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fix(website): bound and roll back the sign-in controller lifecycle - #17446
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Invalidate the sign-in attempt on unmount as well as on a flag flip, so authentication, provisioning, and minting stop after teardown instead of redirecting a page that has left. Guard the mint completion on liveness, not just reducer state. Roll the Firebase identity back with a single sign-out when an attempt is abandoned after auth has already persisted one. Bound each non-interactive step (chunk load, provisioning, mint) against a deadline that restores a retryable state and discards a late resolve, while leaving the user-driven popup wait cancellable.
🌐 Website E2ETip All tests passed.
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe sign-in controller now bounds Firebase loading, provisioning, and minting. It invalidates attempts after unmount, abandons stale flows, signs out persisted workshop authentication, and adds lifecycle tests. ChangesAuth sign-in lifecycle
Priority: ➖ Normal Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~25 minutes Change: Bug fix Suggested reviewers: Important Pre-merge checks failedPlease resolve all errors before merging. Addressing warnings is optional. ❌ Failed checks (1 inconclusive)
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In `@apps/website/src/components/auth/AuthSignIn.test.ts`:
- Line 1146: Replace the timer-based tick helper in the AuthSignIn tests with
waitFor, flushPromises, or an explicitly controlled deferred promise so
asynchronous assertions are deterministic and do not depend on setTimeout
scheduling.
- Line 1142: Add tests in the “AuthSignIn controller lifecycle” suite for
chunk-loading timeout/late completion, chunk-loading invalidation/unmount, and
mint timeout with late success or rejection. Assert controls recover, stale
results neither redirect nor publish a session, and authenticated mint timeout
performs exactly one signOutWorkshop rollback; also cover rejected
signOutWorkshop without an unhandled rejection. Replace the tick helper with
deferred promises, fake timers, or observable readiness.
In `@apps/website/src/components/auth/useAuthSignInController.ts`:
- Around line 279-288: Update the provisioning flow around
withinOperationDeadline and firebase.provisionWorkshopCustomer to use a
per-attempt AbortSignal, aborting it when the deadline expires or abandon()
wins. Pass the signal through token acquisition and verify it before sending the
provisioning request so late getIdToken() completion cannot create customer
state after sign-out begins.
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Replace the tick helper's real-timer sleep with a fake-timer flush so the lifecycle assertions no longer depend on shouldAdvanceTime scheduling, and cover the authenticated-timeout path that rolls the persisted identity back once while recovering the controls even when the best-effort sign-out rejects.
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Inline comments:
In `@apps/website/src/components/auth/AuthSignIn.test.ts`:
- Line 1277: Update the provisioning test around handles.provision to use a
deferred promise, advance past the 16-second deadline, then resolve the promise
and assert the late result cannot mint or publish a session or trigger
navigation. Preserve the existing deadline-recovery assertions while adding
explicit coverage for discarded late results.
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Inline comments:
In `@apps/website/src/components/auth/AuthSignIn.test.ts`:
- Line 1313: In AuthSignIn.test.ts, replace the non-null assertions on
resolveProvision and handles.session with explicit guards before either value is
used; throw clear setup errors when resolveProvision or handles.session is
uninitialized, while preserving the existing test flow when both are available.
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dante01yoon
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Requesting changes for one rollback race. The provisioning timeout/retry path also still depends on backend idempotency; please obtain explicit backend-owner confirmation before merging.
| const abandon = () => { | ||
| abandonAttempt() | ||
| // Best-effort rollback; a failed sign-out must not go unhandled. | ||
| if (authenticated) void firebase?.signOutWorkshop().catch(() => {}) |
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issue: abandon() makes the controller retryable and then starts global Firebase sign-out without awaiting it. A user can begin a new attempt while this rollback is still pending; if the new authentication completes first, the old attempt's signOutWorkshop() can then clear the new attempt's Auth.currentUser, leaving the accepted credential and Firebase state inconsistent. Please serialize rollback before enabling retry, or otherwise ensure a stale rollback cannot sign out a newer attempt.
