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Security: Zaygalx/cloudpin

Security

SECURITY.md

Security policy

Reporting a vulnerability

Please report security problems privately through GitHub's private vulnerability reporting rather than in a public issue. You'll get a reply within a few days, and credit in the release notes if you'd like it.

Examples of what counts as a security problem here:

  • a way for a command to run on an account other than the pinned one without CLOUDPIN_SKIP;
  • a way for an agent to bypass the hook;
  • cloudpin printing, logging or storing a credential;
  • command injection through arguments that cloudpin passes to a CLI.

What cloudpin does with your accounts

  • It runs each CLI's own identity command (az account show, aws sts get-caller-identity, gcloud config list, vercel teams ls, gh api user, supabase projects list, wrangler whoami --json) with the same flags and environment as your command, and reads the result. For Kubernetes, Supabase and Wrangler it also reads project files that name the target (the kubeconfig, supabase/.temp/, the Wrangler config and its account cache).
  • It never logs in, logs out or switches accounts, and never uses or stores a token or key. Credential files are not read, with two exceptions: the kubeconfig, which can hold credentials next to the cluster list (cloudpin takes only the server and namespace from it), and the project's .env files that Wrangler loads, which can hold CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN (cloudpin reads the account variables from them, and keys its cache on a salted hash of the credential variables; it never prints, logs or stores their values). For Vercel it checks whether a login file exists, without reading it.
  • It stores successful identity answers for up to five minutes in a cache file in your user cache folder. Keys are salted hashes, so tokens and command arguments are never written in clear.
  • cloudpin mcp, the MCP server for agents, is read-only: its two tools report status and what cloudpin would decide for a command; they never run that command, log in, switch accounts or write anything.
  • It has no telemetry and sends nothing about you or your accounts. Its one request of its own asks registry.npmjs.org for the latest cloudpin version (public data; the request names only the package), at most once a day, and only from cloudpin's own commands run in a terminal: never from the shell wrappers, cloudpin exec or the agent hooks, and never in CI. cloudpin doctor also checks when you run it. Turn it off with CLOUDPIN_NO_UPDATE_CHECK=1 or NO_UPDATE_NOTIFIER=1.

Verifying a release

Every version is built and published by this repository's release workflow, never from a laptop: npm shows its provenance, and from 0.4.0 each tag also has a GitHub Release with the package tarball, a SHA-256 checksum file and a signed build-provenance attestation. npm packs reproducibly, so the tarball is the same file npm serves. From 1.2.0 the release also has cloudpin-<version>-windows.zip, the file the Scoop bucket installs, in the same checksum file and attestation. To check one:

gh attestation verify cloudpin-<version>.tgz --repo paureis/cloudpin
gh attestation verify cloudpin-<version>-windows.zip --repo paureis/cloudpin   # from 1.2.0
sha256sum -c --ignore-missing SHA256SUMS
npm view cloudpin@<version> dist.integrity   # npm's sha512 for the same file

Supported versions

Security fixes go into the latest release.

There aren't any published security advisories