Expose scoped Reviewer build and verification evidence

PROJECT.md

@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
 # FlyBot — Project State
 
 
+#2378 reuses role Apps for bounded PR/CI reads and hash-verified host logs in Reviewer scratch; absence or incomplete pages are not verification success.
+
+
 #2375 adds explicit exit-proven claim retirement through existing pools/Effects; preserve drafts, pending results and unknown writes. No cancellation or automatic routing.
 
 #2377 makes successor baseline choice explicit and durable; preserve cancelled history, Task-role context and draft lineage without inventing PR or test evidence.
@@ -221,28 +224,16 @@ cutover identities, unknown-exit barriers and private-context publication approv
 Original host/service deployment and real-provider acceptance remain separate.
 See canonical Task, storage, service, compatibility and deployment documentation.
 
-### Remaining backend convergence — #2292
-
-Task execution pins its associated repository independently of Project defaults; local repository-free decision Tasks preserve normal Sessions/handoff/Chief acceptance without inventing code/tests. Actual Codex validation exposed malformed Chief requirement output: types are now explicit, failed admission is visibly blocked and valid retry retains history. Release Tasks now separate explicit human/watch publication authority, durable external observation and Chief closure; unknown results reconcile without repeated publication. Attempt logs and legacy agent history now return bounded hash-bound pages with lossless source references. Initial execution pins an approved active logical role/capability, catalog revision and Task requirements revision. Default developer remains compatible; a unique custom developer can replace it, while ambiguity needs an explicit target. Chief start Effects, capacity queues and Attempts retain the choice. Catalog/requirements changes block pending work for explicit recovery; active Session conventions remain frozen.
-
-#2334 follow-up (updated issue): shell 127 / missing test runners are environment
-blockers. testsStarted records command invocation; stage distinguishes runner startup
-from preparation and tests. Nested Node test markers do not enter host verification.
-
-#2338 preflights input receipts before host side effects and returns correctable
-errors to the original role/Chief Session. Frozen proposals, bounded tool-free
-correction and durable receipts preserve work; stale/revoked input stays denied.
-
-#2347 recovers birth-proven unmanaged native Chief invocations, preserves unknown
-external execution, and admits explicit sealed-candidate verification continuation
-under current authority/context gates. No live rollout or unknown-exit override.
+### Current delivery guarantees
 
-#2331 permits a valid current-SHA Reviewer approval to enter an explicitly scoped
-host merge Effect. Current branch/check/identity/exit gates remain; actual merge
-is separate from Chief Task completion, signed forge review, release and deployment.
+Tasks pin their associated repository and approved role/requirements revisions;
+repository-free decisions do not invent code or tests. Release publication needs
+explicit authority, observed Effects and Chief closure. Large histories use bounded
+hash-bound pages. Missing runner/dependencies are environment failures, not assertion
+failures. Receipts use same-context bounded correction and never acknowledge stale
+inputs. Recovery preserves exact exit proof, candidate/Session/history and permits
+evidence-supported verification continuation. Reviewer approve, host merge, signed
+forge review, release/deployment and Chief acceptance remain distinct. Operations
+consultation uses scoped personal agents; watch grants no host privileges.
 
-#2342 keeps autonomous progress as Chief guidance under configurable action/time
-budgets. Explicit human-selected operations contacts receive only scoped Project
-assistance; replies bind the original question, requirements, generation and
-candidate. Original inbox/Effects and schedules handle notification compensation;
-watch never grants host privileges. See [assistance](docs/chief-assistance.md).
+Detailed dated implementation checkpoints are [preserved verbatim](docs/history/2026-11-04-reliability-memory-checkpoints.md); current contracts remain in the owned subsystem docs.

ROADMAP.md

@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
 # FlyBot — Roadmap
 
 
+#2378: enable explicit Actions reads/download hosts and retrievable exact-SHA test artifacts; real installed-App/private-repository acceptance remains separate.
+
+
 #2375: retire proven exited responsibility before fresh integration admission; source/isolated tests remain separate from live recovery.
 