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Good catch, this was a real race. Fixed in 55f590a.
The rollback is now serialized before retry is re-enabled. abandon() awaits the sign-out (bounded by the operation deadline, still best-effort so a rejection stays handled) before dispatching signInAbandoned, so the controls stay held in pending/minting until the abandoned attempt's Firebase identity has actually been rolled back. Because signOutWorkshop() is a global identity.signOut(), an unawaited one from a stale attempt could resolve after a retry had already authenticated a new user and clear that newer Auth.currentUser; serializing closes that window entirely, since no second attempt can start while the sign-out is in flight. The deadline keeps a hung sign-out from stranding the controls.
Red/green: added a regression test in AuthSignIn.test.ts ('finishes the abandoned attempt rollback before a retry starts...'). Attempt 1 authenticates, provisioning hangs past its deadline (identity persisted, attempt abandoned), and the sign-out is deferred. Against the previous unawaited code the test is RED (controls re-enable to disabled=false while the sign-out is still pending, so a retry could start into it); with the serialized rollback it's GREEN (controls stay held until the sign-out settles, the retry's authentication is ordered strictly after the stale sign-out, and signOut is called exactly once).
This is auth-lifecycle code, so worth another pass on the ordering.
An abandoned attempt that had already persisted a Firebase identity started a global signOutWorkshop() without awaiting it, then immediately re-enabled the controls. A retry could authenticate a new identity while that rollback was still in flight, and the stale sign-out would then clear the new attempt's Auth.currentUser, leaving the accepted credential and Firebase state inconsistent. Await the (bounded, best-effort) sign-out before the reducer leaves pending, so no retry can begin until the abandoned attempt's identity has been rolled back. The deadline keeps a hung sign-out from stranding the controls.
Address Deep's review on #17446: - Gate the session watch's mintSucceeded on the flag, so a credential the session client publishes for an attempt abandoned mid-mint no longer redirects past the mint-promise liveness guard at the watch layer. - Serialize a retry behind a rollback sign-out that outran its deadline: the controls still recover on the deadline, but the next attempt waits for the in-flight global sign-out before authenticating, so a stale sign-out can never clear the newer identity. - Bound the non-interactive email authenticate step with the operation deadline while leaving the user-driven social popup wait unbounded. - Treat a provisioning timeout like a provisioning error: keep the identity and offer a retry instead of a destructive full sign-out. - Surface the generic failure message when a non-interactive step resets to idle at its deadline, instead of silently re-enabling the controls. - Emit auth_completed only once the mint commits, so an attempt abandoned mid-mint reports no completion.
Red/green regression tests for Deep's findings on #17446: - A flag disabled mid-mint does not redirect even once the session client publishes the credential, and reports no auth_completed. - A provisioning timeout keeps the identity and offers a retry rather than signing out; a post-auth rollback that rejects still frees the controls. - A rollback sign-out that outran its deadline is serialized before the retry authenticates, so the stale sign-out cannot clear the new identity. - A hung email sign-in recovers with a message; the social popup wait stays unbounded past the operation deadline.
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@deepme987 — addressing your two un-anchored findings from the review comment (both fixed in c4a17d8, tests in c9dda0f): 🔴 Session watch bypasses the mint-phase liveness guard ( Red/green ( 🟠 Red/green ( Re-requesting your review. I left all six threads open for you. |
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@deepme987 — thanks for the thorough pass; all of your findings are addressed in the replies above (session-watch gate + real One heads-up that ties directly to your |
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confirming from backend - the calls are idempotent |
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@dante01yoon — your remaining blocking prerequisite is now cleared. @deepme987 confirmed from the backend that the provisioning calls are idempotent: #17446 (comment) — so a duplicate Deep's review also surfaced several real issues on this PR, all now fixed with red-green tests:
Focused AuthSignIn suite is green (75/75). Requesting your review. |
…relabel The sign-in social button reads "Sign in with Google" on main; the lifecycle suite's googleButton helper still queried the old "Log in with Google", so its six deadline/rollback cases could not find the button once main was merged in.
