@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+---
+'@objectstack/spec': minor
+'@objectstack/runtime': minor
+'@objectstack/lint': minor
+'@objectstack/platform-objects': minor
+---
+
+feat(automation): a flow declares who may start it — `requiredPermissions` on the flow, checked at every start door
+
+A flow can now carry `requiredPermissions: ['capability', …]`, the same value shape as an action's `requiredPermissions` (ADR-0066 D4). Every door that starts a flow by name checks it in one shared check: the trigger route (`POST /automation/:name/trigger`), an action of `type: 'flow'` (REST `POST /actions/:object/:action` and the MCP `run_action` bridge), and a declared endpoint of `type: 'flow'`. A caller that is not the system principal must hold every named capability (granted through a permission set's `systemPermissions`), or the door answers `403 PERMISSION_DENIED` and nothing runs.
+
+- **The action door inherits the flow's list.** An action that starts a gated flow is gated by the flow even when the action declares nothing, so the app states it once. An action that declares its own list keeps its own gate, which answers first, so a caller at that door needs both lists.
+- **A sub-flow is not a door.** A parent flow's `subflow` node starts its child through the engine and is not checked again; the parent's own start was.
+- **The elevated self-triggered rule still answers first.** Holding the capabilities does not let a member start a `runAs: 'system'` flow of type `autolaunched`, `record_change` or `schedule`.
+- **Studio's flow form** offers the key (a tag list beside `runAs`).
+- **`os validate`** judges the key's values the way it judges an action's: a capability no built-in, `defineCapability` or `systemPermissions` grant provides is reported as `capability-reference-unknown` at `flows[i].requiredPermissions` (`os explain capability-reference-unknown`).
+
+This is how to say who may start an elevated (`runAs: 'system'`) `screen` or `api` flow. An app that gates such a flow with a `decision` node on `current_user.positions` can move that gate to the flow's `requiredPermissions`; the positions array is not an authorization input. A flow that declares no `requiredPermissions` starts exactly as before.
+
+Clause-②: yes (widening) — a flow may declare a new key, `requiredPermissions`; a flow that does not declare it is admitted at every door exactly as before.
+
+Metadata-protocol: added (`FlowSchema.requiredPermissions`)
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ declaration to shadow a built-in one. Match → policy chain (`rateLimit` → `a
 | `type` | Delegates to | Request shape |
 |:---|:---|:---|
 | `object_operation` | the same `callData` binding that serves `/api/v1/data/{object}` | `find` reads its criteria from the query string; `get` / `update` / `delete` take the record id from `query.id`; `create` / `update` take the body. `create` answers `201`, the rest `200` |
-| `flow` | the same automation pipeline as `POST /api/v1/automation/{name}/trigger` | the request body is the flow input. A refused or failed run answers a real status: `404` unknown flow, `409` `FLOW_DISABLED`, `422` `FLOW_NO_START_NODE`, `422` `FLOW_INPUT_SCHEMA_INVALID`, `400` `FLOW_FAILED`, and `403` `PERMISSION_DENIED`, nothing run, when the target is declared `runAs: 'system'` with a self-triggered type (`autolaunched`, `record_change`, `schedule`), exactly as the trigger door answers |
+| `flow` | the same automation pipeline as `POST /api/v1/automation/{name}/trigger` | the request body is the flow input. A refused or failed run answers a real status: `404` unknown flow, `409` `FLOW_DISABLED`, `422` `FLOW_NO_START_NODE`, `422` `FLOW_INPUT_SCHEMA_INVALID`, `400` `FLOW_FAILED`, and `403` `PERMISSION_DENIED`, nothing run, when the target is declared `runAs: 'system'` with a self-triggered type (`autolaunched`, `record_change`, `schedule`) or declares `requiredPermissions` the caller does not hold, exactly as the trigger door answers |
 
 The frozen vocabulary has **no path-template syntax**, so an endpoint cannot express
 `/leads/{id}` — a record id travels as `?id=…`. A method that no declaration claims
 
