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+// Copyright (c) 2026 ObjectStack. Licensed under the Apache-2.0 license.
+
+/**
+ * [#25224 cut 12] The global after-hook of the better-auth instance
+ * `AuthManager` builds — the one `hooks.after` middleware `createAuthInstance`
+ * hands better-auth, which every endpoint's response passes through — moved
+ * out of `auth-manager.ts` whole.
+ *
+ * A MOVE, not a redesign. The function below is the body of the arrow
+ * `createAuthInstance` passes to `createAuthMiddleware` for `hooks.after`, as
+ * it stood, re-indented four levels and otherwise unedited: the same bearer
+ * rotation on impersonation, the same echo of the installed session token,
+ * the same session envelope completion, the same two-factor re-enrolment
+ * reset, the same sign-in outcome count, refusal audit, concurrent-session cap
+ * and login stamp, the same password-change stamp and history commit, the
+ * same old-address notice on an e-mail change, the same directory doors
+ * narrowed for an external caller, the same invite-role refusal code, and the
+ * same sign-up stamp and `disableSignUp` restore — in the same order.
+ *
+ * ## How the moved body reaches the class
+ *
+ * The shape #23050 set for `rest-server.ts` (its `data-action-routes.ts`
+ * header carries the full reasoning), which the eleven `auth-manager-*.ts`
+ * modules split out before this one follow, applied to a closure instead of a
+ * method. `createAuthInstance` keeps its place, its docblock and its
+ * signature, and `hooks.after` keeps its place in the config literal: the
+ * arrow there is now one literal of exactly the {@link AfterHookHost} members
+ * the body reads, plus a `.call`. The `async` moved from that arrow to the
+ * function below, and the arrow returns the function's own promise, so the
+ * middleware awaits the same promise the body settles, with no extra wrapper.
+ *
+ * The body's `this` was the manager, the arrow's lexical receiver; it is now
+ * that host. Every member it reads is a method, and each goes as a closure
+ * that calls it on the manager at call time, so a test double or spy set on
+ * the manager is still the one the body reaches. The arrow builds the host
+ * each time better-auth runs the hook, as every method stub in this series
+ * does, so nothing the body reads is captured early. The arrow read no local
+ * of `createAuthInstance`, so the function takes the same one parameter.
+ *
+ * Nothing re-exports this module, so the published surface does not move.
+ */
+
+import type { AuthManager } from './auth-manager.js';
+import { SIGN_IN_EMAIL_PATH } from './auth-session-audit.js';
+import { narrowDirectoryForExternalCaller } from './external-directory-door.js';
+import { rotateCallerBearerOnImpersonation } from './impersonation-bearer-rotation.js';
+import { codeInviteRoleNotFound } from './invite-role-not-found-code.js';
+import { readRequestClientAddress } from './request-client-address.js';
+import { attachSessionToCredentialResponse } from './session-envelope-completion.js';
+import { resetVerifiedOnTwoFactorReenrollment } from './two-factor-reenrollment-verified-reset.js';
+import { echoInstalledSessionToken } from './two-factor-rotated-token-echo.js';
+
+/**
+ * The `AuthManager` members the function below reads — every one of them, and
+ * no other. Each is typed AS the class member (an indexed access on the
+ * class), so a change to a member's signature on the class is a change here
+ * too, and naming a member the class does not have is a compile error.
+ */
+export interface AfterHookHost {
+  auditRefusedSignIn: AuthManager['auditRefusedSignIn'];
+  enforceConcurrentCap: AuthManager['enforceConcurrentCap'];
+  externalDirectoryDoorDeps: AuthManager['externalDirectoryDoorDeps'];
+  recordPasswordHistory: AuthManager['recordPasswordHistory'];
+  recordSignInOutcome: AuthManager['recordSignInOutcome'];
+  sendChangeEmailNotice: AuthManager['sendChangeEmailNotice'];
+  stampLastLogin: AuthManager['stampLastLogin'];
+  stampPasswordChangedAt: AuthManager['stampPasswordChangedAt'];
+}
+
+/** The body of `createAuthInstance`'s `hooks.after` arrow; the comments there and in it are its contract. */
+export async function globalAfterHook(this: AfterHookHost, ctx: any) {
+  // ── #8243: impersonation must actually take effect for a bearer ──
+  // FIRST among the after-hooks that touch the response, because the
+  // bearer plugin's own after-hook runs behind this one and must see
+  // what we stage: it re-reads `Access-Control-Expose-Headers` to add
+  // `set-auth-token`, so the recovery header we expose here survives
+  // only by being merged before it. See
+  // `impersonation-bearer-rotation.ts` for the mechanism — the short
+  // version is that `bearer()` converts the caller's token back into
+  // the ADMIN's session cookie on every later request, so without
+  // rotating that token, `/admin/impersonate-user` is a 200 no-op.
