selection before recovery expiry checks * Reload partial identity metadata on explicit Connect Retry * Avoid reading partial identity IDs during metadata reload * Share Connections state ownership and verify pinned DashJ bytes * Gate connection revoke toggle on wallet and record availability * Distinguish confirmed no identity from unavailable Connect records * Distinguish purchase preflight cancellation from native handoff * Consume canonical purchase IDs and pin nonce-preserving SDK * Run native purchase replay regressions in SDK CI * Pin wallet Platform SDK to 5.0.1 * Pin final regenerated Platform SDK bindings * Pin SDK CI publication fix * Fix DashConnect confirmation recovery and simplify connection names Poll exact response confirmation up to three times with backoff and redacted outcome diagnostics. Refresh persisted approval terms after failures, block stale retries when refresh fails, and retain group-consent and revocation checks. Show the friendly app name alone on connection cards per MO-1072 testing feedback. Include regression coverage and build code 11090202. Verified with 260 DashConnect tests against the local 5.0.0 SDK and successful response confirmation on emulator-5556. * feat(connect): accept App Connect requests on dashpay://connect (#1656) * feat(connect): accept App Connect requests on dashpay://connect The App Connect DIP (dashpay/dips#181) never allows the dash-key: carrier on mainnet and moves requests to the dashpay:// scheme the wallet already uses for invitations. The Android wallet only knew dash-key:, so a dashpay://connect link from a scan or a tap did nothing. Accept the same request v2 body on dashpay://connect?v=2&n=..&r=..[&cb=..] and hand the decoded bytes to the existing AppConnectParser, so both carriers are processed identically. r is decoded by a strict canonical base64url decoder (java.util.Base64 tolerates padding and trailing bits), with the DIP's size limits checked before decoding. Scheme and host are compared case-insensitively, a repeated v/n/r/cb is invalid, and any dashpay verb the wallet does not implement says the link needs a newer wallet. dashpay://invite still goes to the invitation handler. MainActivity gets a separate dashpay + host connect intent filter; a host on the dash-key/dash-st filter would stop those host-less URIs matching. dash-key:/dash-st: behaviour, mainnet gating and key derivation are unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(connect): report a dashpay:// link with userinfo or a port as invalid dashpay://user@connect?... read 'user' as the verb and told the user to update the wallet. Userinfo or a port makes a malformed link, so it is now refused as an invalid connection link before the verb is looked at. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Specify initial encryption rotation for Platform SDK 5.0.1 Pass rotation 0 explicitly to the updated application encryption derivation API. Verified merged wallet compilation and all 288 DashConnect tests against SDK 5.0.1. Pixel emulator dashpay://connect testing confirmed response recovery on the second read after backoff. * Block key allocation while other scoped registrations are unresolved Check every other grant in the wallet/identity/network scope before deriving or allocating new keys and saving a prepared record. Do not narrow the settlement check to the same app or connection; exclude only the request being recovered. Keep revocation targeting unchanged. Add nine regression tests covering cross-app and cross-connection pending grants, scope and current-request exclusions, settled versus unresolved states, storage failure, and approval ordering before record persistence. All 297 testnet DashConnect tests pass against SDK 5.0.1. * Pin Platform SDK ValueMap header-order fix Use bb3eeae17cccfbd7d70ae1d077770e19e8b36ebc so CI declares ValueMap before generated header use regardless of definition order. The SDK fix passed reordered-header regression checks, a clean native C++ rebuild and seven JNI Value tests. Platform fork/revision remain unchanged. * Consume published Platform SDK 5.0.1 instead of building it in wallet CI Remove the native SDK bootstrap script, composite action and source revision pin, remove its calls from all three wallet workflows, and drop the isolated repository override. Resolve dash-sdk-java, dash-sdk-kotlin (dpp) and dash-sdk-android 5.0.1 from the published Maven artifacts. Verified testnet compilation and all 297 DashConnect tests with SDK resolution restricted to Maven Central, valid workflow YAML, and required Connect/purchase JNI exports in both published Android ABIs. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: PastaPastaPasta <6443210+PastaPastaPasta@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(connect): redesign the approve sheet and Connections page (#1662) * feat(connect): redesign the approve connection sheet Follow the new DashPay Android designs for the App Connect approval: - Reorder the sheet: app name and website, a first-connection warning, request details, identity funding limit and expiration, then collapsible "able to do" / "will NOT have access to" cards. - Describe each grant in plain language instead of raw grant text, and approve every requested grant (the per-grant checkboxes are gone). - Replace the dropdowns with funding limit (0.1/0.5/2/5 DASH) and expiration (30/90/365 days) picker sheets. The sheet opens on the smallest presets at or above the request, so it grants exactly what was asked until the user lowers it. - Add info sheets for identity funding limits and spendable Dash. