@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+---
+'@objectstack/spec': minor
+'@objectstack/plugin-security': minor
+'@objectstack/core': patch
+'@objectstack/platform-objects': patch
+---
+
+feat(spec)!: retire the delegated-admin scope's `manageBindings` and `authorEnvironmentSets` — rights no door honoured (#23488)
+
+**BREAKING** — `manageBindings` and `authorEnvironmentSets` on a permission set's `adminScope` (`AdminScopeSchema`, ADR-0090 D12) are now refused at parse. They named the right to bind sets to positions and the right to author environment permission sets, and they gated the `sys_position_permission_set` and `sys_permission_set` rows, which ADR-0131 D3 retired. A position's sets are part of its definition and a permission set is a definition; both are written through the metadata door, which admits a `manage_metadata` holder and reads no `adminScope`. So a delegate who "may bind" or "may author" was granted nothing. Delete both keys: a delegate's scope is placement, assignment and the allowlist.
+
+Clause-②: yes (narrowing)
+
+Measured before removal, at `cdc42eb49`: no production author set either key to `true` (the showcase wrote the default `false`; the control key `manageAssignments: true` has four production authors), and no door that writes a position or a permission set consulted either key. Their one reader was the delegated-admin gate's strict-containment comparison, which changes below.
+
+## FROM → TO
+
+| you wrote (17.7 and earlier) | write instead |
+| --- | --- |
+| `adminScope: { …, manageBindings: true \| false }` | nothing — delete the key |
+| `adminScope: { …, authorEnvironmentSets: true \| false }` | nothing — delete the key |
+| a delegate who re-composes what a position distributes, or authors a set's body | a `manage_metadata` holder writes the position or set definition through the metadata door (ADR-0131 D3); the delegate assigns people to positions and grants allowlisted sets inside its subtree |
+| reading `scopes[].manageBindings` / `scopes[].authorEnvironmentSets` from `GET /api/v1/security/my-delegable-scope` (`DelegableAdminScope`) | nothing — the report carries `manageAssignments` as the scope's one action right |
+
+**The one-line fix:** delete `manageBindings` and `authorEnvironmentSets` from every `adminScope`.
+
+**What an author who still writes either sees.** `tsc` fails at the authoring site (`AdminScope` types both keys as retired), and the parse — `definePermissionSet()`, `defineStack({ permissions })`, `PUT /api/v1/meta/permission/:name` — refuses it at its own path with the prescription:
+
+> `permission.adminScope.manageBindings` was removed in @objectstack/spec 18 (ADR-0049 enforce-or-remove, ADR-0090 D12) — nothing honoured it once the position-to-permission-set binding rows it gated were retired: a position's sets are part of its definition (ADR-0131 D3), and that definition is written through the metadata door, which admits a `manage_metadata` holder and reads no adminScope. Delete the key; a delegate's scope is placement, assignment and the allowlist — `businessUnit` with `includeSubtree`, `manageAssignments`, and `assignablePermissionSets`. Run `os migrate meta --from 17` to list the mechanical edits for existing sources; `--write` applies the ones it can prove, and you apply the rest by hand.
+
+## The containment change (`@objectstack/plugin-security`)
+
+The delegated-admin gate judges a delegate who hands out a set that itself carries an `adminScope` — a `sys_user_position` assignment of a position that distributes it, or a direct `sys_user_permission_set` grant — by **strict containment**. That comparison read both retired flags. It now reads `includeSubtree`, `manageAssignments` and the allowlist only:
+
+- a delegate whose own scope set either flag `true` can **no longer** hand out a scope otherwise EQUAL to its own — the inert flag used to count as the strictly-larger axis and let that lateral copy through the equal-scope refusal. It is refused `403 PERMISSION_DENIED` (`… would hand out an adminScope not strictly contained by yours`);
+- a granted scope that set either flag `true` no longer counts as out-reaching a delegate that did not.
+
+`DelegatedAdminGate.describeDelegableScope()` (and so `GET /api/v1/security/my-delegable-scope`) no longer reports either flag.
+
+## The retirement kit
+
+- **Two `retiredKey()` tombstones** on `AdminScopeSchema`, a `strictObject` — so each refusal carries its prescription and `tsc` fails first. `RETIRED_KEYS_BY_MAJOR[18]`: `security/AdminScope:manageBindings`, `security/AdminScope:authorEnvironmentSets`. `DelegableAdminScope` (`@objectstack/spec/contracts`) drops both fields.
