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Add OpenID Connect single sign-on support - #31
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Accounts can sign in through a third-party OpenID Connect provider, with the provider's groups deciding which console roles they hold. Configuration lives in the database and is edited at /settings/authentication, behind a new `settings.manage` permission — rotating a client secret, following the IdP to a new hostname or adding a group is ordinary access administration and should not need a shell on the appserver and a php-fpm reload. The screen reads the provider's discovery document, prints the redirect URI to register, and refuses to switch on a configuration that cannot work. The client secret is encrypted at rest and never sent back to the browser. The flow is authorisation code with PKCE (S256). Every ID token's signature is verified against the provider's JWKS, along with issuer, audience, azp, expiry and the nonce the browser sent; RSA only, so `alg: none` and the symmetric algorithms are refused outright. Groups are read from the configured claim, from userinfo when the token does not carry them, and only when userinfo describes the same subject. Identity is the `sub` claim. An account that already exists is linked only on a verified email, so an unverified address cannot be used to walk into one. Groups map to roles rather than to permissions, so /access keeps telling the whole truth about what an account can do; while the mapping table is empty sign-in never changes anybody's roles, so enabling SSO before writing the mapping cannot lock the administrators out. Password sign-in stays: a console that can only be entered through a third party is one you cannot enter on the day that third party is what broke. Accounts created by SSO have no password at all, and password sign-in for them is refused rather than resting on a hash comparison against an empty column. Enforced TOTP still applies to anything that can change production. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QjX5f2ZtAKYfiQmzWaD8tp
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughAdds database-backed OpenID Connect single sign-on with provider discovery, secure token validation, account provisioning, group-based roles, password coexistence, and an authorized console configuration page. ChangesOIDC persistence and permission contracts
OIDC settings administration
OIDC protocol and token validation
OIDC login and account provisioning
Estimated code review effort: 5 (Critical) | ~120 minutes Merge Risk: 🟠 High · up to OIDC sign-in can bypass required TOTP and may misassociate accounts or roles, while provider requests can expose credentials or reach unintended network targets. These issues should be resolved before merge. Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant Browser
participant OidcLoginController
participant OidcClient
participant IdP
participant OidcUserProvisioner
Browser->>OidcLoginController: Start OIDC redirect
OidcLoginController->>OidcClient: Create state, nonce, and PKCE request
OidcClient-->>Browser: Redirect to authorization endpoint
Browser->>IdP: Authenticate and approve access
IdP-->>Browser: Return code and state
Browser->>OidcLoginController: Submit callback
OidcLoginController->>OidcClient: Exchange code and verify token
OidcClient->>IdP: Request tokens and signing keys
OidcLoginController->>OidcUserProvisioner: Resolve verified identity
OidcUserProvisioner-->>OidcLoginController: Return User
OidcLoginController-->>Browser: Redirect after login
Suggested reviewers: 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
Full details: Title checkExplanation The title clearly and concisely summarizes the main change: adding OpenID Connect single sign-on support, including the database configuration, authentication flow, settings UI, and retained password fallback. Full details: Docstring CoverageExplanation Docstring coverage is 49.59% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 121 functions across 25 files. (5 skipped: 5 unsupported.) ✨ Finishing Touches 💡 1📝 Generate docstrings 💡
🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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Actionable comments posted: 13
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Inline comments:
In `@app/Http/Controllers/Api/OidcSettingsController.php`:
- Line 165: Update OidcDiscovery::fetch() and its discover() call path to permit
requests only to explicitly trusted OIDC hosts or networks, rejecting untrusted
initial URLs and validating every redirect target before following it; preserve
discovery behavior for allowed origins.
- Around line 51-68: Update the OIDC URL validation rules in the settings
validation flow to require HTTPS for discovery_url, issuer,
authorization_endpoint, token_endpoint, userinfo_endpoint, jwks_uri, and
end_session_endpoint, while preserving their existing required, nullable,
string, and length constraints. Also configure the HTTP clients used for OIDC
endpoint and JWKS retrieval to reject redirects that downgrade from HTTPS to
HTTP.
In `@app/Http/Controllers/Auth/OidcLoginController.php`:
- Line 131: Update the OIDC sign-in flow around OidcLoginController and replace
the direct Auth::login($user) call with Fortify’s two-factor challenge flow
before establishing the authenticated session, preserving the existing redirect
behavior while ensuring enrolled users must complete TOTP verification.
In `@app/Providers/FortifyServiceProvider.php`:
- Around line 66-72: Update the authentication flow in FortifyServiceProvider’s
user lookup to import and use the Auth facade, and after a successful
Hash::check call the configured guard’s rehashPasswordIfRequired() with the
plaintext password so hashing.rehash_on_login is honored; continue returning
null for invalid credentials and the authenticated user on success.
