Vezuna stores personal health records on the device. Please report vulnerabilities privately.
- Open the repository's Security tab and choose Report a vulnerability (GitHub private vulnerability reporting).
- If that option is not available, open a public issue that says only that you have a security report and asks for a private channel. Do not put details, exploit steps, or health data in the issue.
Include: affected platform (Android/iOS), app version or commit, reproduction steps, impact, and a suggested fix if you have one. Use synthetic data only. Never attach real medical documents, screenshots of real records, vault files, or backups.
No response-time commitment or bug bounty exists. The project is maintained on a best-effort basis.
Only the latest commit on the default branch is supported. No stable release has been published yet.
In scope:
- Encrypted vault, key handling, and
BackupServiceenvelope (shared/src/*/security/,iosApp/Vezuna/CryptoKitAesGcm.swift,iosApp/Vezuna/AppFileStorage.swift). - Source import (camera, image, PDF, OCR) and the lab importer parsing.
- Model file handling and SHA-256 verification (
shared/.../llm/ModelManager.kt,composeApp/.../llm/AndroidModelFileStore.kt). - Export and sharing (
FileProviderincomposeApp/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml, PDF/CSV exporters). - Licensing gates (Play LVL, StoreKit) that must never gate records or exports.
- Unintended network access or data leaving the device.
Out of scope: physical access to an unlocked device, rooted/jailbroken devices, vulnerabilities in third-party dependencies that are already fixed upstream (report upstream, then tell us to bump the version), social engineering, and clinical accuracy of OCR output (report as a regular bug).
These are documented design limits, not undisclosed vulnerabilities:
- iOS key storage. The vault master key is a random 32-byte file in the app's protected directory (
NSFileProtectionComplete), not a Keychain item. Ciphertext and key sit in the same sandbox. Protection depends on iOS file protection and device lock. - Android key storage. AES-256-GCM key in Android Keystore (
KeyGenParameterSpec, not exportable by the app). StrongBox is not requested. - No passphrase recovery.
BackupServicewrites passphrase-sealed portable backups that open on any device. A lost passphrase cannot be recovered. Older same-device envelopes open only with the original device key. - Debug builds.
DEBUG_PREMIUM_BYPASSistruein the debug build type and enables premium/AI features when noVEZUNA_LVL_PUBLIC_KEYis set. It isfalsein release. Do not distribute debug builds. - Release hardening.
isMinifyEnabledisfalsefor Android release builds. - Vendored Play LVL code. The Google Play Licensing library is vendored (Apache-2.0) and uses
AESObfuscatorwith a fixed IV, as upstream does. Licensing is a deterrent, not strong DRM. - No audit. The project has had no independent security audit or certification.
- Local AI. Output of the local model is unverified text, not medical advice. Model files are verified by SHA-256 against catalog metadata; the catalog itself must come from a trusted store channel.
- Shared exports. Exported PDF/CSV and backup files leave the app's encryption when the user shares them. They are staged in the app cache (
cache-pathentries infile_paths.xml).
Never commit real health data, signing keys (*.keystore, *.jks), the Play LVL key from a private build, store credentials, or model binaries. See CONTRIBUTING.md.