@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+---
+'@objectstack/plugin-hono-server': patch
+---
+
+The `/auth/me` endpoints resolve their caller through `@objectstack/core`'s `resolveRequestExecutionContext`, the one request-to-`ExecutionContext` composition
+
+Clause-②: no
+
+- `makeExecutionContextResolver`, which `GET /auth/me/permissions`, `GET /auth/me/localization` and `GET /me/apps` call, resolves the caller by calling `resolveRequestExecutionContext` with this door's differences as named parameters: `anonymous: 'fail-closed'`, `authGate: 'withhold'`, `credentials: 'session-only'`, `sessionApi: 'required'`, `session: 'request'`, no tenancy posture, `localization: 'withhold'`, no request locale, `accessToken: 'withhold'`, and no OAuth provenance or admission channel. The per-request service reads, the environment-kernel resolution and the fail-closed `catch` stay at the door. Every platform door that resolves a request's caller now calls the one composition.
+- One answer changes. When the auth service's session read carries `session.userId` but no `user.id` (no user object, a user without an id, or `user.id: null`), these endpoints answered as signed out; they now answer as signed in as that user, which is how the runtime dispatcher, REST, the settings routes and the storage download already read it. No session producer yields that shape: in this repository better-auth's session read returns no session when the session's user is missing and plugin-auth passes its read through, and cloud's control plane uses the same plugin-auth read.
+- Every other answer is unchanged: no credential, an unrecognised cookie, a failing session read, an API key alone and a host with no auth service get each route's signed-out body; a session the authentication policy holds is still served on these allow-listed routes, with no `authGate` on its context; an unreadable permission store is still the host's `503 SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE`.
+- Nothing to do for a consumer: no export, route, configuration key or response shape changed.
@@ -183,14 +183,14 @@ const TRANSPORT_LEDGER: Record<string, 'guarded' | 'propagates'> = {
   // letter A). It catches nothing around the resolver: every door that calls
   // it — the runtime dispatcher's `resolve-execution-context.ts` first, REST's
   // `rest-server.ts` second, the settings door's `settings-service-plugin.ts`
-  // third and the storage download door's `storage-service-plugin.ts` fourth,
-  // each of the last three through a fail-closed `catch` that re-raises the
-  // outage — receives the outage and answers it at its own net.
+  // third, the storage download door's `storage-service-plugin.ts` fourth and
+  // the `/auth/me` door's `current-user-endpoints.ts` fifth (ruling record
+  // 6257816853), each of the last four through a fail-closed `catch` that
+  // re-raises the outage — receives the outage and answers it at its own net.
   'packages/core/src/security/request-execution-context.ts': 'propagates',
   'packages/mcp/src/plugin.ts': 'propagates',
   'packages/services/service-datasource/src/admin-routes.ts': 'guarded',
   'packages/plugins/plugin-sharing/src/sharing-plugin.ts': 'guarded',
-  'packages/plugins/plugin-hono-server/src/current-user-endpoints.ts': 'guarded',
   'packages/cloud-connection/src/marketplace-install-local-plugin.ts': 'guarded',
   'packages/cloud-connection/src/cloud-connection-plugin.ts': 'guarded',
   // The print door: its caller-resolution `catch` relays the outage with its
@@ -297,8 +297,15 @@ describe('[#13279] every transport that authorizes through resolveAuthzContext',
   it('CONTROL: the scanner finds transports at all, and finds THIS repo', () => {
     // Without this, a broken walk would return [] and the set-equality audit
     // below would be comparing two empty sets and passing.
+    //
+    // [#23217 slice 5] The floor is the ledger's size, 7 rows in 6 packages
+    // since the last door moved onto the one composition. Set equality below
+    // already fails a walk that loses any listed file; the floor, with the
+    // known member asserted next, refuses the one case set equality cannot
+    // see: a broken walk and a gutted ledger together. Every door now calls
+    // the composition, so no further conversion moves this number.
     const found = discoverTransports();
-    expect(found.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(8);
+    expect(found.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(7);
     // A transport this repo is known to hold. [#23217 slice 2] It named
     // `rest-server.ts` until that door moved onto the one composition, which
     // is the call site REST's answers now come from.
 
@@ -0,0 +1,261 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 ObjectStack. Licensed under the Apache-2.0 license.