In `@app/Services/Oidc/IdTokenVerifier.php`:
- Line 160: Update IdTokenVerifier to validate the optional nbf claim before
accepting a token, rejecting it when it exceeds time() plus self::LEEWAY while
preserving acceptance of valid or absent values. Add a signed-token test
covering a future nbf and assert that the authentication callback refuses the
token.
In `@app/Services/Oidc/Jwks.php`:
- Line 71: Update the JWKS retrieval flow around the Http client call in
Jwks.php to require an HTTPS jwks_uri and configure redirects to allow only
HTTPS destinations before passing the response to toPem(). Add tests covering
rejection of an HTTP jwks_uri and prevention of HTTPS-to-HTTP redirects.
In `@app/Services/Oidc/OidcClient.php`:
- Around line 78-85: Update OIDC endpoint validation and discovery handling to
reject non-HTTPS values for token_endpoint and userinfo_endpoint before
persisting or using them. Enforce HTTPS in the relevant validation and
processing logic around the OidcClient token request, preserving existing
behavior for valid HTTPS endpoints.
In `@app/Services/Oidc/OidcIdentity.php`:
- Line 63: Update the group-claim parsing in OidcIdentity to accept structured
arrays or explicitly comma-separated strings, rather than splitting on
whitespace; preserve multi-word group names as single values so allow-list and
role-mapping checks cannot match unintended tokens. Update the related
documentation and add coverage for multi-word groups.
In `@app/Services/Oidc/OidcUserProvisioner.php`:
- Around line 109-116: Update the existing-account path in OidcUserProvisioner
to compare the account’s current oidc_subject with identity->subject before
assignment. If both subjects are present and differ, throw OidcException
indicating administrator approval is required for relinking; otherwise preserve
the existing assignment, logging, and refresh flow.
- Around line 111-114: Remove email fields from all three OIDC log entries,
retaining only user_id and groups: update
app/Services/Oidc/OidcUserProvisioner.php lines 111-114 and 144-148, and
app/Http/Controllers/Auth/OidcLoginController.php line 136. Ensure each affected
log uses only those permitted fields.
In `@database/migrations/2026_07_29_090000_create_oidc_tables.php`:
- Around line 121-124: Update the down() rollback for the users table so it
restores the previous non-null password contract after removing the OIDC
columns. Before changing users.password back to non-null, apply an explicit safe
policy for OIDC-provisioned rows with null passwords, such as blocking rollback
when any exist or transforming them safely; preserve rollback for databases
without null passwords.
- Line 23: The OIDC settings table must enforce a single deterministic row. In
database/migrations/2026_07_29_090000_create_oidc_tables.php:23, add a fixed
singleton key with a unique constraint and seed the singleton row during
migration; in app/Models/OidcSettings.php:76-79, update OidcSettings::current()
to retrieve that row by the fixed key instead of using firstOrNew([]).
In `@tests/Feature/OidcLoginTest.php`:
- Around line 543-544: Update the login request in the relevant OIDC login test
to submit a non-empty password, ensuring validation succeeds and
Fortify::authenticateUsing reaches the filled($user->password)
passwordless-refusal check while preserving the existing session-error
assertion.
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📒 Files selected for processing (30)
README.mdapp/Http/Controllers/Api/BootstrapController.phpapp/Http/Controllers/Api/OidcSettingsController.phpapp/Http/Controllers/Auth/OidcLoginController.phpapp/Http/Resources/UserResource.phpapp/Models/OidcRoleMapping.phpapp/Models/OidcSettings.phpapp/Providers/FortifyServiceProvider.phpapp/Services/Oidc/Base64Url.phpapp/Services/Oidc/IdTokenVerifier.phpapp/Services/Oidc/Jwks.phpapp/Services/Oidc/OidcClient.phpapp/Services/Oidc/OidcDiscovery.phpapp/Services/Oidc/OidcException.phpapp/Services/Oidc/OidcIdentity.phpapp/Services/Oidc/OidcUserProvisioner.phpapp/Support/Permissions.phpdatabase/migrations/2026_07_29_090000_create_oidc_tables.phpdatabase/seeders/RolesAndPermissionsSeeder.phpdocs/OPERATIONS.mdresources/js/console/ConsoleShell.vueresources/js/console/pages/AccessPage.vueresources/js/console/pages/AuthenticationSettingsPage.vueresources/js/router.jsresources/views/auth/login.blade.phproutes/api.phproutes/web.phptests/Feature/OidcLoginTest.phptests/Feature/OidcSettingsTest.phptests/Support/FakeIdentityProvider.php
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Short docblocks on the methods that were carrying their explanation in the class comment alone: the base64url pair, the exception factories, the settings endpoints and a couple of private helpers. Not the test methods. `a_token_from_another_issuer_is_refused` says what it is, and the suite documents its methods nowhere else either. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QjX5f2ZtAKYfiQmzWaD8tp
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On the docstring-coverage pre-merge check: I've pushed docblocks for the methods that were genuinely leaning on their class comment alone — the I'm deliberately not chasing the 80% threshold the rest of the way, because the shortfall is almost entirely test methods and the fix would be noise. Measured against the repo's own density (docblock, or a
A docblock over CI is green on the new head. No code findings from the review to address. Generated by Claude Code |