 #2377: continue the verified original seed or explicitly integrate a new baseline; no silent draft reset or cancelled Attempt revival.
@@ -178,27 +181,9 @@ exit retains capacity. Real-provider parallel/restart/migration/UI and Release
 operational acceptance remain distinct pending evidence under #2292. Previously
 deferred multi-repository automation is not reactivated by this recovery work.
 
-Updated #2334 acceptance adds actual npm missing-vitest/127 classification and
-clean/prepare/same-candidate retest coverage; it remains a source/test follow-up,
-not live npm ci provisioning or production Vitest acceptance.
-
-#2338: bounded input receipt correction in the original Task-role/Chief context,
-with all-plan preflight, immutable business evidence and explicit incomplete
-recovery. Tests distinguish deterministic role transport and actual SDK execution
-with a local provider fixture from paid-model/live project acceptance.
-
-#2347 adds bounded inspection/stop reconciliation, explicit recovery facts and
-same-Attempt Tester/Reviewer continuation. Real disposable unmanaged DSH restart
-reaches a later original scheduled inspection with deterministic inference; paid
-model/live-instance acceptance stays separate. Legacy missing namespace evidence
-requires exact operator corroboration, never a guessed worker release.
-
-#2331: authorized host merge follows Reviewer approval through original broker/
-Effects, with Draft ready, configured CI/review/queue and unknown-write recovery.
-Runtime merge is opt-in per repository/base; contributor delivery still follows
-Owner-authorized CI/merge scope and does not authorize a deployment.
-
-#2342: scoped operations consultation, original-message notification reminders,
-configurable compensation schedules and current-state reply fences. Disposable
-DSH/HTTP acceptance separates deterministic Chief/native/external protocol evidence
-from paid-model judgement, actual host repair and production rollout.
+Current reliability guarantees: environment attribution is separate from code
+verification; receipt correction retains context and evidence; recovery retains
+exact exit and scope fences; configured host merge is separate from Chief closure;
+operations replies are input, not implicit recovery. Historical acceptance notes
+are [preserved verbatim](docs/history/2026-11-04-reliability-memory-checkpoints.md).
+Real provider/App/SDK, deployment and UI acceptance remain separate from fixtures.

changelog.d/2378.fixed.md

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Expose scoped Reviewer Actions access, explicit paged GitHub evidence and hash-verified host-test logs in resource scratch without changing candidate or acceptance boundaries.

core/src/host/project-codex-config.js

@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ function cli(executable, args, { env, cwd, signal, rpc = false }) {
   })
 }
 
+export const roleGithubDomains = scope => scope ? Object.fromEntries(['github.com', 'api.github.com', 'objects.githubusercontent.com', 'codeload.github.com', ...(scope.downloadHosts ?? [])].map(host => [host, 'allow'])) : {}
 export async function validateCodexConfiguration(request, options, { executable, pathDirectory } = codexExecutable()) {
   const declared = options.configOverrides.find(value => value.startsWith('permissions.flybot-role='))
   if (!request.noTools && (!declared || /":tmp"\s*=/.test(declared))) throw failure('permission-profile-mismatch')
@@ -92,7 +93,7 @@ export async function validateCodexConfiguration(request, options, { executable,
     // layers establish a conflict. Never log their values or credential material.
     if (!Array.isArray(resolved.layers) || resolved.layers.some(layer => Object.hasOwn(layer.config ?? {}, 'sandbox_mode') || Object.hasOwn(layer.config ?? {}, 'sandbox_workspace_write')) || resolved.config?.default_permissions !== 'flybot-role') throw failure('legacy-sandbox-conflict')
     const profile = resolved.config?.permissions?.['flybot-role']
-    if (profile?.extends !== (request.readOnly ? ':read-only' : ':workspace') || profile.filesystem?.[':tmpdir'] !== 'write' || Object.keys(profile.filesystem ?? {}).some(key => key.startsWith(':') && key !== ':tmpdir') || profile.network?.mode !== 'limited' || !sameRules(profile.network?.domains, request.roleGithub ? { 'github.com': 'allow', 'api.github.com': 'allow' } : {}) || !sameRules(profile.network?.unix_sockets, {}) || resolved.config?.features?.network_proxy !== true) throw failure('permission-profile-mismatch')
+    if (profile?.extends !== (request.readOnly ? ':read-only' : ':workspace') || profile.filesystem?.[':tmpdir'] !== 'write' || Object.keys(profile.filesystem ?? {}).some(key => key.startsWith(':') && key !== ':tmpdir') || profile.network?.mode !== 'limited' || !sameRules(profile.network?.domains, roleGithubDomains(request.roleGithub)) || !sameRules(profile.network?.unix_sockets, {}) || resolved.config?.features?.network_proxy !== true) throw failure('permission-profile-mismatch')
   }
   return { codexPathOverride: executable, env, capability: { kind: 'codex-cli-config/v1', version: '0.166.0', profile: request.noTools ? 'chief-read-only' : 'flybot-role', modelInvoked: false } }
 }