+
+/**
+ * [ruling record 6227928430, letter A item 2; ruling record 6257816853, slice
+ * 5 letter A] The `/auth/me` door, proven on the one request-to-
+ * `ExecutionContext` composition by this pin plus its existing ones.
+ *
+ * The door is `makeExecutionContextResolver`, which all three current-user
+ * routes call before they answer. It is driven here through the routes
+ * themselves, `GET /auth/me/permissions`, `GET /auth/me/localization` and
+ * `GET /me/apps`, on the real `HonoServerPlugin` booted through `init()`,
+ * `start()` and its `kernel:ready` hooks, with no seam captured. Each row reads
+ * what the routes answered and what reached the security service: the
+ * context `/auth/me/permissions` and `/me/apps` hand to
+ * `resolvePermissionSetsForContext` for the caller's sets.
+ *
+ *  - ADR-0096: a request that resolves no principal is answered by each
+ *    route's own signed-out body, and the security service is never asked:
+ *    no credential, a cookie the auth service does not recognise, a session
+ *    read that throws, an API key alone (this door never opened an API-key
+ *    door), and a host with no auth service.
+ *  - ADR-0069: these routes are allow-listed for a gated user (they
+ *    bootstrap the remediation UI), so a session the authentication policy
+ *    holds is served, and the context the door hands on carries no
+ *    `authGate`.
+ *  - An authorization store that cannot be read is the host's `503`, never a
+ *    signed-out body.
+ *  - The composition's reading (ruling record 6257816853 item 1): a session
+ *    read that carries `session.userId` and no `user.id` is served as that
+ *    user, as at every other door.
+ *
+ * The CONTROL row proves the door admits somebody and withholds what it
+ * declares: an ungated session is served, and its context carries no session
+ * bearer, locale or time zone, although the session carries a bearer, the
+ * request a language and the host a settings service.
+ *
+ * Every row but the ruled reading's was green on the door's hand-written
+ * composition; all of them are green on the shared one.
+ */
+
+import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
+import { AUTHZ_STORE_UNAVAILABLE_CODE, AUTHZ_STORE_UNAVAILABLE_STATUS, hashApiKey } from '@objectstack/core';
+import { HonoServerPlugin } from './hono-plugin';
+
+const ORG = 'org_alpha';
+const COOKIE = 'better-auth.session_token=tok_auth_me_door.c2ln';
+const HELD_COOKIE = 'better-auth.session_token=tok_auth_me_door_held.c2ln';
+const SESSION_USER_ID_COOKIE = 'better-auth.session_token=tok_auth_me_door_session_user_id.c2ln';
+const STRANGER_COOKIE = 'better-auth.session_token=tok_auth_me_door_unknown.c2ln';
+const KEY = 'osk_auth_me_door_key';
+const FUTURE = '2999-01-01T00:00:00Z';
+const PASSWORD_EXPIRED = { code: 'PASSWORD_EXPIRED', message: 'Your password has expired.' };
+
+const PERMISSIONS = '/api/v1/auth/me/permissions';
+const LOCALIZATION = '/api/v1/auth/me/localization';
+const APPS = '/api/v1/me/apps';
+
+/** The one app the engine's registry holds: a signed-in caller is shown it, a signed-out one never is. */
+const APP = { name: 'door_app', label: 'Door App' };
+
+interface Host {
+    /** The auth service: one with a session read, or none at all. */
+    auth: 'session' | 'none';
+    /** The auth service's session read throws for every request. */
+    sessionReadThrows?: true;
+    /** The permission store's membership read fails. */
+    storeDown?: true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * One deployment: an engine answering the grant tables and holding one app,
+ * a metadata service, a settings service with a time zone, a security service
+ * that records every context it is asked about, and the host's auth service.
+ * A gate is active throughout, so a held session is held by policy.