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(connect): keep approve buttons on screen and fix sheet text Found while checking the redesigned sheet on a staging build: - Pin Approve/Deny below a body that scrolls within the visible part of the expanded sheet, instead of a fixed 720dp cap that left a blank gap; the top spacer stays outside the scroll so cards no longer slide under the drag indicator. - Hide the website row when no website was resolved rather than repeating the unverified app label beside the globe. - Escape paragraph breaks in the new strings (raw newlines were folded into spaces) and avoid a possessive on the quoted app label. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(connect): scroll the approve sheet instead of dismissing it on drag down The approve sheet's Compose content scrolled inside a View-based bottom sheet that could not see that scroll, so dragging down to re-read the terms dismissed the sheet, which denies the request. Connect the scroll through nested-scroll interop so the sheet only collapses once the content is back at the top. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(connect): tabbed Connections page with connection details sheet Follow the DashPay Android Connections designs (Figma 40042:59884): - Active / Disconnected / Expired tabs once a connection exists, and a + button in the top bar that opens the scanner like Scan QR. Pending connections stay under Active; local-only records under Disconnected. - Add an EXPIRED status for connections whose keys all expired without being revoked; they stay enabled on Platform until disconnected. - Rows show the app name and website; tapping one opens a details sheet (status, IDs, funding limit and expiry, what the app could and could not do) built from the latest recorded grant, with Disconnect for active and expired connections and Remove from list for local-only records. The old per-key text moves into a collapsed Key details card. - Share the sheet cards between the approve and details sheets. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(connect): Reconnect button and disconnect date on the disconnected sheet Reconnect opens the scanner, since a new login needs the app's QR. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(connect): warn about DashPay profile keys no connection holds Connections now lists enabled keys bound to the DashPay profile that no local grant record holds, e.g. after a wallet restore or from another wallet with the same identity. Dismiss hides those keys on this device until another one appears; Revoke disables them with a master-key identity update, re-checking first that each key is still unlinked. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(connect): drop the Key details card from the connection sheet It is not in the design, and key info is out of scope for the MVP. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(connect): address pre-review findings on the Connections redesign - Describe every login that may still authorize access, not only the newest one. - Show Expired only when no login is still registering or awaiting a confirmed revoke. - Keep the details sheet open while the list reloads on resume. - Cancel an earlier details load when the sheet is reopened or closed. - Warn that removing an older connection does not revoke its Platform access. - Catch a failed save of dismissed profile keys and show the warning again. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(connect): show each key's current Platform limits on the details sheet A key's budget and expiry can change on Platform without changing the key, so the sheet reads the identity and describes each recorded key as Platform holds it now. A key no longer on the identity keeps its recorded terms. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(connect): expose collapsible card headers as buttons with expanded state Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(connect): cover shared DashPay profile key listing, dismissal and revocation Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(connect): confirm on Platform that a connection expired before listing it Another device can extend a key's expiry on Platform, so the expiry saved at approval is only a hint. When a connection's saved expiry has passed, the list reads the identity once and keeps the connection Active if a recorded key is still enabled with a later expiry, scheduling the next refresh from it. If Platform cannot be read, the connection shows as pending, never Expired. Live connections are still listed without a Platform read. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(connect): keep the details selection while connection records reload A reload empties the list until it finishes, so a missing row proves nothing yet; the sheet shows a spinner and closes only if a finished read no longer has the connection. This also survives the dialog being recreated mid-reload. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(connect): give info buttons a button role and a topic-specific label Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(connect): always show Connections in Tools when Connect is supported Connections now offers to create a username, so a wallet without one no longer needs the entry hidden. Only the Platform and Connect flags decide. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(connect): offer to create a username on Connections Without a username, Connections shows the design's intro (Figma 40042:60147) with a Create username button that starts the same flow as Join DashPay. A request opened from the main scanner, the camera or a link lands on this screen instead of an error toast. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(connect): offer to buy credits when the identity cannot pay to approve Approve reads the identity balance first. When it is empty, nothing is submitted, the request stays open, and the sheet offers Buy credits, the same top-up the wallet uses before contact requests and profile edits. An unreadable balance or a recovering approval goes ahead as before. