diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore
index 4acf2c3..0a018e8 100644
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ records/
 config.yml
 data/
 
-# Key material. The answer endpoint verifies a proof-of-human token against a
+# Key material. The answer endpoint verifies the website's caller token against a
 # public key, and whoever mints those tokens holds the private half. Neither
 # belongs in the repository.
 *.pem
diff --git a/bin/make-caller-token-keypair.py b/bin/make-caller-token-keypair.py
index d394b25..f0332c6 100755
--- a/bin/make-caller-token-keypair.py
+++ b/bin/make-caller-token-keypair.py
@@ -1,17 +1,18 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env python3
-"""Generate the keypair the answer endpoint verifies proof-of-human tokens with.
+"""Generate the keypair the answer endpoint verifies the website's caller tokens with.
 
 The endpoint holds only the **public** half, and verifies EdDSA or RS256 -- never
 an HMAC algorithm, so a stolen public key cannot be turned into a signing key.
-Whoever mints tokens holds the private half; who that is is D1 in
-specs/010-search-page-answers, still open.
+The website mints and holds the private half (D1, decided 2026-09-18). The token
+asserts caller identity for one visit, not that a human is present -- there is no
+human gate on the search path.
 
 Rotation is this script plus a restart: generate, replace the public key the
 service reads, hand the private half to the minter. Tokens signed by the old key
 stop verifying immediately, which is the point.
 
 Usage:
-    ./bin/make-human-token-keypair.py deploy/beta
+    ./bin/make-caller-token-keypair.py deploy/beta
 """
 
 import stat
diff --git a/compose.yaml b/compose.yaml
index 181953e..0329d8f 100644
--- a/compose.yaml
+++ b/compose.yaml
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ secrets:
   # The public half of the answer endpoint's token-verifying keypair.
   # External like the rest, so no key material lives in the repository:
   #   docker secret create CALLER_TOKEN_PUBLIC_KEY deploy/beta/caller_token_public.pem
-  # Generate the pair with ./bin/make-human-token-keypair.py deploy/beta
+  # Generate the pair with ./bin/make-caller-token-keypair.py deploy/beta
   CALLER_TOKEN_PUBLIC_KEY:
     external: true
   CHAINLIT_AUTH_SECRET:
diff --git a/docker-compose.yml b/docker-compose.yml
index 488996f..132121c 100644
--- a/docker-compose.yml
+++ b/docker-compose.yml
@@ -112,6 +112,6 @@ secrets:
   # root-owned directory at that path, which then needs sudo to clear and which
   # the key generator would refuse to overwrite. A missing secret just errors.
   #
-  # Generate it with ./bin/make-human-token-keypair.py deploy/beta
+  # Generate it with ./bin/make-caller-token-keypair.py deploy/beta
   caller_token_public.pem:
     file: ./deploy/beta/caller_token_public.pem
diff --git a/pyproject.toml b/pyproject.toml
index a57dff4..0baad42 100644
--- a/pyproject.toml
+++ b/pyproject.toml
@@ -15,13 +15,13 @@ packages = [
 [tool.poetry.dependencies]
 python = ">=3.12, <4"
 langchain = "^1.4.0"
-# Declared, not inherited. The answer endpoint verifies a signed proof-of-human
+# Declared, not inherited. The answer endpoint verifies a signed caller
 # token, so this repository imports PyJWT directly. It arrives transitively today
 # via chainlit and mcp, which is not a dependency -- it is a coincidence that a
 # chainlit upgrade could end, and the symptom would be an endpoint that cannot
 # verify anyone.
 pyjwt = {version = "^2.10", extras = ["crypto"]}
-# Imported directly by bin/make-human-token-keypair.py and the token tests,
+# Imported directly by bin/make-caller-token-keypair.py and the token tests,
 # not just pulled in by pyjwt's crypto extra. Declared so it does not vanish
 # if that extra or the JWT library ever changes.
 cryptography = ">=42,<51"
diff --git a/specs/010-search-page-answers/spec.md b/specs/010-search-page-answers/spec.md
index 61fc6b0..2ea293f 100644
--- a/specs/010-search-page-answers/spec.md
+++ b/specs/010-search-page-answers/spec.md
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ classifier's decision matches, and that no LLM answer call happens for the latte
   serves only the captcha pages and a landing page, and Chainlit owns the conversation
   over websockets
 - **FR-002**: The response MUST stream, so partial text can render before completion
-- **FR-003**: The endpoint MUST refuse any request without a valid proof-of-human
+- **FR-003**: The endpoint MUST refuse any request without a valid caller
   token, before any model call
 - **FR-004**: Citations MUST be Reactome stable IDs, so the website can render links
   in its own style rather than parsing prose
diff --git a/src/util/caller_token.py b/src/util/caller_token.py
index 486e15e..3e4c949 100644
--- a/src/util/caller_token.py
+++ b/src/util/caller_token.py
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ def load_verifying_key(path: str | None = None) -> str:
     if not configured:
         raise RuntimeError(
             f"{KEY_PATH_ENV} is not set. The answer endpoint verifies a signed "
-            "proof-of-human token and cannot run without a verifying key; starting "
+            "caller token and cannot run without a verifying key; starting "
             "without one would accept every request."
         )
     key_file = Path(configured)
@@ -107,6 +107,12 @@ def verify(token: str, verifying_key: str, *, audience: str | None = None) -> di
                 verifying_key,
                 algorithms=ALGORITHMS,
                 audience=expected,
+                # "aud" here is belt-and-braces, and deliberately kept despite
+                # being redundant today: PyJWT already raises
+                # MissingRequiredClaimError for an absent `aud` when an audience
+                # is expected, so removing it fails no test. It is here so that
+                # behaviour changing in a future PyJWT cannot quietly turn "no
+                # audience" into "nothing to check".
                 options={"require": ["exp", "aud"]},
             )
         )