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Security: agentcarlosian/NMLT

SECURITY.md

Security policy

NMLT is pre-alpha programming-language and mathematics research. It has no supported production release and must not be used to authorize safety-critical, security-critical, financial, or irreversible effects.

Reporting a vulnerability

Do not disclose an exploitable vulnerability in a public issue.

  1. Prefer a private GitHub security advisory for the repository.
  2. If that is unavailable, email the maintainer at carlosian@agentmail.to.

Include the affected revision, impact, minimal reproduction conditions, the trust boundary crossed, and whether the result is proven, observed, suspected, or indeterminate. Never send credentials, private source, or destructive payloads.

Current security boundary

The active repository contains:

  • a Rust lossless frontend, resolver, typed IR, elaborator, and retained typed-elaboration validator;
  • a Rust producer for canonical behavior-core-v1 artifacts;
  • Lean definitions, artifact decoding, finite semantic construction, and conditional composition/refinement theorems;
  • a Rust bounded explorer with no verification authority; and
  • CI gates for Rust, Lean, artifact mutations, unchecked proof placeholders, and focused theorem dependencies.

It does not contain the former active temporal checker, finite VC verifier, agentic repair evaluator, standalone grade analyzer, evidence-manifest system, or contest release workflow. Those systems are historical and recoverable from the build-week-judge-demo-2026 tag.

The current trusted-component inventory is security/trusted-components.toml. The active attacker stories and residual trust are documented in docs/threat-model.md.

Important limitations

  • Rust-to-Lean translation is not verified.
  • A source digest identifies supplied source bytes; it does not prove that an arbitrary artifact was compiled from them.
  • The Rust explorer cannot issue a proof, model-check, evidence, or runtime authorization claim.
  • The dynamic Lean result is conditional one-step lifting, not reachability or liveness.
  • Digests provide byte identity, not authorship, freshness, signing, or transparency.
  • The host, toolchain bootstrap, dependencies, runner image, linker, and filesystem remain trusted.

Any report that raises a result above those limits is a security-relevant claim integrity issue even when it does not create conventional memory corruption.

There aren't any published security advisories