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feat(tokens): create and claim once-per-identity token distributions - #1119
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Pin dash-sdk, rs-sdk-trusted-context-provider, platform-wallet and platform-wallet-storage to dashpay/platform v5.1-dev 063589bf (5.0.0-rc.8). The lockfile moves only the Platform packages. The upstream V019 wallet-storage migration adds a nullable asset-lock operation id; V001-V018 are unchanged. The compatibility bridge gets the 033ecae destination snapshot it compares against, and the pin guard records the new revision with an unchanged migration fingerprint. BREAKING CHANGE: the wallet storage upgrade to V019 is forward only. An older build cannot open upgraded storage; going back needs a copy of the data directory taken before the upgrade. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ujJpB9DBhvtbjhYB3aG9Q
The new rust-dashcore wraps secp256k1 keys in EcdsaSecretKey and EcdsaPublicKey, returns secret bytes as Zeroizing, and drops the Secp256k1 context argument. Signers, single-key wallets, DashPay derivation, address and QR handling, migrations and their tests follow the new types. Signing stays on the non-grinding dpp::secp256k1 path, and a parity test pins the BLS signature bytes the previous SDK made. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ujJpB9DBhvtbjhYB3aG9Q
Handle the dpp and SDK types the new pin adds, keeping today's behaviour: - Document replace keeps moderated_at and moderated_by; new documents start without them. - The document editor refuses typed-array fields instead of dropping their contents, and keeps referenced key ids as numbers. - Shielded token events show read-only in group actions, and the shielded pool token settings are refused before anything is signed. - Contested document creation states the protocol's base contest fund, so the SDK never auto-quotes a larger one. - Masternode vote reads use ResourceVoteWithCount, the SDK's new vote type; the vote count is not used yet. - New query fields, wallet events, wallet error variants and asset-lock funding modes are handled where the SDK now requires them. - Entropy-only document ids are documented as placeholders from protocol 14, and deferred upstream features link to their issues. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ujJpB9DBhvtbjhYB3aG9Q
The SDK was pinned to the protocol 13 table, so it could not build any protocol 14 transition or follow the versioned identity lookup. It now starts at upstream's per-network minimum and ratchets to what proven responses report. - System contracts are cached per protocol version and served through accessors. The context provider serves them at the version the proof verifier asks for and fails rather than serve another version's. - A proved epoch sets the fee multiplier and raises the protocol version. An older epoch than the adopted one is ignored. - Rebuilding the connection resets the protocol version, fee multiplier and adopted epoch under one lock before the new SDK is published, and drops reads begun on the old connection. - Capabilities read the network's version through a helper that stays closed for a version this build does not define. - Contest timing reads the live version; retired vote schedules keep the protocol 13 notice window they were created under. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ujJpB9DBhvtbjhYB3aG9Q
Compare the protocol 13 client tables with a recorded snapshot, so an upstream change to them is reviewed, and check that keys and documents DET builds on a protocol 13 network use encodings protocol 13 decodes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ujJpB9DBhvtbjhYB3aG9Q
Map the refusals the new protocol adds to flows DET already offers to dedicated TaskError variants: a full username contest, a vote choice the contest does not allow, a name someone else asked for first, a token that cannot be moved, a changed immutable document field, a reference to a document type that cannot be deleted, and a moderators' fee on a contract without moderation. Names supplied by the node stay in the typed source only, never in the message. Token operations that fail inside the wallet runtime keep their SDK cause, so they are classified like any SDK error; an unclassified one names the operation that did not complete. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ujJpB9DBhvtbjhYB3aG9Q
Add a dated design note for the pin, the protocol version sources, the connection state rules and the protocol 13 guards, and point AGENTS.md at From<SdkError> for TaskError as the SDK error reference. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ujJpB9DBhvtbjhYB3aG9Q
