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Vendored Hatch wiring makes every Hatch install fail when the checkout path contains %XX, # or ; (e.g. a Jenkins "feature%2Fx" workspace), because Hatch's {root:uri} only escapes spaces #547
Description
[agent] Found by the scheduled Hatch bug-hunt routine (ledger #314).
Summary
Vendored Hatch wiring writes six @ {root:uri}/.socket/vendor/pypi/<uuid>/<wheel>#sha256=… into project.dependencies and env dependencies / extra-dependencies. docs/testing/hatch.md says this is done "so checkouts remain relocatable". But Hatch/Hatchling expand {root:uri} with hatchling/utils/fs.py:path_to_uri, which only escapes spaces:
def path_to_uri(path: str) -> str:
if os.sep == "/":
return f"file://{os.path.abspath(path).replace(' ', '%20')}"
return f"file:///{os.path.abspath(path).replace(' ', '%20').replace(os.sep, '/')}"So when the checkout path contains a URL-significant character, the expanded requirement points somewhere else, or doesn't parse at all:
%2F/%20/ any%XX: pip percent-decodes it, giving…/app_feature/six-patch/.socket/…andOSError: [Errno 2] No such file or directory.#: the rest of the path becomes a URL fragment, givingNo such file or directory: '/…/a'.;:Invalid requirement: 'six @ file:///…/semi': Expected a marker variable or quoted string.
Jenkins multibranch pipelines put the branch name into the workspace directory with / encoded as %2F (e.g. app_feature%2Fsix-patch), so this is a realistic CI path. The native (unwired) project installs fine in the same directory. Only the socket-patch wiring breaks it.
The scan itself gives no warning, even when it runs from such a path. It reports applied / success.
Impact
- In any checkout whose absolute path contains
%XX,#or;, every Hatch env that carries a vendored reference fails to create (hatch run,hatch env create,hatch test). That includes the default env, because project dependencies go through the same expansion during the dev-mode install. CI goes red, and the cause is far from obvious. vexin that checkout still emitsnot_affected/inline_mitigations_already_exist(from the committed artifact, with only a "live tree does not match" warning), even though no Hatch env can be installed there.- Hosted mode is unaffected (http URL).
This is the same class as the Maven #350 (file://${project.basedir} not URI-encoded), but in the Hatch lane.
Repro (Linux, Hatch 1.18.1; local mock patch API serving a patched six 1.16.0 wheel, --vendor-source service)
mkdir -p dev/app/src/app && cd dev/app && touch src/app/__init__.py && git init -q
cat > pyproject.toml <<'EOF'
[build-system]
requires = ["hatchling"]
build-backend = "hatchling.build"
[project]
name = "app"
version = "0.1.0"
dependencies = ["six==1.16.0"]
[tool.hatch.build.targets.wheel]
packages = ["src/app"]
[tool.hatch.envs.lint]
extra-dependencies = ["six==1.16.0"]
EOF
socket-patch scan --vendor --vendor-source service --json # applied, success
git add -A && git commit -qm vendored
git clone -q . "../../ws/app_feature%2Fsix-patch" && cd "../../ws/app_feature%2Fsix-patch"
hatch run python -c 'import six'
# ERROR: Could not install packages due to an OSError: [Errno 2] No such file or directory:
# '/…/ws/app_feature/six-patch/.socket/vendor/pypi/<uuid>/six-1.16.0-py2.py3-none-any.whl'
hatch run lint:python -c 'import six' # same error
git clone -q . ../plain && cd ../plain && hatch run python -c 'import six; print(six.SOCKET_PATCHED)' # control: TrueThe same failure happens with the scan run directly inside directories named a#b, p%20q and semi;colon. Directories named at@sign and quo'te work.
Expected vs actual
- Expected: docs/testing/hatch.md: "Vendored references use
{root:uri}so checkouts remain relocatable." A vendored scan should either produce wiring that installs from any checkout path, or refuse / warn at scan time when the root contains characters that Hatch's{root:uri}doesn't encode (%,#,;,?). It should also document that a checkout can't be relocated to such a path. - Actual: the scan succeeds silently, and every Hatch env install fails in such checkouts.
OS × Hatch matrix (main 61cfb9b, vendored)
| 1.2.1 | 1.7.0 | 1.16.5 | 1.18.1 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Linux, %2F path (default env + env extra-dependencies) |
fail | fail | fail | fail (reproduced 2×) |
Linux, # / %20 / ; path |
— | — | — | fail |
Linux, @ / ' / space path |
— | pass (space, earlier run) | — | pass |
| Linux, same commit in a plain path (control) | pass | pass | pass | pass |
| macOS / Windows | untested (same path_to_uri; probe branches currently can't be cleaned up by the routine) |
|||
| Hosted, any path | not affected |
First bad
Present since vendored Hatch landed (#244). Released v4.0.0 has no Hatch lane.
Suspect code
crates/socket-patch-core/src/vendor/pypi_hatch.rs:46,:95,:180: they emit{root:uri}/…without checking whether the project root is URI-safe for Hatch's expansion.crates/socket-patch-core/src/utils/hatch.rs:361(vendored preflight): it checks the Hatch version but not the root path.- The root cause is upstream in
hatchling/utils/fs.py:path_to_uri(only' 'is escaped). A scan-time refusal or warning, plus a documented limitation, would avoid silently breaking CI.
Backlog review — 2026-10-08
Priority: P1 → P2. Special checkout-path characters break Hatch installation visibly; constrained path trigger and relocation workaround.
Activity
mikolalysenko commentedon Oct 2, 2026
[agent] Triaged:
priority:p1(Hatch / PyPI family). I confirmed onmain(61cfb9b) thatcrates/socket-patch-core/src/vendor/pypi_hatch.rs:46,95,180emit{root:uri}/…references without checking the project root first, and nothing in the vendored Hatch preflight checks the root path for%,#,;or?. Not a duplicate. #505 also involves{root:uri}, but its cause is a workspace member's{root:uri}that the root env never expands, so I'm cross-linking rather than clustering. No open PR covers this.Generated by Claude Code
mikolalysenko commentedon Oct 12, 2026
[agent] Claiming this issue (shared root cause: vendored Hatch wiring emits {root:uri} references without checking that Hatch's path_to_uri can expand the project root into a valid file URL). Branch: agent/fix-hatch-root-uri-unsafe-path. Claim-ID: 2026-10-12T10:21:19Z-5f64f7
Generated by Claude Code
mikolalysenko commentedon Oct 12, 2026
[agent] Draft PR: #1428
Generated by Claude Code
Refuse vendored Hatch in %/#/?/; checkouts
Check the real Hatch root, %XX and whitespace