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Reviewed at head c42a27b. My previous blocking prerequisite is cleared — @deepme987 gave explicit backend-owner confirmation that the provisioning calls are idempotent (#17446 (comment)), so the timeout/retry path re-issuing provisionWorkshopCustomer is safe. Thank you both for chasing that down rather than assuming it.
The rollback serialization added for @deepme987's :272 finding closes the cross-attempt race, and I verified the suite is green at this head (72/72 AuthSignIn.test.ts). One new blocking issue came out of that same change, inline.
The one blocker
The retry now waits on pendingRollback with no deadline. When signOutWorkshop() settles late, that is exactly right. When it never settles, the next attempt disables the controls and never recovers — no deadline, no message, no way back except a page reload. That is the failure mode this PR exists to prevent ("a hung provider cannot pin the controls"), reintroduced at the one step that is not bounded.
I checked this rather than reasoned about it. Against this head, with signOutWorkshop returning a promise that never settles:
after the retry click, +300s of fake time:
events = ["authenticate"] // the retry never authenticated
button.disabled = true // controls still held
toast count = 0 // nothing told the user
replace calls = 0
The existing test serializes a rollback sign-out that outran its deadline before the retry authenticates covers the settles-late half and asserts the blocked state (events = ['authenticate']), then calls resolveSignOut!(). Removing that resolve is what produces the output above.
I recognise this is the trade @deepme987 framed at :272, and that simply wrapping the await in withinOperationDeadline would hand the cross-attempt race straight back — so I am not asking for that as a one-liner. Either direction works for me:
- Bound the wait and, on expiry, route through
recoverFromTimeout()so the user at least gets the controls and the generic-failure copy back; or - Take @deepme987's other option and invalidate the sign-out instead of serializing on it, so a superseded
signOutWorkshopcannot clear a newer identity and the retry never has to wait at all.
The second is the more durable shape, since signOutWorkshop() is global and un-cancellable and serializing on it will always mean a hung one is load-bearing.
What I verified
AuthSignIn.test.tspasses 72/72 atc42a27bin an isolated worktree.- CI is green on this head, and the branch has merged
mainincluding #17466, withc42a27bfixing the Google button label after that relabel — so the #17466 conflict noted on #17644 is already reconciled here. - The session-watch gate (
if (active && enabled.value)) does close @deepme987's:394finding for the flag-off case. On an off→on flicker the gate passes while the generation is stale, butrunMint'sstate.value.step !== 'minting'guard makes that path return early instead of signing out, so it lands signed-in-and-redirected rather than inconsistent. Not a finding, just noting I looked. reportAuthCompletedsurviving a failed mint intoretryMintis correct: it fires at theminting -> signedInchoke when the login actually commits.
Everything else here reads well, and the red/green evidence on each thread made this much faster to review. Happy to re-stamp as soon as the hung-rollback path either recovers or stops being load-bearing.
| // Wait out a prior attempt's rollback whose sign-out outran its deadline: | ||
| // authenticating into an in-flight global sign-out would let it clear this | ||
| // attempt's credential. | ||
| if (pendingRollback) await pendingRollback |
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issue: this await has no deadline, so a rollback sign-out that never settles pins the controls permanently.
dispatch({ type: 'signInStarted', provider }) on line 262 has already put the reducer in pending (so busy is true and the buttons are disabled) before we reach this line. pendingRollback is only cleared from rollback.finally(...) on line 277, which never runs if firebase.signOutWorkshop() never settles. So the user clicks sign-in, the button goes disabled, and nothing ever re-enables it — there is no timer on this path and no message.
Verified against this head with handles.signOut returning new Promise<void>(() => {}); 300s of fake time after the retry click:
events = ["authenticate"] // the retry never authenticated
button.disabled = true
toast count = 0
replace calls = 0
serializes a rollback sign-out that outran its deadline before the retry authenticates covers the settles-late case and asserts this same blocked state, then resolves the sign-out; dropping that resolve is the whole difference.