+  await rotateCallerBearerOnImpersonation(ctx);
+
+  // ── #10701: a 2FA verification must echo the session it INSTALLED ─
+  // On the enrolment lane `/two-factor/verify-totp` rotates the
+  // caller's session and then echoes the PRE-rotation token — the row
+  // it just deleted. A client that stores it (the console's
+  // `auth-session-token` pattern) is holding a revoked credential, and
+  // because `bearer()` overwrites the request cookie with whatever the
+  // Authorization header carries, presenting it destroys the valid
+  // rotated cookie too. See `two-factor-rotated-token-echo.ts`. This
+  // corrects the echoed VALUE only; resolver precedence is untouched.
+  await echoInstalledSessionToken(ctx);
+
+  // ── #17234: complete the SessionResponse envelope with the session
+  // the route just committed ────────────────────────────────────────
+  // `/sign-in/email` and `/sign-up/email` answer `{ token, user }`
+  // (plus `redirect` on sign-in) with no `session` member anywhere in
+  // the body or the headers, so `SessionResponseSchema` never parsed
+  // either method's return value. The session is not absent — it is
+  // the row `internalAdapter.createSession` already committed before
+  // the endpoint returned — so this reads it back by the response's
+  // own token, the same seam `/get-session` uses, and attaches it.
+  // See `session-envelope-completion.ts` for the full measurement and
+  // why this can never fabricate an id or an expiry.
+  await attachSessionToCredentialResponse(ctx);
+
+  // ── #10700: `verified` must describe the secret stored beside it ──
+  // A second `/two-factor/enable` on an already-confirmed account
+  // rewrites the TOTP secret on the one `sys_two_factor` row the
+  // account has and INHERITS `verified` from the enrollment before it,
+  // so a secret nobody confirmed is honoured at the sign-in challenge.
+  // better-auth already gates that challenge on the flag — a first
+  // enrollment is inert until the session-lane verify flips it — so
+  // restoring the flag restores the gate rather than adding a second
+  // one. See `two-factor-reenrollment-verified-reset.ts`, whose header
+  // also states what this deliberately does NOT do.
+  await resetVerifiedOnTwoFactorReenrollment(ctx);
+
+  // ── ADR-0069 D2: account lockout (counter) ──────────────────
+  // better-auth catches an INVALID_EMAIL_OR_PASSWORD APIError and runs
+  // the after-hook with it on `ctx.context.returned`; a success leaves
+  // the session payload there. Count failures, reset on success.
+  if (ctx?.path === SIGN_IN_EMAIL_PATH) {
+    const email = typeof ctx?.body?.email === 'string' ? ctx.body.email : '';
+    if (email) {
+      let succeeded = true;
+      try {
+        const { isAPIError } = await import('better-auth/api');
+        succeeded = !isAPIError(ctx?.context?.returned);
+      } catch {
+        succeeded = !(ctx?.context?.returned instanceof Error);
+      }
+      const lockStamped = await this.recordSignInOutcome(email, succeeded);
+      // A refused sign-in writes `login_failed`, and the one that
+      // stamped the lockout also writes `account_locked`. A successful
+      // one is recorded as `login` by the session hook, unchanged.
+      if (!succeeded) await this.auditRefusedSignIn(ctx, email, lockStamped);
+      if (succeeded) {
+        const uid = ctx?.context?.returned?.user?.id;
+        if (typeof uid === 'string') await this.enforceConcurrentCap(uid);
+        // ADR-0069 D7 — login audit: stamp last_login_at/ip on success.
+        // Independent of lockout config (recordSignInOutcome no-ops when
+        // lockout is off). The IP is the address `handleRequest`
+        // established for this request by the client-address trust rule,
+        // the same address the D5 allow-list judged; none when it was
+        // undetermined. ⛔ Never re-read from a header here.
+        if (typeof uid === 'string') {
+          await this.stampLastLogin(uid, await readRequestClientAddress());
+        }
+      }
+    }
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // ── ADR-0069 D1: on a successful change/reset — stamp
+  //    password_changed_at (expiry) and commit password history.