+- **The D2 conversion `permission-admin-scope-binding-authoring-removed`** (protocol 18, retired from the load path) deletes both keys from every `permissions[].adminScope`, one notice per key, whatever they hold. Both keys carried the default `false`, so a 17.x parse materialized them in every declared scope; the rehydration seams replay this conversion over stored `permission` rows and built artifacts, and `os migrate meta --stored` lists the rows that carry them before the upgrade.
+- **The D3 entry `permission-admin-scope-binding-authoring-retired`** records the containment change above: the judgement the strip cannot make for the upgrader.
+- **`@objectstack/core`:** `permissionSetDefinitionFromRow` — the mapping `os migrate`'s legacy-row ceremony saves a `sys_permission_set` row through — drops both keys from the row's `admin_scope`. That save goes through `saveMetaItem`, which replays no conversion: measured, a 17.x row's body answered `422 INVALID_METADATA` at `adminScope.manageBindings`, and the same body without the keys saved.
+- **`@objectstack/platform-objects`:** the permission-set form's `adminScope` help text (all four locales) names the scope's live keys only.
+- **No deprecation window**, per the project's startup-stage posture.
+
+⚠️ **The out-of-repo consumer population is NOT MEASURED.** `@objectstack/spec` is published, so this is breaking for consumers no telemetry was consulted for. Studio's two switches for these keys retire in an objectui follow-up.
+
+<!-- adr-0087: registered permission-admin-scope-binding-authoring-removed, permission-admin-scope-binding-authoring-retired -->
@@ -56,8 +56,8 @@ set, and the gate resolves the name in the security catalog. The gate's rules:
 | Tenant admins pass through | The superuser wildcard reaches the ordinary CRUD/RLS checks — delegation constrains *delegates*, not HQ |
 | Subtree anchoring | Assignments a delegate creates must be anchored (`sys_user_position.business_unit_id`) inside their subtree, and the target user must sit inside it |
 | Allowlist, no self-escalation | Every set reached by the write — bound to the assigned position, or granted directly — must be on `assignablePermissionSets`. Granting an un-allowlisted set is refused **for anyone, including the delegate themselves** |
-| Action flags | `manageAssignments` gates the assignment rows — `sys_user_position`, and direct `sys_user_permission_set` grants. `manageBindings` and `authorEnvironmentSets` gated writes to the binding rows and set rows of the retired `sys_position_permission_set` and `sys_permission_set` objects; neither object is registered any more, so neither flag admits a write. A position's sets are part of its definition and a permission set is a definition: both are written through the metadata door, which admits a `manage_metadata` holder (the platform operator under `group` or `isolated`) and reads no `adminScope` (ADR-0131 D3). The two flags still count in the strict-containment comparison below |
-| Strict containment | Granting or authoring a set that itself carries an `adminScope` requires a held scope that **strictly contains** it — handing your own exact scope to a peer is refused (no lateral propagation) |
+| Action flag | `manageAssignments` gates the assignment rows — `sys_user_position`, and direct `sys_user_permission_set` grants — and is the scope's only action right. A position's sets are part of its definition and a permission set is a definition: both are written through the metadata door, which admits a `manage_metadata` holder (the platform operator under `group` or `isolated`) and reads no `adminScope` (ADR-0131 D3). The scope's former `manageBindings` and `authorEnvironmentSets` named the retired `sys_position_permission_set` and `sys_permission_set` rows, admitted no write once those objects were gone, and are retired: the schema refuses both with the fix |
+| Strict containment | Granting a set that itself carries an `adminScope` — assigning a position that distributes it, or granting it directly — requires a held scope that **strictly contains** it: the same root, no wider subtree, `manageAssignments` only if yours has it, an allowlist inside yours, and smaller on at least one of those. Handing your own exact scope to a peer is refused (no lateral propagation) |
 | Single-row writes | Delegates write single rows by id only — a broad filter-write cannot be boundary-checked |
 | Audit stamp | Every assignment a delegate creates is `granted_by`-stamped automatically |
 | Tenant-level assets stay tenant-level | The `everyone`/`guest` audience anchors and security-domain publishes are untouchable from any delegated scope |
 