Protocol version 14 adds a once-per-identity distribution: every identity may claim a fixed amount of a token exactly once. - The token creator offers the distribution with the amount each identity can claim, gated on a new OncePerIdentityDistribution capability. Without it the rules stay version 0, the format older networks accept. The creator and the backend both refuse it on a network that does not accept it, before anything is signed. The registration estimate prices every term, including the distribution's extra fee, from the fee table of the network's confirmed protocol version. - The Claim screen and My Tokens show the distribution. The claim confirmation names the distribution (and, for this one, the amount), and confirming sends exactly the claim that was shown. - A successful claim records an advisory hint per identity and token, at the proved claim's block time. The Claim screen shows it without ever blocking a claim, and dismissing it is saved through a backend task. A node's unproven "already claimed" refusal is never recorded. A claim that succeeded but could not be recorded is reported as made, so the user is not invited to claim again. - Platform's refusals (already claimed, invalid amount) map to dedicated, actionable errors. - A protocol 13 guard checks the distribution is never silently dropped when encoded for protocol 13. - User story TOK-019. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ujJpB9DBhvtbjhYB3aG9Q
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✅ Final review complete — no blockers (commit b92dcd0) · triage: critical · Phase 2 only (no Phase 1 for this repository) |
…it refusals Protocol version 14 refusals that flows already in DET can hit get dedicated, actionable messages, each keeping the SDK error as its source: - an identity banned or suspended (until when) on a moderated contract; - a gas sponsor short of credits, a gas payer the document type does not offer, and mixed gas payers in one batch; - pre-programmed token distributions of one time over the limit. An overflowing shielded note total is logged at warn: it means corrupt or hostile sync data, not routine noise. Tests cover contracts saved at protocol 12 loading unchanged at 13 and 14, and contracts saved at 14 decoding at 13 and in full again at 14. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ujJpB9DBhvtbjhYB3aG9Q
…efusals from the Platform bump Merges 74695e7 from chore/bump-platform-063589bf. The conflict in src/backend_task/error.rs keeps both sides: the once-per-identity refusals and the moderation, gas sponsorship and distribution limit refusals each keep their variants, match arms and test cases. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ujJpB9DBhvtbjhYB3aG9Q
A lookup at another version, as the proof verifier makes at a response's version, swapped out the app's set, so each such lookup reloaded the system contracts and the next app read reloaded them again. Each version now keeps its own set; the app's reads keep the set they last got for a failed reload. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ujJpB9DBhvtbjhYB3aG9Q
…poch When the epoch cannot be read, the proved DPNS fallback confirmed the SDK's version, which starts at the network's upstream minimum (14 on devnet), as the network's. It now confirms the version of the responses the SDK verified, and nothing before any. Restores the completed-withdrawal status list with the reason sending FAILED to a protocol 13 network is safe, and its test, now comparing the protocol 13 schema with the latest one. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ujJpB9DBhvtbjhYB3aG9Q
The derived key DET signs with is copied into secp256k1's own type, which keeps its bytes after use. Wrap it so it is erased on drop, as the derived key it comes from would be; signatures stay byte-identical. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ujJpB9DBhvtbjhYB3aG9Q
… protocol 13 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ujJpB9DBhvtbjhYB3aG9Q
The new refusals sent users to another document editor or token client. They now say the app cannot edit this field type, sign this action or change this token setting yet, in one wording, and the shielded setting refusal sits with the token contract errors. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ujJpB9DBhvtbjhYB3aG9Q
Also corrects the platform compatibility fixtures README: no code reads e3cd7cf.sql any more; it is the V001-V018 checksum reference. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ujJpB9DBhvtbjhYB3aG9Q
After the network refuses a second once-per-identity claim, the Claim screen turns Claim off for that distribution while it is open and says why, so a retry is not charged again. The refusal is unproven node output, so it is never saved as the claim hint. The token creator's registration estimate moves into model::fee_estimation, the local refusal and the disabled-checkbox hint reuse TaskError::TokenOncePerIdentityNotSupported's text, and the claim reuses its token id instead of computing it twice. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ujJpB9DBhvtbjhYB3aG9Q
…identity branch Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ujJpB9DBhvtbjhYB3aG9Q
…able one Both refusals describe the same situation, a network below protocol 14, so they now open the same way. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ujJpB9DBhvtbjhYB3aG9Q