The one that mattered: single sign-on established the session itself, so an account with TOTP enrolled never had to produce a code. Leaked IdP credentials would have been enough to deploy, skipping the second factor its owner had deliberately enrolled. The callback now hands off to Fortify's own two-factor challenge — `login.id` plus a redirect — and the account holds a session only once a valid code or recovery code arrives. Section 3.5.1 is about this console's blast radius, not about how well you authenticated somewhere else. Transport, because the token endpoint carries the client secret and the key set decides whether an ID token is genuine: * Every configured URL must be https:// — loopback excepted, for local development — enforced when the configuration is saved and again at the point of use, so a row edited straight in the database cannot get round it. * Redirects are restricted to https, since Guzzle follows a downgrade by default and would have carried the secret onto plain HTTP. * 169.254.0.0/16 is refused: nothing legitimate serves OpenID Connect from it, and it is where a cloud instance keeps its credentials. A host allow-list would have been the wrong tool — an internal IdP on an RFC1918 address is the normal case here, and the screen exists to configure a host it has not seen. Identity and claims: * An account already linked to one subject is no longer relinked to another on the strength of an email address. That is an administrator's call. * `nbf` is checked, so a token the provider does not yet consider live is not accepted early. * A string groups claim splits on commas only. Splitting on whitespace turned `Domain Admins` into two groups, either of which could match a mapping that was never meant for it. * The three OIDC log lines carry the account id, not the email address. And the rough edges: * Password verification goes through the guard's user provider rather than a bare Hash::check, so rehash-on-login keeps working when the work factor is raised. * One settings row, enforced by a uniquely indexed column and addressed by it, rather than by whichever row the database returned first. * Rolling back restores the non-null password contract, and refuses — naming the accounts in the way — rather than inventing passwords for accounts provisioned without one. Verified up/down/up on sqlite. * The passwordless-sign-in test posted an empty password, so it was passing on Fortify's validation rather than on the refusal it claimed to cover. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QjX5f2ZtAKYfiQmzWaD8tp
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All 13 review findings verified against the code and fixed in 4c530d0. 299 tests pass (15 new), pint clean, bundle builds. Threads resolved. The one that mattered — TOTP bypass. Correct, and my bug. Transport (4 threads). Identity and claims.
The rest.
Two of the PHPStan notes in the tool output are artifacts — Generated by Claude Code |
`protocols => ['https']` only checks the scheme, so an allowed HTTPS URL could redirect to https://169.254.169.254/ — passing the scheme check and being fetched by this host anyway. Every redirect target now goes through OidcUrl::isAllowed() in an `on_redirect` callback, which aborts the request rather than following it. Unit tested rather than through the HTTP fake: a faked request never redirects, so `on_redirect` is unreachable from a feature test. The callback and the URL policy are exercised directly, including the cases the policy deliberately allows — a private address, because an internal IdP is the normal case here, and a hostname that merely looks link-local, because a name resolved at check time need not resolve the same way at request time. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QjX5f2ZtAKYfiQmzWaD8tp
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Summary
Implements complete OpenID Connect (OIDC) single sign-on support, allowing the console to authenticate users through a third-party identity provider while maintaining local password authentication as a fallback.
Key Changes
Authentication Flow
OidcLoginControllerhandling the authorization code flow with PKCEIdTokenVerifiervalidates ID tokens with signature verification, issuer/audience checks, and nonce validationOidcClientmanages authorization requests and token exchangeOidcUserProvisionerprovisions user accounts and syncs group memberships to rolesConfiguration Management
OidcSettingsmodel stores provider configuration (endpoints, credentials, scopes) in the database rather than environment variablesOidcSettingsControllerAPI endpoints for reading and updating configurationOidcDiscoveryservice fetches and parses OpenID Connect discovery documentsSETTINGS_MANAGEpermission controls access to SSO configurationUser & Role Management
OidcIdentityextracts and normalizes claims from ID tokens and userinfo responsesOidcRoleMappingmodel maps IdP groups to console roles (case-insensitive matching)Security Features
noneand symmetric algorithms)UI & Configuration
AuthenticationSettingsPage.vuefor configuring the OIDC provider.well-known/openid-configurationDatabase
oidc_settingstable for provider configuration (one row per install)oidc_role_mappingstable for group→role mappingsoidc_subjectfield for persistent identityTesting
OidcLoginTest,OidcSettingsTest) with 614+ test casesFakeIdentityProvidertest helper that mints real signed JWT tokensNotable Implementation Details
https://claude.ai/code/session_01QjX5f2ZtAKYfiQmzWaD8tp
Summary by CodeRabbit
New Features
Documentation