Skip to content

Security: bloodf/vezuna

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Vezuna stores personal health records on the device. Please report vulnerabilities privately.

Reporting a vulnerability

  1. Open the repository's Security tab and choose Report a vulnerability (GitHub private vulnerability reporting).
  2. If that option is not available, open a public issue that says only that you have a security report and asks for a private channel. Do not put details, exploit steps, or health data in the issue.

Include: affected platform (Android/iOS), app version or commit, reproduction steps, impact, and a suggested fix if you have one. Use synthetic data only. Never attach real medical documents, screenshots of real records, vault files, or backups.

No response-time commitment or bug bounty exists. The project is maintained on a best-effort basis.

Supported versions

Only the latest commit on the default branch is supported. No stable release has been published yet.

Scope

In scope:

  • Encrypted vault, key handling, and BackupService envelope (shared/src/*/security/, iosApp/Vezuna/CryptoKitAesGcm.swift, iosApp/Vezuna/AppFileStorage.swift).
  • Source import (camera, image, PDF, OCR) and the lab importer parsing.
  • Model file handling and SHA-256 verification (shared/.../llm/ModelManager.kt, composeApp/.../llm/AndroidModelFileStore.kt).
  • Export and sharing (FileProvider in composeApp/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml, PDF/CSV exporters).
  • Licensing gates (Play LVL, StoreKit) that must never gate records or exports.
  • Unintended network access or data leaving the device.

Out of scope: physical access to an unlocked device, rooted/jailbroken devices, vulnerabilities in third-party dependencies that are already fixed upstream (report upstream, then tell us to bump the version), social engineering, and clinical accuracy of OCR output (report as a regular bug).

Known limits (read before reporting)

These are documented design limits, not undisclosed vulnerabilities:

  • iOS key storage. The vault master key is a random 32-byte file in the app's protected directory (NSFileProtectionComplete), not a Keychain item. Ciphertext and key sit in the same sandbox. Protection depends on iOS file protection and device lock.
  • Android key storage. AES-256-GCM key in Android Keystore (KeyGenParameterSpec, not exportable by the app). StrongBox is not requested.
  • No passphrase recovery. BackupService writes passphrase-sealed portable backups that open on any device. A lost passphrase cannot be recovered. Older same-device envelopes open only with the original device key.
  • Debug builds. DEBUG_PREMIUM_BYPASS is true in the debug build type and enables premium/AI features when no VEZUNA_LVL_PUBLIC_KEY is set. It is false in release. Do not distribute debug builds.
  • Release hardening. isMinifyEnabled is false for Android release builds.
  • Vendored Play LVL code. The Google Play Licensing library is vendored (Apache-2.0) and uses AESObfuscator with a fixed IV, as upstream does. Licensing is a deterrent, not strong DRM.
  • No audit. The project has had no independent security audit or certification.
  • Local AI. Output of the local model is unverified text, not medical advice. Model files are verified by SHA-256 against catalog metadata; the catalog itself must come from a trusted store channel.
  • Shared exports. Exported PDF/CSV and backup files leave the app's encryption when the user shares them. They are staged in the app cache (cache-path entries in file_paths.xml).

Handling sensitive data when contributing

Never commit real health data, signing keys (*.keystore, *.jks), the Play LVL key from a private build, store credentials, or model binaries. See CONTRIBUTING.md.

There aren't any published security advisories