The protocol version fallback takes only a version the SDK verified, and a mock expectation's metadata is never recorded as verified, so the three headless refresh tests saw the version stay unconfirmed. The mock now has the SDK accept the version from metadata treated as proved, as after a live network's signed response, and a new test pins that a response the SDK never verified leaves the version unconfirmed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ujJpB9DBhvtbjhYB3aG9Q
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ujJpB9DBhvtbjhYB3aG9Q
The SDK picks each transition's encoding from the platform version DET passes in, so these tests checked dpp's version tables rather than DET. The mainnet start version and the contest fund cap stay covered by the platform_info and fee_estimation tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ujJpB9DBhvtbjhYB3aG9Q
The SDK at this pin already tracks the version the network has proven: it records the version of every response whose proof and quorum signature it verified, and a rebuilt connection is a new SDK that starts from nothing. DET's own copy, raised from proved epochs and DPNS reads and reset on every rebuild, duplicated that state. The app now reads the current SDK's verified version; capabilities still stay closed before a version is proven and for one this build does not define, and network info shows the proven number or says none is confirmed. Proved epochs still set the fee multiplier, in epoch order and only on the current connection. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ujJpB9DBhvtbjhYB3aG9Q
A connection rebuild never changes the chain, the multiplier changes once per epoch and feeds only fee estimates, so ordering epoch reads and dropping those begun before a rebuild guarded against nothing worth the machinery. A proved epoch read sets the multiplier directly again; an unavailable epoch still keeps the last known value and labels it as such. A rebuild still reads the epoch, so the new SDK proves the network's version again. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ujJpB9DBhvtbjhYB3aG9Q
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ujJpB9DBhvtbjhYB3aG9Q
A released protocol's tables and each network's minimum version are upstream's to keep fixed; DET's start is covered by platform_version_starts_at_the_network_minimum. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ujJpB9DBhvtbjhYB3aG9Q
The proof verifier asks for contracts at the version it verifies with, which can be newer than the SDK's. System contracts were already served at that version; a saved user contract was decoded at the SDK's version instead, dropping newer-protocol settings such as action fees. The fallback now decodes it at the version asked for. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ujJpB9DBhvtbjhYB3aG9Q
…king Building the recoverable-signature envelope returns an error upstream; it is now reported as the existing message-signing failure, with the detail logged, instead of aborting the signing path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ujJpB9DBhvtbjhYB3aG9Q
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ujJpB9DBhvtbjhYB3aG9Q
…identity Keeps #1114's deletion of protocol_13_transitions.rs and drops this branch's once-per-identity protocol 13 encoding test with it: that encoding is upstream's to test. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ujJpB9DBhvtbjhYB3aG9Q
…m bump merge #1114 removed DET's protocol version copy. The token registration fee estimate reads the SDK's version, and the once-per-identity tests prove versions through the SDK, which only raises them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ujJpB9DBhvtbjhYB3aG9Q
…entity The squash commit's tree equals #1114's final head, which this branch already contains, so the tree is unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ujJpB9DBhvtbjhYB3aG9Q
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…er-identity Brings in non-transferable tokens (#1118), the token action layout (#1129), Rust 1.99 and dependency updates (#1131) and Platform 575d961f with the protocol_version_info API (#1132). Both protocol-14 token options are kept side by side: the once-per-identity distribution and non-transferable tokens each have their own capability, feature gate, backend refusal, TaskError variant, creator control, test and user story (TOK-019, TOK-020). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ujJpB9DBhvtbjhYB3aG9Q
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Final validation — Phase 2 only (no Phase 1 for this repository)
The PR correctly implements the once-per-identity distribution flow, but three edge cases remain. The UI skips inline validation for an empty amount, the backend accepts malformed version 1 distribution rules until upstream validation, and identity-scoped claim hints are not removed during identity deletion or devnet wiping. CI checks reported for this head are successful.