@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ const approvalFlow = {
 | `status` | `enum` | optional | `'draft'`, `'active'`, `'obsolete'`, `'invalid'` (defaults to `'draft'`) |
 | `type` | `FlowType` | ✅ | Flow trigger type (see below) |
 | `runAs` | `enum` | optional | `'system'` (elevated, bypasses RLS; after an approval decision its attribution user is the decider) or `'user'` (the default, RLS-respecting: the trigger user until a human decision, the decider after it, with the decider's permissions). A `'user'` run that resolved **no** trigger user has nothing to scope to, so its data operations are refused — declare `'system'` for schedule / time-relative / API triggers and for record-change flows fired by a write that carried no user |
+| `requiredPermissions` | `string[]` | optional | Capabilities a caller must hold, every one listed, to START the flow. Checked at every door that starts a flow by name (the trigger route, a `type: 'flow'` action over REST and MCP `run_action`, a declared `type: 'flow'` endpoint): anyone else but the system principal is refused `403` `PERMISSION_DENIED` and nothing runs. An action that starts the flow inherits the list. A parent flow's `subflow` node is not a door and is not checked again. This is how to say who may start an elevated `screen` or `api` flow; `current_user.positions` is not an authorization input |
 | `variables` | `FlowVariable[]` | optional | Input/output variables |
 | `nodes` | `FlowNode[]` | ✅ | Flow nodes |
 | `edges` | `FlowEdge[]` | ✅ | Connections between nodes |
@@ -2291,20 +2292,21 @@ curl -b cookies.txt -X POST \
 | `POST /api/v1/automation/:name/runs/:runId/restore-suspension` | Re-arm a run stranded by a failed resume — and, for a nested run, every ancestor whose pause that strand's cascade consumed, deepest first, from whichever member you name. Same gate as `cancel`; body `{ reason? }`. `501 NOT_IMPLEMENTED` when the service does not declare the verb |
 
 **Failures answer real HTTP status codes.** A flow that does not run is not a
-`200`. The route classifies six outcomes. Five of them it reads off the engine's
-own verdict — never the message text; the `403` is the door's own admission
+`200`. The route classifies seven outcomes. Five of them it reads off the engine's
+own verdict — never the message text; the two `403`s are the door's own admission
 check, made before anything is dispatched:
 
 | Status | `error.code` | What happened | What to do |
 |:---|:---|:---|:---|
 | `404` | — | No flow by that name in this deployment | Check the name; nothing was dispatched |
 | `403` | `PERMISSION_DENIED` | The caller is not the system principal, and the flow is declared `runAs: 'system'` with a self-triggered `type` (`autolaunched`, `record_change`, `schedule`). The same answer at every door that starts a flow by name: this route, a `type: 'flow'` action (REST and MCP `run_action`) and a declared `type: 'flow'` endpoint | Let it run on its own trigger, or call it from a parent flow's `subflow` node. If members are meant to start it, declare it `type: 'screen'` (or `'api'` for a signed inbound hook) |
+| `403` | `PERMISSION_DENIED` | The flow declares `requiredPermissions` and the caller, not the system principal, does not hold every capability it names. Checked after the row above, at the same doors; the message names the declared and the missing capabilities | Grant the capability through a permission set's `systemPermissions`, or start the flow as someone who holds it |
 | `409` | `FLOW_DISABLED` | The flow exists but is switched off | Enable it — the identical request then succeeds |
 | `422` | `FLOW_NO_START_NODE` | The stored definition has no `start` node | Fix the flow; retrying cannot help |
 | `422` | `FLOW_INPUT_SCHEMA_INVALID` | A node's `config` violates the `inputSchema` its own definition declares | Fix the flow; the refusal is non-retryable — even under `errorHandling.strategy: 'retry'` the engine refuses once and never enters the retry loop |
 | `400` | `FLOW_FAILED` | The flow **ran** and was rejected | Read `error.details.summary` for the failing node |
 
-The first five never dispatched anything: no node executed, no record was
+The first six never dispatched anything: no node executed, no record was
 written, and there is no run to look up. Only `400` describes a run. The
 `FLOW_INPUT_SCHEMA_INVALID` verdict is a pure function of the flow definition —
 re-running the guard cannot change the answer — so a `retry` strategy does not
 