+  if (ctx?.path === '/change-password' || ctx?.path === '/reset-password') {
+    let succeeded: boolean;
+    try {
+      const { isAPIError } = await import('better-auth/api');
+      succeeded = !isAPIError(ctx?.context?.returned);
+    } catch {
+      succeeded = !(ctx?.context?.returned instanceof Error);
+    }
+    if (succeeded) {
+      const stampId = ctx?.context?.__osPwChangeUserId;
+      if (stampId) await this.stampPasswordChangedAt(stampId);
+      const stash = ctx?.context?.__osPwHistory;
+      if (stash?.userId) await this.recordPasswordHistory(stash.userId, stash.oldHash);
+    }
+    delete ctx.context.__osPwChangeUserId;
+    delete ctx.context.__osPwHistory;
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // ── #8019: tell the OLD address, without gating on it ──────────────
+  // Maintainer ruling 2026-08-12 — 「notify the OLD address — do not
+  // gate on it」. See the `changeEmail` config site for why this cannot
+  // be `sendChangeEmailConfirmation` (that option IS the gate).
+  //
+  // Why HERE is the whole design:
+  //   • after-hook ⇒ better-auth has already produced its response, so
+  //     nothing this code does can change the endpoint's outcome. The
+  //     "does not gate" property is structural, not a promise;
+  //   • gated on success ⇒ a refused request sends nothing;
+  //   • `sendChangeEmailNotice` swallows its own failures ⇒ a dead
+  //     mailbox, an unseeded template or a missing transport cannot
+  //     turn the notification into a block. That inversion — a security
+  //     notice that takes the flow down with it — is precisely the
+  //     failure mode the ruling exists to avoid.
+  //
+  // Sent at REQUEST time, which is also the strongest moment available:
+  // the owner learns while the attacker still has to prove control of
+  // the new mailbox, so the warning arrives inside the window where it
+  // can still be acted on. It is also the only moment that exists
+  // exactly once per attempt — the apply step (`GET /verify-email`)
+  // does not carry the old address, and better-auth mints a fresh
+  // session there when the link is opened without one, so an
+  // apply-time notice would silently miss that path.
+  if (ctx?.path === '/change-email') {
+    const from = ctx?.context?.__osChangeEmailFrom;
+    delete ctx.context.__osChangeEmailFrom;
+    let succeeded: boolean;
+    try {
+      const { isAPIError } = await import('better-auth/api');
+      succeeded = !isAPIError(ctx?.context?.returned);
+    } catch {
+      succeeded = !(ctx?.context?.returned instanceof Error);
+    }
+    const newEmail = typeof ctx?.body?.newEmail === 'string' ? ctx.body.newEmail : '';
+    if (succeeded && from?.email && newEmail) {
+      // #14319 — the notice goes to the account owner, who IS the
+      // caller here, so the request rung applies.
+      await this.sendChangeEmailNotice(from, newEmail, ctx);
+    }
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // ── Ruling 6355206139 E2: the directory doors, narrowed for an external ──
+  // list-members and get-full-organization check membership only, so an
+  // `external` caller would read every fellow member (and every pending
+  // invitation) there. See `external-directory-door.ts`.
+  await narrowDirectoryForExternalCaller(ctx, this.externalDirectoryDoorDeps());
+
+  // ── #24750: invite-member's unknown-role refusal carries its code ──
+  // better-auth throws it with only a message; the spec promises
+  // `ROLE_NOT_FOUND` (see `invite-role-not-found-code.ts`). It throws
+  // on a match, so it stays after every section above.
+  await codeInviteRoleNotFound(ctx);
+
+  if (ctx?.path !== '/sign-up/email') return;
+  // ADR-0069 D1 — stamp password_changed_at for a newly-created local
+  // user (expiry clock starts at sign-up). Best-effort.
+  {
+    const newUserId = ctx?.context?.returned?.user?.id;
+    let signupOk: boolean;
+    try {
+      const { isAPIError } = await import('better-auth/api');
+      signupOk = !isAPIError(ctx?.context?.returned);
+    } catch {
+      signupOk = !(ctx?.context?.returned instanceof Error);
+    }
+    // [#25060] Not for an existing address answered as a success: that
+    // answer's user id belongs to no row, and nothing was created.
+    if (signupOk && typeof newUserId === 'string' && ctx?.context?.__osExistingAddressSignUp !== true) {
+      await this.stampPasswordChangedAt(newUserId);
+    }
+  }
+  const ep = ctx?.context?.options?.emailAndPassword;
+  if (ep && ctx.context.__osDisableSignUpOrig !== undefined) {
+    ep.disableSignUp = ctx.context.__osDisableSignUpOrig;
+    delete ctx.context.__osDisableSignUpOrig;
+  }
+}