Skip to content

Security: angelitosystems/AngelitoPDF

Security

docs/security.md

Security

Threat model: HTML/CSS and template data may contain untrusted input (customer names, clinical notes). Options (RenderOptions) and templates are trusted developer input.

Guarantees (each has a test in crates/angelito-pdf/tests/security.rs)

Guarantee Test
No HTTP/HTTPS fetches, ever remote_resources_are_not_fetched
No local file reads unless baseDir is set no_file_access_without_base_dir
Reads confined to baseDir (../ blocked) base_dir_allows_inside_and_blocks_traversal
UNC / SMB paths (file://host/…, //host/…, @import) rejected before touching the network unc_paths_never_touch_the_network
<img src> never reads disk by itself (only registered images) images_are_embedded_only_when_registered
Template data HTML-escaped; data is never evaluated as template code template_data_is_rendered_and_html_escaped
Template CPU bounded (fuel) template_cpu_is_bounded
Input size capped (default 10 MiB), also on CLI stdin input_size_limit_is_enforced, oversize_stdin_is_rejected
Renderer panics become Error::Render("internal renderer error"); CLI prints no paths renderer_panic_becomes_an_error
Deep nesting: 400 levels render; estimated depth > 10,000 rejected up front (NestingTooDeep), also after templating; 256 MiB render-thread stack. Content deeper than 512 levels is dropped by the renderer deep_nesting_does_not_overflow_the_stack
Parse errors never written to stdout CLI stdin_to_stdout_is_a_clean_pdf_even_with_malformed_html

Known open issues (from the phase-1 security review)

  1. Memory bomb via SVG <image href="data:…">: a 1.5 MB input decoding to a 20000×20000 image peaked at ~1.1 GB. No pixel cap yet. Mitigation until fixed: run the CLI under an OS memory limit (cgroup / ulimit -v / Windows job object). The PHP package will set a process timeout.
  2. Stack overflow is prevented by the depth pre-check (release builds overflowed at 300k–1M levels; the limit is 10,000). Other unbounded recursion in the renderer is not ruled out — fuzzing is pending.
  3. No wall-clock timeout inside the library. The CLI caller (PHP) must apply one.
  4. Do not use the |safe filter on user data in templates; it disables escaping.
  5. Templates are trusted: they must not come from end users.

Accepted dependency advisories

cargo deny check runs in CI. These unmaintained notices (no known vulnerability) are accepted in deny.toml because they reach us only through the renderer and cannot be swapped independently:

ID Crate Path
RUSTSEC-2024-0436 paste (proc-macro, build time only) fulgur-core → woff2-patched → safer-bytes
RUSTSEC-2026-0206 rustybuzz (text shaping) krilla, usvg
RUSTSEC-2026-0192 ttf-parser (font parsing) fontdb, krilla

Font parsing is the relevant attack surface: fonts are only loaded from paths the integrator passes in fonts (or system fonts), never from the HTML. Revisit on each Fulgur upgrade.

There aren't any published security advisories