| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
Latest 0.x release (see crates.io) |
Yes |
| Earlier releases | No |
Only the latest published 0.x release on crates.io
receives security patches. Users on older releases are encouraged to upgrade.
Do not open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.
Public disclosure before a fix is available gives potential attackers advance notice and puts users at risk.
Use the private Security Advisory form on this repository (GitHub → Security tab → "Report a vulnerability"). This channel is confidential; only the maintainers and invited collaborators can see the report.
Include in the report:
- A concise description of the vulnerability.
- The
sefer-allocversion(s) affected. - Minimal reproduction steps or proof-of-concept code.
- The
rustc/ OS / target triple of the environment where you reproduced it. - Whether the bug is triggered by the default feature set or requires a
non-default feature (e.g.
experimental,alloc-core,alloc-global,production) — see[features]inCargo.tomlfor the current feature list. - (If known) which invariant from
docs/INVARIANTS.mdis violated.
| Milestone | Target |
|---|---|
| Initial acknowledgement | within 72 hours |
| Triage and severity assessment | within 1 week |
| Coordinated patch + advisory | within 90 days (critical: sooner) |
We follow a coordinated disclosure model. If you have a hard deadline (e.g., conference deadline, vendor disclosure policy), please mention it in your report and we will do our best to accommodate.
The following are considered security vulnerabilities in this project:
- Memory safety — use-after-free, out-of-bounds reads/writes, uninitialized reads, dangling references, pointer provenance violations.
- Use-after-free via stale handles — a
Handlethat should returnNoneafter the backing slot is freed instead returns a reference to freed or reused memory. - Data races — unsound concurrent access in
SyncRegion,LockFreeRegion, or the epoch reclamation path that results in undefined behaviour (not merely a logic error). unsafecontract violations — a caller that upholds all documented preconditions for asafeorunsafepublic API still experiences UB.- Soundness holes in safe abstractions — triggering UB through safe Rust
code alone (no
unsafeblocks in the calling code). - Panics or unwinding out of any
GlobalAllocmethod — unwinding across aGlobalAllocboundary is undefined behaviour per thestddocumentation, and is in scope if reachable.
The following are not considered security vulnerabilities:
-
Denial-of-service via excess allocation requests — by design, callers control memory consumption and the allocator does not impose quotas.
-
Panics reachable through documented panic conditions (e.g., capacity overflow with
expect) — except unwinding out of anyGlobalAllocmethod, which is undefined behaviour per thestddocumentation and is in scope if reachable. -
Contract violations of
unsafeAPIs — a double free or a wrongLayoutpassed toGlobalAlloc/AllocCore(bothunsafe) is a caller-contract violation, not a vulnerability, unless the observable behaviour is worse than documented (the code explicitly does not guarantee detection of duplicate own-thread frees — seesrc/registry/heap_core/free/dealloc_own_base.rs). -
Performance degradation without a safety impact.
-
Findings that require arbitrary code execution on the host already (e.g., exploiting a separate vulnerability) to trigger.
-
Reports about crates in
[dev-dependencies]that are not reachable from library code.
Feature status: the internals and bench-internals features are
test/diagnostic surfaces and are outside the security scope, except where a
hole is reachable from safe code without those features. The experimental,
batch-api, and exact-object-proto features are prototype features:
soundness issues in them are accepted as reports at reduced severity, and no
security guarantees are made for them.
Related supply-chain note: Cargo features are additive and unified across
the dependency graph, so any dependency can enable exact-object-proto,
virgin-zero-skip, hardened, or bench-internals and silently change the
global allocator's behavior for the whole binary (prototype paths, skipped
zero fills, new abort paths, extra measurement hooks). Verify the feature
set that actually ships (cargo tree -e features -i sefer-alloc) before
relying on allocator-level guarantees; the README's Security section
("Additive features can change the global allocator") lists what each of
these features changes.
Researchers who responsibly disclose valid vulnerabilities will be credited here (with permission).
| Researcher | Issue | Version fixed |
|---|---|---|
| (TBD) | — | — |