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--enable-manager on a non-loopback listener exposes an unauthenticated management API (remote node install / config write / restart); Manager 4.3 relaxes the install gate #17367
python main.py --listen 0.0.0.0 --enable-manager exposes ComfyUI-Manager's
management API on the same unauthenticated HTTP port as ComfyUI. Manager's
authorisation for custom-node installation is derived from security_level, network_mode and the listener address — not from the caller — so any client
that can reach the port can install custom nodes (arbitrary code execution), and
in some configurations change Manager settings or restart the process.
Details
ComfyUI itself offers no authentication for Manager's routes.
With the defaults (security_level = normal, network_mode = public) a stock
non-loopback listener is "protected" only by the middle+ check in
Manager 4.2.2 (remote install then requires network_mode = personal_cloud).
In Manager 4.3, do_install selects middle for versioned DB/CNR installs,
and is_allowed_security_level('middle') has no listener or network-mode
condition. Verified against 4.3 (tarball) with a default config.ini and a
non-loopback listener: POST /v2/manager/queue/task (kind=install, a stable
versioned node) + POST /v2/manager/queue/start are accepted and the install
worker runs; 4.2.2 denied the same request. POST /v2/manager/db_mode and POST /v2/manager/reboot also return 200 with defaults (the middle gate).
ComfyUI master still pins comfyui_manager==4.2.2 (bump PRs bump manager version to 4.3 #16410/bump manager version to 4.3 #16613),
so most current installs run the version in which remote installs require personal_cloud — which is a supported configuration and is what the
compromised deployment used.
A real compromise of such a deployment was traced to this path: an
unauthenticated Manager install of a DB node that permits arbitrary Python
execution, then that node writing a persistent backdoor custom node, then a
WebSocket C2 and a cryptominer. Full technical write-up and request/response
evidence: Comfy-Org/ComfyUI-Manager#3440.
Why this is filed here
SECURITY.md puts anything that needs a non-default network exposure in normal
issues rather than private advisories, which I followed. The ComfyUI-side asks:
When --enable-manager is used with a non-loopback listener, either require
Manager to authenticate (token) or print a prominent startup warning that the
management API is unauthenticated and remote installs are possible.
Reconsider the bundled Manager version/defaults in light of 4.3's gate change
(middle vs middle+), so a fresh --listen 0.0.0.0 install does not have a
remotely installable management API at default security_level.
Document that security_level is not authentication, and that exposing 8188
exposes node installation, config writes and restart.
Sanitised: no hostnames, public IPs, credentials or payload code are included.
Activity