🟡 3 suggestion(s)
1 finding(s) not shown inline (the lines are not part of this PR's diff)
🟡 Suggestion: Clear once-claim hints during identity and devnet cleanup
src/context/contract_token_db.rs:742-751
The new claim hint is stored under DetScope::Identity, but devnet cleanup removes only global token keys, global dismissal keys, and the global token order. Likewise, forget_identity_token_state removes an identity's global dismissal markers and token-order entries but does not remove its once-per-identity claim-hint keys. After a devnet reset or identity removal, re-importing the same identity can therefore display an advisory date from the old chain. Add identity-scope prefix cleanup for ONCE_PER_IDENTITY_CLAIM_PREFIX to both cleanup paths and cover it with a persistence regression test.
source: gpt-6.1-sol (phase2-reviewer: general, rust-quality)
Review provenance
Source: reviewer 1: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 2: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: rust-quality); final verifier: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: sol-verifier, role: final-verifier)
- Triage:
criticalbygpt-6.1-sol(effort low) — This is a large, intricate change that modifies token creation, distribution rules, fee estimation, claim construction, and network-enforced once-per-identity funds movement in src/backend_task/tokens/claim_tokens.rs and related token logic. - Phase 1 reviewers: not run (disabled for this repository)
- Fresh verifier:
gpt-6.1-sol— final-verifier; agentsol-verifier - Phase 2 reviewers:
gpt-6.1-sol— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— rust-quality (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `src/ui/tokens/tokens_screen/distributions.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] src/ui/tokens/tokens_screen/distributions.rs:1122-1127: Show inline validation when the once-per-identity amount is empty
When the distribution is enabled and the amount field loses focus while empty, the `!self.once_per_identity_amount_input.trim().is_empty()` guard skips `parse_once_per_identity_amount`. The user therefore sees no validation message under the field and only encounters the invalid value later through the registration flow. Validate on focus loss regardless of whether the field is empty so the required amount error is shown inline.
In `src/backend_task/tokens/mod.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] src/backend_task/tokens/mod.rs:259-272: Validate the contents of version 1 distribution rules in the backend
`ensure_distribution_rules_supported` checks only the `V1` enum tag and the protocol capability. A malformed `V1` value with no once-per-identity distribution, a zero amount, or an amount above `i64::MAX` can therefore proceed through the backend task and reach contract construction or signing before upstream validation rejects it. The backend is the authoritative enforcement layer, so it should validate the actual once-per-identity payload with the model validator before building or signing, with regression coverage for malformed `V1` rules.
In `src/context/contract_token_db.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] src/context/contract_token_db.rs:742-751: Clear once-claim hints during identity and devnet cleanup
The new claim hint is stored under `DetScope::Identity`, but devnet cleanup removes only global token keys, global dismissal keys, and the global token order. Likewise, `forget_identity_token_state` removes an identity's global dismissal markers and token-order entries but does not remove its once-per-identity claim-hint keys. After a devnet reset or identity removal, re-importing the same identity can therefore display an advisory date from the old chain. Add identity-scope prefix cleanup for `ONCE_PER_IDENTITY_CLAIM_PREFIX` to both cleanup paths and cover it with a persistence regression test.
| if response.lost_focus() && !self.once_per_identity_amount_input.trim().is_empty() { | ||
| self.once_per_identity_amount_error = | ||
| parse_once_per_identity_amount(&self.once_per_identity_amount_input) | ||
| .err() | ||
| .map(|error| error.to_string()); | ||
| } |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
🟡 Suggestion: Show inline validation when the once-per-identity amount is empty
When the distribution is enabled and the amount field loses focus while empty, the !self.once_per_identity_amount_input.trim().is_empty() guard skips parse_once_per_identity_amount. The user therefore sees no validation message under the field and only encounters the invalid value later through the registration flow. Validate on focus loss regardless of whether the field is empty so the required amount error is shown inline.
| if response.lost_focus() && !self.once_per_identity_amount_input.trim().is_empty() { | |
| self.once_per_identity_amount_error = | |
| parse_once_per_identity_amount(&self.once_per_identity_amount_input) | |
| .err() | |
| .map(|error| error.to_string()); | |
| } | |
| if response.lost_focus() { | |
| self.once_per_identity_amount_error = | |
| parse_once_per_identity_amount(&self.once_per_identity_amount_input) | |
| .err() | |
| .map(|error| error.to_string()); | |
| } |
source: gpt-6.1-sol (phase2-reviewer: general)
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Ready for review — files with no dedicated owner: lklimek. |
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Policy satisfied — this can merge. |
TL;DR: The token creator can add a once-per-identity distribution, a fixed amount every identity may claim exactly once, on networks that support it. The Claim screen claims exactly the distribution the user confirmed, and it notes, without blocking, when an identity may have already claimed.