core/src/host/project-delivery.js

@@ -1112,7 +1112,7 @@ export function createProjectDelivery(rt, { publisher, releaseProvider, roleArti
           else await workspaceGit(workspace, ['reset', '--hard', attempt.candidateSha])
         }
         if (project.repository) { await prepareWorkspace(attempt, workspace, settings); await prepareIntegrations(attempt, workspace) }
-        context = await buildProjectContext(rt, { retrieval: true, policy, projectId: project.id, taskId: task.id, role, revision: pinned.revision, resourceId: lease?.resourceId, definition, memory: definition.memory, knowledge: ownEntry(state.projectKnowledge ?? {}, project.id) ?? [], requirement: attempt.requirement, feedback: attempt.feedback, projectFacts: { roleGithub: roleGithubStatus(rt, project), mergePolicy: projectMergePolicyStatus(settingsOf(project), project.defaultBranch ?? 'main'), environmentPreparation: workspace.environmentPreparation ? { id: workspace.environmentPreparation.id, status: workspace.environmentPreparation.status, executor: workspace.environmentPreparation.executor, identitySha256: workspace.environmentPreparation.identitySha256 ?? null, sha256: workspace.environmentPreparation.sha256 } : null, workspaceMaterialization: workspace.materialization ?? null, ...(pinned.change ? { roleDefinitionChange: pinned.change } : {}), integrationInputs: structuredClone(attempt.integrationInputs ?? []), testFailure: await failureContext(attempt), publicationBinding: attempt.publicationBinding ?? null, integrationInstruction: attempt.publicationBinding ? 'Merge the pinned upstreamSha into the published candidate using --no-commit, resolve and stage conflicts before handoff. Host sealing retains both trusted inputs; never fabricate parents or discard backend changes.' : null, workingDraft: !attempt.candidateSha && workspaceFor(attempt, 'developer') ? { kind: 'unverified-workspace-reference', resourceId: workspaceFor(attempt, 'developer').resourceId, path: workspaceFor(attempt, 'developer').resourceId === workspace.resourceId ? workspaceFor(attempt, 'developer').path : null, note: 'Unsealed source, not candidate or verification evidence. Cross-resource drafts require a sealed artifact before verification.' } : null, handoff: task.collaboration?.history.at(-1) ? { purpose: task.collaboration.history.at(-1).purpose, reason: task.collaboration.history.at(-1).reason } : null, candidateSha: attempt.candidateSha ?? null, tests: attempt.evidence.tests ? { sha: attempt.evidence.tests.sha, passed: attempt.evidence.tests.passed, status: attempt.evidence.tests.status ?? null, stage: attempt.evidence.tests.stage ?? null, reason: attempt.evidence.tests.reason ?? null, sha256: attempt.evidence.tests.sha256, command: attempt.evidence.tests.command } : null, review: attempt.evidence.review ? { sha: attempt.evidence.review.sha, verdict: attempt.evidence.review.verdict, summary: attempt.evidence.review.summary } : null }, repository: await repositoryContext(project.id, attempt.baseSha, project) })
+        context = await buildProjectContext(rt, { retrieval: true, policy, projectId: project.id, taskId: task.id, role, revision: pinned.revision, resourceId: lease?.resourceId, definition, memory: definition.memory, knowledge: ownEntry(state.projectKnowledge ?? {}, project.id) ?? [], requirement: attempt.requirement, feedback: attempt.feedback, projectFacts: { roleGithub: roleGithubStatus(rt, project), mergePolicy: projectMergePolicyStatus(settingsOf(project), project.defaultBranch ?? 'main'), environmentPreparation: workspace.environmentPreparation ? { id: workspace.environmentPreparation.id, status: workspace.environmentPreparation.status, executor: workspace.environmentPreparation.executor, identitySha256: workspace.environmentPreparation.identitySha256 ?? null, sha256: workspace.environmentPreparation.sha256 } : null, workspaceMaterialization: workspace.materialization ?? null, ...