Bitcoin tooling and security engineering. I build offline, air-gapped wallet software and test it like it owes me money.
Creator and lead maintainer of EntropyLab, developed under the OogaBoogaX organization with its co-maintainers. It's a self-contained, single-file Bitcoin key and wallet calculator designed to run fully air-gapped. The entire app is one HTML file with no network egress.
- Never invent entropy: all key material comes from user-supplied physical entropy (dice, coin flips, cards) or existing seeds — with live chi-squared fairness analysis that flags biased dice as you enter them.
- Tested like a consensus implementation: 275 test suites and more than 5,500 tests (November 2026) covering BIP32 / 39 / 44 / 49 / 84 / 85 / 86 / 88 / 321 / 352 / 388 derivation, descriptors, PSBT handling, and aezeed — differential fuzzing against independent reference implementations (including a C++ LifeHash reference), plus an adversarial scenario harness.
- Reviewed before it merges: every code change is reviewed by five models and an adversarial red team, and every finding is fixed or refuted against the code first. The rounds and their fixes are in the red-team log.
- Reproducible builds as a tested property: the build runs twice from different staging paths and must produce byte-identical output; CI additionally requires the runner and the pinned dev container to agree on the digest.
- Rust/WASM for the hot paths — hdkey derivation, PSBT parsing, vanity search — with explicit stack scrubbing for secret-bearing buffers.
I review other open-source Bitcoin software (wallets, signers, PSBT tools, servers) with the same team of models, check every claim against the code, and report privately through each project's security policy. The public record of disclosed and fixed findings is security-reviews.
- Byte-identical builds as a test, not a promise — how EntropyLab's CI makes reproducibility a property that fails the build instead of a claim in a README.
- Throwing 4 MB of garbage at an air-gapped page, every night — adversarial whole-page testing: network taps, delivery proofs, and why a green run that never landed its payload is the worst outcome.
- When your test oracle is somebody else's code — differential fuzzing against a C++ reference at a pinned commit, the 1% of fingerprints two "correct" implementations disagree on, and fuzzing a parser's tolerance instead of just its math.
- Bitcoin protocol security: derivation, parsing, PSBTs, script policies
- Adversarial and differential testing of cryptographic implementations
- Reproducible build verification and build-integrity tooling
- Privacy-preserving, network-silent software design
The best way to reach me is an issue or discussion on EntropyLab. Open to Bitcoin security reviews and protocol testing work; see the track record.