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(connect): one funding limit per connection, split between its keys Per MO-1117, the approve sheet sets one funding limit and one expiry for the whole connection: - The limit starts at the total the app requests (Yappr: 0.5 + 0.01 DASH), capped at 5 DASH, and the user may go above or below it. - It is split between the keys: a DashPay profile key gets 0.002 DASH (half the limit under 0.004 DASH) and the app's own key gets the rest. - One expiry for all keys: the request, capped at a year, 90 days if none. - Set custom limit opens a keypad sheet (Figma 40103:38833) that refuses 0 and anything above 5 DASH; Set date opens the system date picker. - Consent checks only the wallet's maximums; a recovering approval keeps the limits it was prepared with. - The approve and details sheets show the keys' budgets together. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(connect): show when a connection was made and the funding left on its keys Per MO-1117 (no designs; the wallet's existing patterns): - Details show a Connected date. A record keeps connectedAt from the first time it became active; older records use when they became active. - Details show the funding left on each enabled key (the app's own key and the DashPay profile key), read from Platform; an unreadable one shows as unavailable. - Disconnect asks for confirmation first, since it revokes the app's keys on Platform for good. Removing an older connection from the list does not. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(connect): reword what the app's own key may do with tokens "Act as you in Yappr until <date>, including buying and sending its tokens. It can spend up to <limit> DASH of your identity balance on fees and token purchases, but can send any amount of your Yappr tokens." Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(connect): close the pre-review findings on limits, expiry and consent - Judge a connection expired by Platform time, and count any live key of the app the wallet has no record of (e.g. registered on another device). - A recovering approval keeps an unlimited budget an earlier version saved. - Connection terms leave out keys a renewal disabled; a key without an expiry leaves the connection without one. - The details sheet is bound to its connection's wallet scope, and reads the username before the scope-checked terms. - The Buy credits prompt shows only while the wallet is unlocked. - The approve sheet shows what each contract-group key covers, including members added later. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * revert(connect): drop the contract-group scope lines from the approve sheet The disclosure needs a design before it goes on the sheet. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(connect): keep a disconnected connection's terms when its encryption key survives A disconnect disables the authentication keys and keeps encryption keys, so leaving out disabled keys left only the encryption key and the sheet showed "No limit". Disabled keys are left out only while an authentication key is still enabled. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(connect): run DashConnect on mainnet, gated on Platform protocol 14 (#1670) * feat(connect): run DashConnect on mainnet, gated on Platform protocol 14 DashConnect is built into the prod flavour (SUPPORTS_CONNECT = true) and no longer refuses production builds or mainnet. Instead every entry point and operation requires the network to run Platform protocol version 14, which brings key funding limits and expiry, contract-group bounds, remaining-budget queries and the AppConnect response contract. - ConnectAvailability: build support plus the protocol version the wallet already records (PlatformRepo.refreshProtocolVersion, which only goes up). - Tools shows Connections only once the network is known to be new enough. - The Connections screen and every repository operation check it, and report DashConnect as unavailable below version 14. - A QR's network selector is matched to the wallet's network, so a mainnet wallet accepts n=m (it was compared with devnet). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(connect): mainnet key derivation and a retryable protocol check - Application keys are derived with the wallet's network, so a mainnet wallet uses the mainnet coin type (both were derived as testnet). - Tools reads the protocol version again on every resume until Connections is available, so an offline start or a network upgrade is noticed. - A protocol version that could not be read is not reported as too old: the Connections screen stays retryable and a request says to try again. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(connect): count only a Platform version the network reported A failed refreshProtocolVersion() does not return 0: the SDK keeps its per-network starting version (13 on mainnet and testnet) and returns that. Offline after a fresh launch, the gate read 13 as the network's answer and called a protocol 14 network too old, removing the Connections screen's Retry. The version now counts only after a proven query succeeds. PlatformRepo.readProtocolVersion() reads Platform time for the identity, whose verified response sets the SDK's version, and returns null when the network does not answer. ConnectAvailability keeps the highest version read this way; Tools and the repository ask through it. The session's checks run after its proven identity read instead of after a refresh. A wallet without a username still gets the username prompt: the Connections screen reads the version once the identity is known. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(connect): pin the network flag of approval key derivation Approval derives authentication and encryption keys with isMainnet true on mainnet and false elsewhere; going back to a hard-coded value now fails this test. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(connect): drop the stale prod note from the QR routing comments Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(connect): read the Platform version without a wallet identity The proven query behind the version read asked for the wallet's own identity, so a wallet without a username never learned the version and Tools kept the Connections entry hidden, the way to create a username. The query now asks for an identity no wallet owns: its proven absence carries the same verified metadata, so any wallet can read the version. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(tools): keep Connections shown while the username loads The username coroutine copied the state before its suspending read and wrote that copy back afterwards, so an availability update in between was undone. With the version already known, a later Tools visit hid the Connections entry for good. Every writer now goes through update {}. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(connect): answer with the version kept when probes overlap The cache kept the highest version read, but each probe answered with its own. An older probe that read 13 and finished after a newer one read 14 reported the network too old, which hid the Connections screen while Tools showed the entry. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(connect): check the Platform version before offering a username The screen skipped the version check for a wallet without a username, because the version used to be read with the wallet's identity. Now that any wallet can read it, the screen checks it first, so a network too old for DashConnect is not offered a username to use it with. A restored process does not replay the link, so the screen cannot rely on the link check. Requests check the version before waiting for the identity too. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(connect): keep a confirmed version when an overlapping probe fails A probe that failed answered "unknown" before looking at the version kept, so after another probe had confirmed protocol 14 it still made the caller reject an incoming link or mark the records unavailable. A failed probe now answers with the kept version too, and is unknown only when no probe has confirmed one. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: v11.9.2 with updated translations and core 24 support (#1674) * feat(connect): translate DashConnect strings into DE, PL, IT, ES, PT-BR, RU and FR Add strings_app_connect.xml for the seven locales and the three DashConnect strings in strings-dashpay.xml and strings.xml. Translated locally, not pulled from Transifex; strings_app_connect.xml is not in .tx/config yet. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: v11.9.2 release notes Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: v11.9.2 (11090205) and pin dashj 24.0.0 checksums Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update dashj to 24.0.0 * chore: drop Gradle dependency verification for dashj-core The checksums pinned a locally built 24.0.0 whose JAR and module metadata differ in packaging from the Maven Central release, which failed CI. The release is immutable, so the verification file and the non-changing override it needed are removed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: verify dashj-core 24.0.0 against the Maven Central release Restores gradle/verification-metadata.xml, scoped to dashj-core, with the SHA-256 hashes of the Maven Central 24.0.0 JAR, POM, module metadata, sources and javadoc. The version force pins coordinates, not bytes, and Maven Local is searched first, so the hashes are what keeps a different local publication out of the build. docs/app-connect-v2.md: describe the release pin and its verification, the dashpay://connect carrier, and drop the stale SDK-build CI note. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(merge): keep the DashConnect audit through the registry-driven wipe Reset Wallet clears every live config through BaseConfig.clearAllLiveInstances() before deleting datastore files. It called clearAll() directly, bypassing DashConnectConfig.onWalletWiped(), which keeps grants and unknown purchase receipts for a same-seed restore, so the audit was lost before either preservation step ran. The registry now applies each config's own wipe policy; onWalletWiped() defaults to clearAll(), so every other config is unchanged. DashConnectConfigTest now runs the production order (registry clear, then file deletion). DatabaseMigrationTest includes the 21-to-22 migration. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: drop WalletDataAdapter's unused seam-lock registry, fix registry KDoc Both left over from removing lockOutputsPayingTo with CrowdNode (PastaClaw on #1687). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: PastaPastaPasta <6443210+PastaPastaPasta@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: QA Integration <eric.britten@dash.org>
Summary
5.0.1-SNAPSHOTfrom PR Refactoring the code related to restoring wallet from recovery phrase #41, built from theferment-5.0.1Platform fork.dash-st:handling path from manifest routing, scanners, URI parsing, view-model handling, repository API, and tests.Still to do
LoginKeyDerivationHKDF with the DIP-13 session key derivation. The current wallet HD stack only supports 32-bit BitcoinJ child numbers, while the DIP-13 path includes 256-bit hardened identity/request leaves; this likely needs an SDK/key-wallet derivation helper beyond returning the path string.loginKeyResponseto the system contract.Verification
5.0.1-SNAPSHOTand published it to an isolated local Maven repository. The AAR includes arm64-v8a and x86_64 libraries with the required JNI exports and 16 KB alignment.:wallet:testProdDebugUnitTest --tests '*ConnectionsViewModelTest' --tests '*RevocationSettlementTest'passes against those artifacts.Summary by CodeRabbit
New Features
Bug Fixes
Documentation