+ */
+function services(host: Host, asked: unknown[]): Record<string, unknown> {
+    const tables: Record<string, Array<Record<string, unknown>>> = {
+        sys_api_key: [{ id: 'k_live', key: hashApiKey(KEY), revoked: false, user_id: 'u_key', active_organization_id: ORG, expires_at: FUTURE }],
+        sys_member: [
+            { user_id: 'u_key', organization_id: ORG, role: 'member' },
+            { user_id: 'u_ses', organization_id: ORG, role: 'member' },
+            { user_id: 'u_held', organization_id: ORG, role: 'member' },
+        ],
+    };
+    const matches = (row: Record<string, unknown>, where: Record<string, unknown> | undefined) =>
+        Object.entries(where ?? {}).every(([k, v]) => {
+            if (k.startsWith('$')) throw new Error(`fixture: unsupported combinator ${k}`);
+            if (v !== null && typeof v === 'object') {
+                const list = (v as { $in?: unknown[] }).$in;
+                if (!Array.isArray(list)) throw new Error(`fixture: unsupported operator on ${k}`);
+                return list.includes(row[k] ?? null);
+            }
+            return (v ?? null) === (row[k] ?? null);
+        });
+    const objectql = {
+        async find(object: string, q: { where?: Record<string, unknown>; limit?: number } = {}) {
+            if (host.storeDown && object === 'sys_member') throw new Error('connection refused');
+            const rows = (tables[object] ?? []).filter((row) => matches(row, q.where));
+            return typeof q.limit === 'number' ? rows.slice(0, q.limit) : rows;
+        },
+        registry: { getAllApps: () => [APP], getAllObjects: () => [] },
+        getSchema: () => undefined,
+    };
+
+    const registered: Record<string, unknown> = {
+        objectql,
+        metadata: { list: async () => [] },
+        settings: {
+            async get(namespace: string, key: string) {
+                return { value: `${namespace}.${key}` === 'localization.timezone' ? 'Europe/Paris' : undefined };
+            },
+        },
+        security: {
+            async resolvePermissionSetsForContext(context: unknown) {
+                asked.push(context);
+                return [];
+            },
+        },
+    };
+    if (host.auth === 'session') {
+        const sessions: Record<string, unknown> = {
+            [COOKIE]: { user: { id: 'u_ses' }, session: { id: 'sess_ses', userId: 'u_ses', token: 'bearer_ses', activeOrganizationId: ORG } },
+            [HELD_COOKIE]: {
+                user: { id: 'u_held', authGate: PASSWORD_EXPIRED },
+                session: { id: 'sess_held', userId: 'u_held', token: 'bearer_held', activeOrganizationId: ORG },
+            },
+            [SESSION_USER_ID_COOKIE]: { session: { id: 'sess_uid', userId: 'u_ses', token: 'bearer_uid', activeOrganizationId: ORG } },
+        };
+        registered.auth = {
+            api: {
+                async getSession(input: { headers: Headers }) {
+                    if (host.sessionReadThrows) throw new Error('session backend unavailable');
+                    return sessions[input.headers.get('cookie') ?? ''] ?? null;
+                },
+            },
+            isAuthGateActive: () => true,
+            resolveUserAuthGates: async () => [],
+        };
+    }
+    return registered;
+}
+
+/** Boot the real plugin on `host` and answer the three routes for one request. */
+async function boot(host: Host, headers: Record<string, string>) {
+    const asked: unknown[] = [];
+    const registered: Record<string, unknown> = services(host, asked);
+    const readyHooks: Array<() => Promise<void> | void> = [];
+    const quiet = { debug() {}, info() {}, warn() {}, error() {}, fatal() {}, child() { return quiet; } };
+    const ctx: any = {
+        logger: quiet,
+        registerService: (name: string, value: unknown) => { registered[name] = value; },
+        // The kernel's locator: an absent slot THROWS.