(pinned.change ? { roleDefinitionChange: pinned.change } : {}), integrationInputs: structuredClone(attempt.integrationInputs ?? []), testFailure: await failureContext(attempt), publicationBinding: attempt.publicationBinding ?? null, integrationInstruction: attempt.publicationBinding ? 'Merge the pinned upstreamSha into the published candidate using --no-commit, resolve and stage conflicts before handoff. Host sealing retains both trusted inputs; never fabricate parents or discard backend changes.' : null, workingDraft: !attempt.candidateSha && workspaceFor(attempt, 'developer') ? { kind: 'unverified-workspace-reference', resourceId: workspaceFor(attempt, 'developer').resourceId, path: workspaceFor(attempt, 'developer').resourceId === workspace.resourceId ? workspaceFor(attempt, 'developer').path : null, note: 'Unsealed source, not candidate or verification evidence. Cross-resource drafts require a sealed artifact before verification.' } : null, handoff: task.collaboration?.history.at(-1) ? { purpose: task.collaboration.history.at(-1).purpose, reason: task.collaboration.history.at(-1).reason } : null, candidateSha: attempt.candidateSha ?? null, tests: attempt.evidence.tests ? { sha: attempt.evidence.tests.sha, passed: attempt.evidence.tests.passed, status: attempt.evidence.tests.status ?? null, stage: attempt.evidence.tests.stage ?? null, reason: attempt.evidence.tests.reason ?? null, sha256: attempt.evidence.tests.sha256, command: attempt.evidence.tests.command, logSource: { query: 'attempt.log', attemptId: attempt.id, sha256: attempt.evidence.tests.sha256, nativePath: (definition.execution?.harness ?? 'flybot') === 'flybot' ? attempt.evidence.tests.log : null } } : null, review: attempt.evidence.review ? { sha: attempt.evidence.review.sha, verdict: attempt.evidence.review.verdict, summary: attempt.evidence.review.summary } : null }, repository: await repositoryContext(project.id, attempt.baseSha, project) })
         } finally { if (preparation && !state.projectResourceLeases?.[lease.id]?.preparation?.exitUnknown) await rt.projectResources.endPreparation(preparation) }
       } catch (error) {
         const registered = lease && ownEntry(state.projectResourceLeases ?? {}, lease.id)

core/src/host/project-github-app.js

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ export function githubIdentityMetadata(identity) {
 export function createGithubAppProvider({ request = fetch, now = Date.now, readKey = privateCredentialFile } = {}) {
   const cache = new Map(), refreshing = new Map()
   async function resolve(settings, { repository, permissions = { contents: 'read' } } = {}) {
-    if (!validId(settings.appId) || !validId(settings.installationId) || !/^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+\/[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+$/.test(repository ?? '') || !Object.keys(permissions).length || Object.entries(permissions).some(([key, value]) => !['contents', 'pull_requests', 'issues', 'checks'].includes(key) || !['read', 'write'].includes(value))) throw denied('GitHub App installation scope is not configured')
+    if (!validId(settings.appId) || !validId(settings.installationId) || !/^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+\/[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+$/.test(repository ?? '') || !Object.keys(permissions).length || Object.entries(permissions).some(([key, value]) => !['contents', 'pull_requests', 'issues', 'checks', 'actions'].includes(key) || !['read', 'write'].includes(value) || key === 'actions' && value !== 'read')) throw denied('GitHub App installation scope is not configured')
     let key, material
     try {
       material = await readKey(settings.privateKeyFile)