Wrapping this in withinOperationDeadline alone would give back the cross-attempt race @deepme987 raised at :272, so that is not what I am asking for. Could we either bound it and route the expiry through recoverFromTimeout() so the controls and the failure copy come back, or invalidate the stale sign-out (his other option) so a superseded signOutWorkshop cannot clear a newer identity and the retry never needs to wait here?
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Fixed with your first option (92447b8): the wait is now await withinOperationDeadline(pendingRollback), and on expiry it routes through recoverFromTimeout() (abandon + failure toast + back to idle) instead of authenticating, so a never-settling sign-out can't pin the controls. The rollback stays pending, so a later retry keeps guarding against the cross-attempt race @deepme987 raised at :272 rather than reopening it.
Added a red-green test — 'recovers the controls with a message when a prior rollback sign-out never settles': signOut returns a never-settling promise, and after the deadline the controls re-enable with the failure toast and the retry does not authenticate into the still-live sign-out. Verified red against the old unbounded await (button stayed disabled, no toast), green with the bound. Full controller suite 73/73.
A retry awaited a prior attempt's rollback signOutWorkshop with no deadline, so a sign-out that never settles left the controls disabled forever (the reducer is already pending). Bound that wait: on expiry, recover with the failure copy and keep the rollback pending so the retry still guards against it, instead of authenticating into a still-live global sign-out.
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Approving at head 92447b8. My blocking issue is fixed, and I verified it by re-running the exact reproduction from my last review rather than reading the diff.
The fix closes it
Same scratch test, byte for byte, with signOutWorkshop returning a promise that never settles — 300s of fake time after the retry click:
before c42a27b |
after 92447b8 |
|
|---|---|---|
button.disabled |
true (pinned indefinitely) | false (recovered) |
| toast count | 0 (silent) | 1 (failure copy) |
events |
["authenticate"] |
["authenticate"] |
replace calls |
0 | 0 |
All three properties I asked for, and the third one is the part that is easy to lose: the retry still does not authenticate, because the timeout branch returns instead of falling through. So bounding the wait did not hand back the cross-attempt race @deepme987 raised at :272 — which was my whole reason for not asking for a bare withinOperationDeadline wrapper.
Keeping pendingRollback set on expiry is the right call, and worth calling out since it looks like an omission: it means each subsequent attempt re-waits, re-times-out, and re-reports, rather than one attempt "using up" the guard and the next one authenticating into a still-live global sign-out.
What else I checked
AuthSignIn.test.tspasses 73/73 at this head (72 + the new case), in an isolated worktree.- The new test is mutation-killing. Reverting just the bounded block back to
if (pendingRollback) await pendingRollbackfailsrecovers the controls with a message when a prior rollback sign-out never settleson exactly the right assertion (must not pin the controls … expected disabled false). It is not a test that passes either way. - The settles-late path is unchanged.
serializes a rollback sign-out that outran its deadline before the retry authenticatesstill passes: when the sign-out resolves inside the retry's 16s window,rolledBackis not the timeout sentinel and the flow proceeds, soeventsis still['authenticate','signOut:settled','authenticate']with onesignOut. The fix only adds an exit for the case that previously had none. - No unbounded wait left. Line 296 is the only
awaitonpendingRollbackin the file, and it is wrapped. abandon()is safe on this path:authenticatedis still false when the rollback wait expires, so it will not issue a secondsignOutWorkshop— it just frees the reducer.- CI is green — no failing check runs at
92447b8.
Residual, which I think you got right
If signOutWorkshop() genuinely never settles, every later attempt on that page now fails at its deadline with the generic toast until a reload. That is a real limitation, but it is the correct side to fail on: the alternative is authenticating into a live global sign-out that can clear the new credential, which is the bug the serialization exists to prevent. The user gets feedback and a way out, which is what was missing. Noting it so it is clear I considered it rather than missed it.
That clears the last item from my review, and the backend-idempotency prerequisite was already answered by @deepme987. Thanks for the thorough red/green on this one — the before/after numbers made it quick to confirm.
