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`PSBTParser` took each input's declared amount straight from `witness_utxo` /
`non_witness_utxo` and never checked it. Those fields are supplied by whoever
built the PSBT, so the input total -- and therefore the fee shown on the
review screens -- was an unverified claim.
embit provides `InputScope.verify()` for exactly this: it re-hashes the
supplied previous transaction and compares it to the outpoint's txid. Its
docstring cites the 2020 miner-fee attack and notes that a hardware wallet
must do this check "even on segwit transactions", because BIP-143 commits
only to the amount of the input currently being signed -- with two or more
inputs an attacker can collect one valid signature per signing session by
being truthful about exactly one input each time.
`psbt.verify()` on its own is too strict: it raises for any input lacking a
previous tx, and BIP-174 permits a segwit input to carry only `witness_utxo`.
So this splits the two cases:
* previous tx present but its txid does not match the outpoint -> reject
* no previous tx at all -> record in `unverified_input_nums` so the UI can
warn, rather than refusing PSBTs from coordinators that omit it
`has_unverified_input_amounts` is exposed for a follow-up warning screen; this
commit deliberately changes no UI.
All seven bundled test PSBTs (native segwit, nested segwit, taproot, legacy
p2pkh, and the three multisig variants) already carry the previous
transaction and verify cleanly, so no currently-supported flow regresses.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Cross-referencing #973, which I only found after opening this PR. @vinovod reported on 2026-08-02 that they had independently identified and reproduced three issues in the PSBT review/signing flow on 0.8.7 and dev, and asked for a private security contact before publishing reproduction details. One of the three areas listed there for triage — "previous-transaction verification before fee review/signing" — sounds like it may cover the same ground as this PR, though I have no way to tell from the summary alone whether the underlying defect is the same one. I reached this independently and had not seen #973 when I opened this PR; I searched the tracker only afterwards, which was the wrong order. To whatever extent the two overlap, @vinovod reported first. |
PSBTParser summed each input's declared amount without ever checking it, so the fee shown on the overview and math screens was only a claim from the coordinator. _verify_input_amounts() now runs in parse() before any amount is summed and raises InputAmountVerificationError when an input has no utxo data, when its non_witness_utxo does not hash to the txid it claims to spend, when a legacy or unrecognized input supplies no non_witness_utxo, or when a witness_utxo disagrees with a verified non_witness_utxo, and PSBTOverviewView catches it, clears the parser, and routes to a discard-only PSBTInputVerificationFailedView (approach and placement from SeedSigner#977). Segwit inputs carrying only a witness_utxo are still accepted, since BIP-143 commits the amount they sign and Sparrow never sends both utxo fields Co-Authored-By: 0kPN1 <55192256+0kPN1@users.noreply.github.com>
PSBTParser summed each input's declared amount without ever checking it, so the fee shown on the overview and math screens was only a claim from the coordinator. _verify_input_amounts() now runs in parse() and raises PSBTInputAmountVerificationError when an input has no utxo data, when its outpoint index falls outside the non_witness_utxo it claims to spend, when that non_witness_utxo does not hash to the txid it claims to spend, when a legacy or unrecognized input supplies no non_witness_utxo, or when a witness_utxo disagrees with a verified non_witness_utxo. PSBTOverviewView catches it, clears the parser, and routes to a discard-only PSBTInputAmountVerificationFailedView (approach and placement from SeedSigner#977). The check runs after the ownership checks so a psbt this seed cannot sign is reported as a mismatch rather than as a suspicious transaction, and before _parse_inputs, where amounts are first summed. Segwit inputs carrying only a witness_utxo are still accepted, since BIP-143 commits the amount they sign and Sparrow never sends both utxo fields Co-Authored-By: 0kPN1 <55192256+0kPN1@users.noreply.github.com>
…ia descriptor From a review of open upstream SeedSigner PRs and their discussions: - Previous-tx proof (upstream SeedSigner#995/SeedSigner#977): a non_witness_utxo must hash to the txid its input spends (UTXO_MISMATCH), and a legacy p2sh input may not rely on a witness_utxo alone (INVALID_WITNESS_UTXO). Legacy signatures commit to no amount, so either lie hides fee in a single signing. - Multisig change without global xpubs (review thread on upstream SeedSigner#1032): a change-shaped m-of-n containing our key is not provably this wallet's. It is now a payment unless a loaded descriptor identifies it; the new PSBTIdentifyChangeView offers "Load descriptor to identify change", and returning with a descriptor re-reads the psbt. verify_multisig_output's per-entry check is shared as _descriptor_owns_output. - OP_RETURN payload read from its push opcode (SeedSigner#965/SeedSigner#1003): direct pushes lost their first byte on screen. - INCONSISTENT_FINGERPRINTS (SeedSigner#1040): a global xpub whose fingerprint disagrees with the keys it derives. - Untrusted-QR crashes (SeedSigner#967/SeedSigner#968/SeedSigner#970/SeedSigner#971): SeedQR checksum and whole-payload detection, signmessage bounds, parse_derivation_path on short/48h paths, and a UR2 seq_len bound. New psbt_faker vectors cover each (PREV_TX_TXID_MISMATCH, LEGACY_P2SH_WITNESS_ONLY, OP_RETURN_DIRECT_PUSH, TX-24.xpub_fingerprint_mismatch, TX-21.ms_foreign_quorum*, TX-21.ms_honest_change_no_xpubs). TX-20 and XTRAS.MIXED_INPUT_TYPES are re-vendored after generator fixes; TX-20 is no longer vacuous. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test+fix: resync psbt_faker corpus and close the gaps it exposes Re-vendor the regenerated psbt_faker corpus (97 vectors, fixed BIP-371 taproot encoding) and cover every vector in psbt_suite_util. Parser fixes for vectors that previously parsed: - FORGED_OUTPUT_OWNERSHIP also when a genuine key of ours annotates an output whose script does not pay it (TX-21.claims_us_pays_other, TX-21.ms_repointed_*, TX-22.ms_decoy_*). - MISLABELED_OUTPUT_OWNERSHIP: an output paying our key but attributed to a foreign fingerprint (TX-21.pays_us_claims_other, taproot_claims_other, ms_fp_relabeled). - SURPLUS_DERIVATIONS / MIXED_DERIVATION_MAPS for contradictory claims (TX-22.surplus_paths, taproot_surplus_internal_key, mixed_path_maps*). - SCRIPT_TIMELOCK warning for CLTV/CSV in an output's committed script (TX-20.cltv_time). - verify_multisig_output checks every derivation entry instead of embit's first-match Descriptor.owns (decoy-last used to verify as ours). TX-20.cltv_height/csv_relative are vacuous upstream (scriptPubKey is still p2wpkh) and marked so. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: stop flow tests hanging when collected after the refusal-screen tests tests/test_psbt_refusal_screens.py imported the GUI before tests/base.py installed its renderer and hardware-button doubles. Any flow test collected after it then ran against the real, never-configured Renderer (every View and the error View raise, so the Controller loops forever) or against real buttons (real-screen flows wait for a key press forever). The full suite only passed because alphabetical order puts the flow tests first. The refusal-screen test now imports base first, and base.py also rebinds seedsigner.gui.Renderer when the package was already imported by some other module collected earlier. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: port upstream PSBT/QR hardening; identify multisig change only via descriptor From a review of open upstream SeedSigner PRs and their discussions: - Previous-tx proof (upstream SeedSigner#995/SeedSigner#977): a non_witness_utxo must hash to the txid its input spends (UTXO_MISMATCH), and a legacy p2sh input may not rely on a witness_utxo alone (INVALID_WITNESS_UTXO). Legacy signatures commit to no amount, so either lie hides fee in a single signing. - Multisig change without global xpubs (review thread on upstream SeedSigner#1032): a change-shaped m-of-n containing our key is not provably this wallet's. It is now a payment unless a loaded descriptor identifies it; the new PSBTIdentifyChangeView offers "Load descriptor to identify change", and returning with a descriptor re-reads the psbt. verify_multisig_output's per-entry check is shared as _descriptor_owns_output. - OP_RETURN payload read from its push opcode (SeedSigner#965/SeedSigner#1003): direct pushes lost their first byte on screen. - INCONSISTENT_FINGERPRINTS (SeedSigner#1040): a global xpub whose fingerprint disagrees with the keys it derives. - Untrusted-QR crashes (SeedSigner#967/SeedSigner#968/SeedSigner#970/SeedSigner#971): SeedQR checksum and whole-payload detection, signmessage bounds, parse_derivation_path on short/48h paths, and a UR2 seq_len bound. New psbt_faker vectors cover each (PREV_TX_TXID_MISMATCH, LEGACY_P2SH_WITNESS_ONLY, OP_RETURN_DIRECT_PUSH, TX-24.xpub_fingerprint_mismatch, TX-21.ms_foreign_quorum*, TX-21.ms_honest_change_no_xpubs). TX-20 and XTRAS.MIXED_INPUT_TYPES are re-vendored after generator fixes; TX-20 is no longer vacuous. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(screenshots): give the multisig PSBT global xpubs; add PSBTIdentifyChangeView The screenshot generator's multisig PSBT carries no PSBT_GLOBAL_XPUB, so since multisig change is only identified through global xpubs or a loaded descriptor, it had no change output and the PSBTChangeDetailsView_multisig_* screenshots crashed (get_change_data returned None), failing CI's "Generate screenshots". - The multisig screenshots now use a copy of that PSBT with global xpubs taken from its own wallet descriptor, like a coordinator that includes them. - The parser is built with the loaded descriptor, and the descriptor is loaded before the PSBT, so the "verified" screenshot parses the way the device would. - New screenshots for PSBTIdentifyChangeView (no descriptor / descriptor loaded), from the original xpub-less PSBT. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