Stacked atop #1114.
User story
As a token creator, I want every identity to be able to claim a fixed amount of my token exactly once, so that I can run a fair airdrop without a list of recipients (TOK-019).
Scenario
Base flow
Actual
The creator had no once-per-identity option, and the Claim screen could not claim one. The confirmation only asked whether to "claim tokens for this contract". It read the distribution when Confirm was pressed, so a distribution changed while the dialog was open was claimed instead of the one shown.
Expected
Detailed discussion
Capability::OncePerIdentityDistribution/FeatureGate::TokenOncePerIdentityDistribution(src/context/feature_gate.rs), open from protocol 14 (PROTOCOL_VERSION_14). Upstream names no feature constant for it. Claiming needs no gate, because such a token can only exist on such a network.src/model/token.rs):parse_once_per_identity_amountbounds the amount like a token balance (1..=i64::MAX), with a typedOncePerIdentityAmountError.once_per_identity_amountreads the distribution from a configuration.distribution_rules_with_once_per_identitykeeps version 0 rules unless the distribution is set, so tokens without it keep the format older networks accept.ensure_distribution_rules_supported(src/backend_task/tokens/mod.rs) refuses version 1 rules withTaskError::TokenOncePerIdentityNotSupportedbefore signing.model::fee_estimation::estimate_token_contract_registration. The creator passes it the fee table of the SDK's current version (platform_version()), so every term, includingtoken_uses_once_per_identity_distribution_fee, comes from one table.TaskError::TokenOncePerIdentityNotSupported's text, so all three read the same.src/ui/tokens/claim_tokens_screen.rs):PendingClaim), so confirming sends that exact claim. The confirmation text names the distribution.TokenOncePerIdentityAlreadyClaimedrefusal for the screen's identity and token turns Claim off for the once-per-identity distribution while the screen is open, with a note. It is never written to the hint, because a node's refusal is unproven.src/context/contract_token_db.rs,src/backend_task/tokens/claim_tokens.rs):det:token_once_claimed:v1:<token_id>.TaskError::TokensClaimedButClaimNotRecorded. The user learns the claim was made and is told not to claim again.TokenTask::ClearOncePerIdentityClaimHint/BackendTaskSuccessResult::OncePerIdentityClaimHintCleared, never a database write from the UI.src/backend_task/error.rs):TokenOncePerIdentityAlreadyClaimed(token, identity and claim time, from Platform's refusal) andInvalidOncePerIdentityDistributionAmount. Both keep the SDK error as their source.Testing
model::token: amount bounds; rules stay V0 without the distribution and become V1 with it.model::fee_estimation::tests::token_contract_registration_adds_each_feature_fee_from_the_given_tablebackend_task::tokens::tests::once_per_identity_rules_need_a_network_that_accepts_thembackend_task::tokens::claim_tokens::tests: recorded at the proved block time; an unrecordable claim says so; a failed claim or an "already claimed" refusal records nothing.context::contract_token_db: the hint is per identity and token; stored configurations with either rules version round-trip.ui::tokens::claim_tokens_screen::tests: the confirmation names the distribution and amount; confirming claims the distribution the confirmation named; dismissal goes through a backend task; a refused second claim turns Claim off without saving anything.ui::tokens::tokens_screen::tests::once_per_identity_distribution_builds_version_1_rules_only_on_protocol_14backend_task::error:once_per_identity_already_claimed_maps_to_its_variantand the amount case inprotocol_v14_consensus_errors_map_to_their_variants.context::feature_gate: the gate is closed at boot and on 13, open on 14, and closed on an unknown future version.cargo clippy --all-features --all-targets -- -D warningsandcargo fmt --allpass.🤖 Co-authored by Claudius the Magnificent AI Agent
🤖 Generated with Claude Code
https://claude.ai/code/session_012ujJpB9DBhvtbjhYB3aG9Q
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b92dcd0docs/user-stories.md,src/backend_task/error.rs,src/backend_task/mod.rsand 12 more) — approved by lklimekWhen every merge requirement is met, the
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