@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ The endpoint builds its per-object map in four passes — seed, fold, clamp, ann
 
 For that principal an unrestricted object got no entry, so annotate never saw it and the response said nothing about it at all. The client reads `apiOperations: undefined`, takes the default-allow path #3391 gave it, renders **Export**, and the click is refused. A sibling object declaring `apiMethods` got an entry, an `apiOperations` without `export`, and no button — the same principal, the same session, two answers.
 
-- **The seed and annotate cannot diverge again.** Since #20134 the seed places an entry for every registered object a super-user wildcard reaches, and `annotateEffectiveApiOperations` alone decides which entries carry `apiOperations`: an object that is unrestricted **and** keeps `export` gets none.
+- **The seed and annotate cannot diverge again.** Since #20134 the seed places an entry for every registered object a super-user wildcard reaches that the merge left without one, and `annotateEffectiveApiOperations` alone decides which entries carry `apiOperations`: an object that is unrestricted **and** keeps `export` gets none.
 - **The export axis is the only axis this reaches.** Measured across the `enable` shapes an unrestricted object can carry: withholding `export` subtracts `export` and nothing else, and `mode` stays `unrestricted` either way — which is why the old `mode`-only guard could not tell the two cases apart. The CRUD axis needed no annotation and still gets none.
 - **What the response gains**: for such a principal, one entry per unrestricted object, each the full closure minus `export`. Its CRUD bits are folded `true` — the same answer the client already computed by falling back to `'*'`, now stated explicitly rather than inherited.
 - **Denial is unchanged.** `enforceExportPermission` → `security.canExport` still answers `403 EXPORT_NOT_PERMITTED`, and no request that was refused is now accepted. This is the affordance half: the channel that is supposed to tell the client now does.