@@ -336,9 +336,11 @@ export const EastSubsidiaryAdmin = definePermissionSet({
 The runtime gate enforces: assignments anchored inside the subtree only,
 allowlisted sets only (**to others and to themselves** — no self-escalation),
 single-row writes, `granted_by` audit stamping, and **strict containment**
-when granting or authoring a set that itself carries an `adminScope` (handing
-out your own exact scope is refused). Anchors and security publishes stay
-tenant-level.
+when granting a set that itself carries an `adminScope` (handing out your own
+exact scope is refused). A delegate's scope is placement, assignment and the
+allowlist: writing a set's body or a position's sets is a metadata write, judged
+by `manage_metadata`, never by an `adminScope`. Anchors and security publishes
+stay tenant-level.
 
 ## Provenance — package vs environment sets (ADR-0086)
 
 
@@ -31,8 +31,8 @@ const result = AdminScopeSchema.parse(data);
 | **businessUnit** | `string` | ✅ | [ADR-0090 D12] Delegation boundary: sys_business_unit.name of the subtree root. Required and non-blank: an empty or whitespace-only value names no business unit and is refused. |
 | **includeSubtree** | `boolean` | optional (default: `true`) | Cover descendant business units too (default true) |
 | **manageAssignments** | `boolean` | optional (default: `false`) | Manage user↔position assignments within the subtree |
-| **manageBindings** | `boolean` | optional (default: `false`) | Manage position↔permission-set bindings within the subtree |
-| **authorEnvironmentSets** | `boolean` | optional (default: `false`) | Author environment-owned permission sets (single posture only: under group or isolated the platform operator authors the catalog, ADR-0131 D3) |
+| **manageBindings** | `never` | optional | [REMOVED] `permission.adminScope.manageBindings` was removed in @objectstack/spec 18 (ADR-0049 enforce-or-remove, ADR-0090 D12) — nothing honoured it once the position-to-permission-set binding rows it gated were retired: a position's sets are part of its definition (ADR-0131 D3), and that definition is written through the metadata door, which admits a `manage_metadata` holder and reads no adminScope. Delete the key; a delegate's scope is placement, assignment and the allowlist — `businessUnit` with `includeSubtree`, `manageAssignments`, and `assignablePermissionSets`. Run `os migrate meta --from 17` to list the mechanical edits for existing sources; `--write` applies the ones it can prove, and you apply the rest by hand. |
+| **authorEnvironmentSets** | `never` | optional | [REMOVED] `permission.adminScope.authorEnvironmentSets` was removed in @objectstack/spec 18 (ADR-0049 enforce-or-remove, ADR-0090 D12) — nothing honoured it once permission sets stopped being rows: a permission set is an environment metadata definition (ADR-0131 D3), written through the metadata door, which admits a `manage_metadata` holder and reads no adminScope. Delete the key; a delegate's scope is placement, assignment and the allowlist — `businessUnit` with `includeSubtree`, `manageAssignments`, and `assignablePermissionSets`. Run `os migrate meta --from 17` to list the mechanical edits for existing sources; `--write` applies the ones it can prove, and you apply the rest by hand. |
 | **assignablePermissionSets** | `string[]` | optional (default: `[]`) | Allowlist of permission-set names the delegate may hand out |
 
 
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ const result = AdminScopeSchema.parse(data);
 | **systemPermissions** | `string[]` | optional | System level capabilities |
 | **tabPermissions** | `Record<string, Enum<'visible' \| 'hidden' \| 'default_on' \| 'default_off'>>` | optional | App/tab visibility: visible, hidden, default_on (shown by default), default_off (available but hidden initially) |
 | **rowLevelSecurity** | `{ name: string; label?: string; description?: string; object: string; … }[]` | optional | Row-level security policies (see rls.zod.ts for full spec) |
-| **adminScope** | `{ businessUnit: string; includeSubtree?: boolean; manageAssignments?: boolean; manageBindings?: boolean; … }` | optional | [ADR-0090 D12] Scoped delegated-administration grant (BU subtree + assignable-set allowlist) |
+| **adminScope** | `{ businessUnit: string; includeSubtree?: boolean; manageAssignments?: boolean; assignablePermissionSets?: string[] }` | optional | [ADR-0090 D12] Scoped delegated-administration grant (BU subtree + assignable-set allowlist) |
 | **protection** | `{ lock: Enum<'none' \| 'no-overlay' \| 'no-delete' \| 'full'>; reason: string; docsUrl?: string }` | optional | Package author protection block — lock policy for this permission set. |
 | **_lock** | `Enum<'none' \| 'no-overlay' \| 'no-delete' \| 'full'>` | optional | Item-level lock — controls overlay & delete (ADR-0010). |
 | **_lockReason** | `string` | optional | Human-readable reason shown when a write is refused by _lock. |
@@ -182,8 +182,8 @@ const result = AdminScopeSchema.parse(data);
 | **businessUnit** | `string` | ✅ | [ADR-0090 D12] Delegation boundary: sys_business_unit.name of the subtree root. Required and non-blank: an empty or whitespace-only value names no business unit and is refused. |
 | **includeSubtree** | `boolean` | optional (default: `true`) | Cover descendant business units too (default true) |
 | **manageAssignments** | `boolean` | optional (default: `false`) | Manage user↔position assignments within the subtree |
-| **manageBindings** | `boolean` | optional (default: `false`) | Manage position↔permission-set bindings within the subtree |
-| **authorEnvironmentSets** | `boolean` | optional (default: `false`) | Author environment-owned permission sets (single posture only: under group or isolated the platform operator authors the catalog, ADR-0131 D3) |
+| **manageBindings** | `never` | optional | [REMOVED] `permission.adminScope.manageBindings` was removed in @objectstack/spec 18 (ADR-0049 enforce-or-remove, ADR-0090 D12) — nothing honoured it once the position-to-permission-set binding rows it gated were retired: a position's sets are part of its definition (ADR-0131 D3), and that definition is written through the metadata door, which admits a `manage_metadata` holder and reads no adminScope. Delete the key; a delegate's scope is placement, assignment and the allowlist — `businessUnit` with `includeSubtree`, `manageAssignments`, and `assignablePermissionSets`. Run `os migrate meta --from 17` to list the mechanical edits for existing sources; `--write` applies the ones it can prove, and you apply the rest by hand. |
+| **authorEnvironmentSets** | `never` | optional | [REMOVED] `permission.adminScope.authorEnvironmentSets` was removed in @objectstack/spec 18 (ADR-0049 enforce-or-remove, ADR-0090 D12) — nothing honoured it once permission sets stopped being rows: a permission set is an environment metadata definition (ADR-0131 D3), written through the metadata door, which admits a `manage_metadata` holder and reads no adminScope. Delete the key; a delegate's scope is placement, assignment and the allowlist — `businessUnit` with `includeSubtree`, `manageAssignments`, and `assignablePermissionSets`. Run `os migrate meta --from 17` to list the mechanical edits for existing sources; `--write` applies the ones it can prove, and you apply the rest by hand. |
 | **assignablePermissionSets** | `string[]` | optional (default: `[]`) | Allowlist of permission-set names the delegate may hand out |
 
