Tracexy captures network traffic and installs a privileged helper to do it. Both are worth attacking, so security reports are taken seriously.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| Latest release | Yes |
| Previous release | Security fixes only |
| Older releases | No |
Please do not open a public GitHub issue for a security vulnerability.
Use GitHub Security Advisories — go to the Security tab and click "Report a vulnerability."
Include:
- What the vulnerability is, and roughly how bad you think it is
- Steps to reproduce, or a proof of concept
- Which versions you tested
- Anything you already know about mitigations
Please give us a reasonable window to ship a fix before disclosing publicly. We'll keep you posted on progress and credit you in the release notes unless you'd rather we didn't.
If you are looking for somewhere to start:
- The privileged helper (
TracexyCaptureHelper/) and the XPC surface between it and the app. Both sides validate the other's code signature; holes in that validation are the highest-value finding in this codebase. - Packet decoding (
Tracexy/Core/Protocol/). Every byte read there comes from a hostile source. A crafted frame or capture file that causes a crash, an out-of-bounds read, or unbounded allocation is a real bug —PacketBufferis supposed to make that impossible. - Capture file parsing (
Tracexy/Core/Capture/). Same reasoning: a.pcaphanded to you by someone else is untrusted input.
- Requiring an admin password to install the privileged helper. That is the design.
- The app being able to see network traffic on the machine it is running on. That is the product.