Document security fix for subagent tool privilege escalation - #102
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Rafael Asor (Attenu) reported the subagent privilege escalation privately and asked to be credited as "Rafael Asor (Attenu)" with a link to attenu-guard. Also records that no released version was affected. v1.2.0 was tagged at 07:49 on 3 September and the delegation tool landed at 16:17 the same day, so the issue existed only on main, between a5a401c and the fix. Anyone running a release was never exposed, and a changelog entry that leaves that unsaid reads as though they were. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ToCUNy2SqwvfTq4a6xfSk1
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Summary
Updates the CHANGELOG to document a critical security vulnerability fix and credit the reporter. The issue involved subagents being able to exceed their parent agent's tool privileges through prompt injection, potentially granting access to dangerous tools like
execute_shell_command,delete_agent, andplace_order.Changes
main.Details
The fix itself (tool intersection logic in
_build_subagent_tools) was already implemented. This change documents:mainonlyThis improves transparency and gives proper credit to the security researcher who responsibly disclosed the vulnerability.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01ToCUNy2SqwvfTq4a6xfSk1