 ### Nested Shape: `PermissionSet.protection`
 
@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ itself is a scoped grant*. Example: the 华东 subsidiary's IT admin receives an
 that says:
 
 - *where*: the 华东 business-unit subtree only;
-- *what*: assign users to positions, bind sets to positions — inside that subtree;
+- *what*: assign users to positions, and grant allowlisted sets directly — inside that subtree;
 - *which*: an **allowlist** of sets they may hand out (say, the CRM and HR self-service sets).
 
 They can onboard their own staff and reshuffle their own positions, but they can never grant
@@ -303,19 +303,21 @@ things (the `everyone`/`guest` anchors, security publishes). Headquarters keeps
 the same explain engine answers "who *could have* granted this", not just "who did".
 
 **How it is authored (landed in P3).** An admin scope is a field on an ordinary permission set
-(`adminScope: { businessUnit, includeSubtree, manageAssignments, manageBindings,
-authorEnvironmentSets, assignablePermissionSets[] }`), so it is distributed via positions and
-audited like every other grant. The same set should also carry plain CRUD on the RBAC link
-tables (`sys_user_position`, `sys_position_permission_set`, `sys_user_permission_set`) — the
-scope authorizes *what* may be administered, the CRUD bits let the requests through at all.
+(`adminScope: { businessUnit, includeSubtree, manageAssignments, assignablePermissionSets[] }`),
+so it is distributed via positions and audited like every other grant. The same set should also
+carry plain CRUD on the assignment tables (`sys_user_position`, `sys_user_permission_set`) — the
+scope authorizes *what* may be administered, the CRUD bits let the requests through at all. A
+position's sets and a set's body are environment definitions written through the metadata door by
+a `manage_metadata` holder (ADR-0131 D3), so binding and set authoring are not delegable: the
+scope's former `manageBindings` and `authorEnvironmentSets` retired with the binding and set rows
+they gated.
 Runtime rules enforced by the `DelegatedAdminGate` (plugin-security):
 
 - assignments a delegate creates must be **anchored** (`sys_user_position.business_unit_id`)
   inside their subtree, and are `granted_by`-stamped automatically;
 - every set reached by the write — bound to the assigned position, or granted directly — must be
-  in the allowlist; re-composing a position (bindings) requires every current holder to sit
-  inside the subtree;
-- granting or authoring a set that itself carries an `adminScope` requires a held scope that
+  in the allowlist;
+- granting a set that itself carries an `adminScope` requires a held scope that
   **strictly contains** it (handing your own exact scope to a peer is refused — no lateral
   propagation);
 - delegates write **single rows by id** only (a broad filter-write cannot be boundary-checked);