diff --git a/.jules/sentinel.md b/.jules/sentinel.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e3a68fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.jules/sentinel.md
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+## 2026-06-16 - [Fix path traversal vulnerability in disk storage service]
+**Vulnerability:** Path traversal vulnerability in `AbstractDiskBasedService`. The method `getPathInStorageDirectory(UploadId id)` resolved the path dynamically from `id.toString()` without bounds checking, which could allow an attacker to read/write arbitrary files given an ID payload containing directory traversal sequences `..` or URL encoded path variants (`%2E%2E`).
+**Learning:** `URLCodec.encode` might not correctly sanitize path traversal characters. An attacker can set an ID value like `..`, which would bypass the encode step because `.decode("..")` evaluates to `..`. Therefore, input sanitization should verify the absolute directory boundaries.
+**Prevention:** Use Java `java.nio.file.Path` to resolve the full absolute path and ensure the path is within bounds using `startsWith()` logic on normalized absolute paths.
diff --git a/src/main/java/me/desair/tus/server/upload/disk/AbstractDiskBasedService.java b/src/main/java/me/desair/tus/server/upload/disk/AbstractDiskBasedService.java
index 0c12472..58ce045 100644
--- a/src/main/java/me/desair/tus/server/upload/disk/AbstractDiskBasedService.java
+++ b/src/main/java/me/desair/tus/server/upload/disk/AbstractDiskBasedService.java
@@ -37,7 +37,12 @@ protected Path getPathInStorageDirectory(UploadId id) {
     if (id == null) {
       return null;
     } else {
-      return storagePath.resolve(id.toString());
+      Path resolvedPath = storagePath.resolve(id.toString());
+      Path normalizedStoragePath = storagePath.toAbsolutePath().normalize();
+      if (!resolvedPath.toAbsolutePath().normalize().startsWith(normalizedStoragePath)) {
+        throw new IllegalArgumentException("Upload ID violates storage path boundaries");
+      }
+      return resolvedPath;
     }
   }