PSBTParser summed each input's declared amount without ever checking it, so the fee shown on the overview and math screens was only a claim from the coordinator. _verify_input_amounts() now runs in parse() and raises PSBTInputAmountVerificationError when an input has no utxo data, when its outpoint index falls outside the non_witness_utxo it claims to spend, when that non_witness_utxo does not hash to the txid it claims to spend, when a legacy or unrecognized input supplies no non_witness_utxo, or when a witness_utxo disagrees with a verified non_witness_utxo. PSBTOverviewView catches it, clears the parser, and routes to a discard-only PSBTInputAmountVerificationFailedView (approach and placement from #977). The check runs after the ownership checks so a psbt this seed cannot sign is reported as a mismatch rather than as a suspicious transaction, and before _parse_inputs, where amounts are first summed. Segwit inputs carrying only a witness_utxo are still accepted, since BIP-143 commits the amount they sign and many coordinators never sends both utxo fields Co-Authored-By: 0kPN1 <55192256+0kPN1@users.noreply.github.com>
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Replaced with #995, thank you for this contribution. Still plan to give credit for the release. |
Description
Problem or Issue being addressed
PSBTParserreads each input's amount straight out of the PSBT and never checks it (psbt_parser.py#L97-L106):witness_utxo/non_witness_utxoare supplied by whoever built the PSBT. Nothing insrc/callsPSBT.verify()orInputScope.verify()—grep -rn "non_witness_utxo" src/returns the single hit above. The input total, and therefore the fee onPSBTMathScreen, is an unverified claim from the coordinator.embit provides
InputScope.verify()for exactly this, and its docstring is explicit about why:The "even on segwit" part is the non-obvious bit. BIP-143 commits only to the amount of the input currently being signed, so segwit is not inherently safe once a transaction has two or more inputs: an attacker can collect one valid signature per signing session by being truthful about exactly one input each time, then combine the sessions.
Solution
A bare
psbt.verify()is too strict — it defaults toignore_missing=Falseand raises for any input carrying no previous transaction, and BIP-174 permits a segwit input to supply onlywitness_utxo. That would reject PSBTs from coordinators that omit it.So
_verify_input_amounts()splits the two cases:unverified_input_nums, so the UI can warn rather than refusehas_unverified_input_amountsis exposed for a follow-up warning screen. This PR changes no UI, to keep it reviewable.No extra memory cost:
PSBT.parse()already defaults toCompressMode.KEEP_ALL, so the previous transaction is retained in RAM today and simply never used. The added work is one SHA256d per input over data already in memory. (CompressMode.PARTIALkeeps only the needed txout plus_txhashif memory ever matters — the check handles that case too.)Additional Information
Compatibility. All seven bundled test PSBTs already carry the previous transaction and verify cleanly, so no currently-supported flow regresses:
verify()SINGLE_SIG_NATIVE_SEGWIT_1_INPUTSINGLE_SIG_NESTED_SEGWIT_1_INPUTSINGLE_SIG_TAPROOT_1_INPUTSINGLE_SIG_LEGACY_P2PKH_1_INPUTMULTISIG_NATIVE_SEGWIT_1_INPUTMULTISIG_NESTED_SEGWIT_1_INPUTMULTISIG_LEGACY_P2SH_1_INPUTOverlapping PRs. #965 and #966 touch the same region of
psbt_parser.py. This PR is independent of both and inserts its call inparse()rather than inside_parse_inputs(), but it will need a trivial rebase depending on merge order — happy to do that whenever suits.Not hands-on tested. Verified via the unit test suite only; I have not run this on a Pi or the emulator. Since the change is confined to parsing and adds no screen, I did not want to claim hardware validation I did not do. Grateful if a reviewer with a device can confirm a normal signing flow is unaffected.
Exception type. I used
RuntimeErrorto match the existing"Mixed inputs in the transaction"raise in the same file. A dedicated exception routed to aDireWarningScreenmay fit the codebase better — happy to change it.Screenshots
N/A — no new or modified screens. The parser exposes
has_unverified_input_amountsbut nothing renders it yet.This pull request is categorized as a:
Checklist
I ran
pytestlocally191 passed (translations submodule initialised and catalogs compiled).
I included screenshots of any new or modified screens
Should be part of the PR description above.
I added or updated tests
Any new or altered functionality should be covered in a unit test. Any new or updated sequences require FlowTests.
Three cases in
tests/test_psbt_parser.py: every bundled PSBT verifies; a forged previous tx is rejected; awitness_utxo-only input is flagged but not rejected. No flow sequences changed, so no FlowTests.I tested this PR hands-on on the following platform(s):
None — unit tests only, as noted above.
I have reviewed these notes:
Scope kept to the parser; the warning screen is deliberately left for a follow-up.
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