The main merge brought in #17446's hung-email-sign-in test, which still asserted against AUTH_ERROR_MESSAGES.generic. This branch's localization work replaced that constant with the t('auth.errors.generic') lookup, so the reference dangled and the suite failed to parse. Match the canonical form used everywhere else in the file.
…in controller (Comfy-Org#17644) ## Summary The sign-in controller carried its own generation counter for abandoning in-flight sign-in work on flag-off or unmount. It now uses the shared `useGenerationGuard()` primitive, with no change in behavior. Part of the A3 stack for FE-2192. Fixes FE-2192 ## Changes - `apps/website/src/components/auth/useAuthSignInController.ts` replaces `let signInGeneration` and its manual bumps with `useGenerationGuard()`. The enabled watch calls `signIn.abandon`, each attempt calls `signIn.capture()`, and liveness becomes `attempt.live() && enabled.value`. - The manual `onUnmounted` bump is gone; the guard's built-in `onScopeDispose(abandon)` covers unmount. ## Review Focus - This PR stacks on both Comfy-Org#17446 (the sign-in controller lifecycle rewrite) and the A3a primitive (Comfy-Org#17641). It merges after both. Until Comfy-Org#17446 lands, its controller changes appear in this diff. - The swap is one-for-one: `capture()` reads the generation exactly as the old `const attempt = signInGeneration` did, and only `abandon()` bumps it. ## QA - [x] The Comfy-Org#17446 controller suite stays green through the swap: 71 passing, no assertion changed. - [x] Sabotage check: forcing the liveness handle to true turns exactly 4 tests red (the flag-flicker case and all three unmount cases), which proves the guard is load-bearing. - [x] Gates pass: typecheck, eslint, oxfmt, knip, comment hygiene. Resolves the sign-in controller concentration finding from @DrJKL's Comfy-Org#17283 review: [r3976008876](Comfy-Org#17283 (comment)). Linear: [FE-2192](https://linear.app/comfyorg/issue/FE-2192/refactor-consolidate-workshop-auth-lifecycle-and-state-ownership)
Summary
Stop the website sign-in controller from redirecting, provisioning, or minting for an attempt that is no longer live, and roll the Firebase identity back when an attempt is abandoned after it has already signed in.
Changes
The controller now bumps its
signInGenerationon unmount as well as on a flag flip, so authentication, provisioning, and minting all halt after teardown instead of continuing to publish and redirect a page that has left. Mint completion is guarded on liveness, not just reducer state, so a flag-off or unmount during the mint no longer sends the visitor away. When an attempt is abandoned after Firebase auth has persisted an identity, the controller signs that identity out once so it is not left silently signed in, and that best-effort sign-out swallows its own rejection so an offline failure never surfaces as an unhandled rejection. Each non-interactive step (chunk load, provisioning, mint) runs against a deadline that restores a retryable state and discards a late resolve; the user-driven popup wait stays cancellable rather than being timed out.No breaking changes and no new dependencies.
Review Focus
The rollback fires only after
authenticatehas resolved (tracked by anauthenticatedflag), so a load-phase abandon does not call sign-out and a post-auth abandon calls it exactly once. The deadline bounds the three non-interactive steps but deliberately leaves the popup await unbounded, matching the reviewer's ask to keep the user-driven wait cancellable.withinOperationDeadlinediscards a late resolve but the underlying request keeps running, so a provisioning timeout followed by a user retry can callprovisionWorkshopCustomertwice; this is harmless only if backend provisioning is idempotent, which a backend owner should confirm.Testing
No Playwright test is added here. The changed behavior is teardown, flag-flip, and deadline-race timing that the unit suite drives deterministically with fake timers and deferred promises; a real browser cannot reproduce those races reliably. The website end-to-end auth harness lands separately in #17435.
Fixes FE-2179
Resolves review comments on #17283 from @DrJKL — r3984130792, r3984130796, r3984130802, r3984130806.
Linear: FE-2179