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ One of the largest consumers of the flag;
 | 55 | Package domain capability gates bypassed | runtime | Get: package management and package-inventory reads without the capability | `packages/runtime/src/domains/packages.ts#requireManageMetadata`, `#requireReadCapability` |
 | 56 | Activation write / authoring refusals do not fire | runtime | Get: activation artifacts writable and authorable without the activation-authoring capability | `packages/runtime/src/domains/activation-gate.ts#refuseUngrantedActivationWrite`, `#refuseUngrantedActivationAuthoring` |
 | 55b | Walled environment-metadata refusal does not fire | metadata-core, rest, runtime | Get: under `isolated` / `group`, a write of the environment's metadata, of any type, at the `/meta` write doors (save, reset, publish, rollback) and `POST /meta/_migrate-stored` on both transports, at every `/packages` write door (create, the manifest `PATCH`, enable, disable, publish, `publish-drafts`, `discard-drafts`, `revert`, `rollback`, `commits/:commitId/revert`, `duplicate`, `adopt-orphans`, delete), at the `/automation` definition writes (create, update, delete, clone), and at the permission-set clone door. Every other caller below the platform-operator rung is refused `403` there (ADR-0131 D3, D12 items 7–8, D11), because one organization's write would change what every organization resolves. The seeders, the package door and migrations write the environment's metadata this way. Under `single` the refusal is inert for every caller | `packages/metadata-core/src/meta-write-capability.ts#walledCatalogWriteVerdict`, `packages/rest/src/rest-server.ts#walledCatalogRefusal`, `packages/runtime/src/domains/packages.ts#refuseWalledCatalogPackageWrite`, `packages/runtime/src/domains/automation.ts#refuseWalledFlowDefinitionWrite` |
-| 57 | Automation run-state read, flow-authoring write, the paused-run caller gate (screen read and resume), the two operator run-lifecycle writes and the elevated self-triggered start at every door that starts a flow by name all pass | runtime | Get: run state, flow writes, a paused run's screen and its resume with no grant and without being the run's starter — and cancelling or restoring a suspension without the platform-operator rung. The screen read and the resume ask one predicate, so this is one bypass for both. The lifecycle bypass is the in-process owner's door: plugin-approvals' revise-window recall (ADR-0044) cancels on behalf of a decision it already authorized and recorded. And starting a flow declared `runAs: 'system'` whose type is self-triggered (`autolaunched`, `record_change`, `schedule`) through any door that starts a flow by name — the trigger route, an action of `type: 'flow'` (REST `/actions` and the MCP `run_action` bridge) and a declared endpoint of `type: 'flow'` — which every other caller, the guest principal included, is refused `403 PERMISSION_DENIED` (the maintainer's rulings, letters B and A). The three doors ask one predicate, so this is one bypass for all of them, and it is the in-process caller's, such as a job: inbound HTTP never carries the flag | `packages/runtime/src/domains/automation.ts#mayReadRunState`, `#refuseUngrantedFlowWrite`, `#isRunStarterOrRunStateReader`, `#refuseUngrantedRunLifecycleWrite`, `packages/runtime/src/flow-start-admission.ts#refusesElevatedSelfTriggeredStart` |
+| 57 | Automation run-state read, flow-authoring write, the paused-run caller gate (screen read and resume), the two operator run-lifecycle writes and the elevated self-triggered start at every door that starts a flow by name all pass | runtime | Get: run state, flow writes, a paused run's screen and its resume with no grant and without being the run's starter — and cancelling or restoring a suspension without the platform-operator rung. The screen read and the resume ask one predicate, so this is one bypass for both. The lifecycle bypass is the in-process owner's door: plugin-approvals' revise-window recall (ADR-0044) cancels on behalf of a decision it already authorized and recorded. And starting a flow declared `runAs: 'system'` whose type is self-triggered (`autolaunched`, `record_change`, `schedule`) through any door that starts a flow by name — the trigger route, an action of `type: 'flow'` (REST `/actions` and the MCP `run_action` bridge) and a declared endpoint of `type: 'flow'` — which every other caller, the guest principal included, is refused `403 PERMISSION_DENIED` (the maintainer's rulings, letters B and A) — and starting, through the same doors, a flow whose `requiredPermissions` the caller does not hold (ruling record 6377848497, letter A). The three doors ask one check, so this is one bypass for all of them, and it is the in-process caller's, such as a job: inbound HTTP never carries the flag | `packages/runtime/src/domains/automation.ts#mayReadRunState`, `#refuseUngrantedFlowWrite`, `#isRunStarterOrRunStateReader`, `#refuseUngrantedRunLifecycleWrite`, `packages/runtime/src/flow-start-admission.ts#flowStartRefusal` |
 | 58 | Audience-binding suggestion authority gate passes | plugin-security | Get: a system caller lists, accepts and dismisses suggestions without `manage_metadata` and, under a wall, without the platform-operator rung | `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/suggested-audience-bindings.ts#assertDeploymentAuthority` |
 | 59 | Email-template organization door passes; webhook provenance stamp skipped | plugin-email, plugin-webhooks | Get (`sys_email_template`): a create or update of a template row. The door refuses every other write that names a caller, `403 PERMISSION_DENIED` (ADR-0131 D6); the plugin itself no longer writes the table (templates resolve from the registry), so the v18 migration ceremony's promotion is the one remaining writer. Lose (`sys_webhook`): the row is not marked as an admin customization, and the declared-name guard does not run (a new row or a rename taking a declared webhook's name, 409) — the system writers are the platform's machinery (the legacy-secret sweep, the ownership ceremony, migrations) | `packages/plugins/plugin-email/src/email-template-door.ts#isOrganizationWrite`, `packages/plugins/plugin-webhooks/src/webhook-provenance.ts#bindWebhookProvenanceStamp`, `packages/plugins/plugin-webhooks/src/declared-webhooks.ts#bindDeclaredWebhookNameGuard` |
 | 60 | **Automation flow data nodes re-add the `owner_id` stamp** (the one place row 2's gap is compensated inline) | service-automation | Get: a flow-authored INSERT under system elevation still lands owned, when the run resolved a user. Fill-only — flow-authored values win | `packages/services/service-automation/src/runtime-identity.ts#stampSystemInsertOwner`, called from `packages/services/service-automation/src/builtin/crud-nodes.ts#registerCrudNodes` |