+        getService: <T,>(name: string): T => {
+            if (!(name in registered)) throw new Error(`[Kernel] Service '${name}' not found`);
+            return registered[name] as T;
+        },
+        getKernel: () => ({ hasPlugin: () => false }),
+        hook: (event: string, fn: () => Promise<void> | void) => { if (event === 'kernel:ready') readyHooks.push(fn); },
+    };
+    const plugin = new HonoServerPlugin({ port: 0, cors: false });
+    await plugin.init(ctx);
+    await plugin.start(ctx);
+    for (const fn of readyHooks) await fn();
+    const app = (plugin as any).server.getRawApp();
+
+    const answers: Record<string, { status: number; body: any }> = {};
+    for (const route of [PERMISSIONS, LOCALIZATION, APPS]) {
+        const res: Response = await app.request(`http://localhost${route}`, { headers });
+        answers[route] = { status: res.status, body: await res.json() };
+    }
+    return { answers, asked: asked as Array<Record<string, unknown>> };
+}
+
+const SIGNED_OUT = {
+    [PERMISSIONS]: { authenticated: false },
+    [LOCALIZATION]: { authenticated: false },
+    [APPS]: { apps: [] },
+};
+
+const ROWS: Array<{
+    name: string;
+    host: Host;
+    headers: Record<string, string>;
+    /** Each route's own signed-out body, and the security service never asked. */
+    signedOut?: true;
+    /** The host's outage answer on every route, and the security service never asked. */
+    outage?: true;
+    /** Who the security service was asked about, by both routes that ask it. */
+    principal?: string;
+}> = [
+    { name: 'ADR-0096: no credential is signed out on every route', host: { auth: 'session' }, headers: {}, signedOut: true },
+    {
+        name: 'ADR-0096: a cookie the auth service does not recognise is signed out on every route',
+        host: { auth: 'session' }, headers: { cookie: STRANGER_COOKIE }, signedOut: true,
+    },
+    {
+        name: 'ADR-0096: a session read that throws resolved no caller, so it is signed out and not an outage',
+        host: { auth: 'session', sessionReadThrows: true }, headers: { cookie: COOKIE }, signedOut: true,
+    },
+    {
+        name: 'ADR-0096: an API key alone is signed out, because this door never opened an API-key door',
+        host: { auth: 'session' }, headers: { 'x-api-key': KEY }, signedOut: true,
+    },
+    {
+        name: 'ADR-0096: a host with no auth service signs nobody in',
+        host: { auth: 'none' }, headers: { cookie: COOKIE }, signedOut: true,
+    },
+    {
+        name: 'ADR-0069: a held session is served on these allow-listed routes, and its context carries no authGate',
+        host: { auth: 'session' }, headers: { cookie: HELD_COOKIE }, principal: 'u_held',
+    },
+    {
+        name: "a permission store that cannot be read is the host's 503 on every route, never a signed-out body",
+        host: { auth: 'session', storeDown: true }, headers: { cookie: COOKIE }, outage: true,
+    },
+    {
+        name: 'the ruled reading: a session read carrying session.userId and no user.id is served as that user',
+        host: { auth: 'session' }, headers: { cookie: SESSION_USER_ID_COOKIE }, principal: 'u_ses',
+    },
+    {
+        name: 'CONTROL: an ungated session is served, and its context carries no session bearer, locale or time zone',
+        host: { auth: 'session' }, headers: { cookie: COOKIE, 'accept-language': 'zh-CN' }, principal: 'u_ses',
+    },
+];
+
+describe('[ruling 6227928430 item 2, ruling 6257816853] the /auth/me door: the ADR-0096 principal-less refusal and the ADR-0069 allow-list on its three routes', () => {
+    it.each(ROWS)('$name', async (row) => {
+        const { answers, asked } = await boot(row.host, row.headers);
+
+        if (row.signedOut) {
+            for (const [route, body] of Object.entries(SIGNED_OUT)) {
+                expect(answers[route], route).toEqual({ status: 200, body });
+            }
+            expect(asked).toHaveLength(0);
+            return;
+        }
+        if (row.outage) {
+            for (const route of [PERMISSIONS, LOCALIZATION, APPS]) {
+                expect(answers[route]!.status, route).toBe(AUTHZ_STORE_UNAVAILABLE_STATUS);
+                expect(answers[route]!.body?.error?.code, route).toBe(AUTHZ_STORE_UNAVAILABLE_CODE);
+            }
+            expect(asked).toHaveLength(0);
+            return;
+        }
+
+        expect(answers[PERMISSIONS]).toMatchObject({ status: 200, body: { authenticated: true, userId: row.principal, tenantId: ORG } });
+        expect(answers[LOCALIZATION]).toMatchObject({ status: 200, body: { authenticated: true } });
+        expect(answers[APPS]).toEqual({ status: 200, body: { apps: [APP] } });
+        // `/auth/me/permissions` and `/me/apps` each ask once, about this caller.
+        expect(asked).toHaveLength(2);
+        for (const context of asked) {
+            expect(context).toMatchObject({ userId: row.principal, tenantId: ORG, principalKind: 'human', isSystem: false });
+            // Withheld by this door: the ADR-0069 posture, the session bearer and
+            // the localization the endpoints resolve for themselves.
+            expect(context.authGate).toBeUndefined();
+            expect(context.accessToken).toBeUndefined();
+            expect(context.locale).toBeUndefined();
+            expect(context.timezone).toBeUndefined();
+        }
+    });
+});