@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+---
+'@objectstack/spec': minor
+'@objectstack/core': minor
+'@objectstack/plugin-security': minor
+'@objectstack/plugin-auth': minor
+'@objectstack/platform-objects': patch
+---
+
+feat(spec,core)!: a position's permission sets are declared in `permissionSets` on its definition, and the authorization resolver reads positions, their sets and the set bodies from the security catalog (ADR-0131 D3/D4)
+
+Clause-②: yes
+
+<!-- adr-0087: registered position-permission-sets-declared -->
+
+**BREAKING** (the resolver stops reading the position → permission-set junction), shipped as `minor` under the launch-window convention for breaking changes.
+
+**FROM → TO.** A position's permission sets were `sys_position_permission_set` rows. They are now declared in `permissionSets` on the position's definition; junction rows no longer grant.
+
+```ts
+definePosition({ name: 'sales_rep', label: 'Sales Representative', permissionSets: ['crm_sales_user'] });
+```
+
+The one-line fix for an app that bound sets to its positions with a boot-time binder: name the sets in `permissionSets` on each position.
+
+**`@objectstack/spec`.** `PositionSchema` accepts `permissionSets`: a list of permission-set names (lowercase snake_case). Before, the key was refused with a pointer to the junction. Each name is resolved in the environment catalog when a holder's grants are resolved. A name the catalog does not hold confers nothing.
+
+**`@objectstack/core`.** `resolveUserAuthzGrants`, and every surface built on it (`resolveAuthzContext`, `hasPlatformAdminStanding`, the permission explainer, `runAs: 'user'` automation), reads the security catalog the security plugin binds to its engine (`bindSecurityCatalogReader`, `securityCatalogReaderOf`):
+
+- A held position grants the sets its definition's `permissionSets` names. The junction rows and the read of set rows by the junction's ids are gone.
+- A held set, granted directly or through a position, has the body (`systemPermissions`, `tabPermissions`) of its catalog definition. A set that only a `sys_permission_set` row carries, with no definition, confers nothing — including a row inserted directly (a script or a harness, outside the product's doors).
+- **Deactivation moves to the activation ledger** (ADR-0049, as ADR-0131 D3 and ADR-0126 §4 place it). A position or a permission set is switched off by a `sys_metadata_activation` row of type `position` or `permission` whose `active` is false, deployment-wide. The `sys_position` and `sys_permission_set` rows are no longer read at all, their `active` column included. A name with no ledger row is in effect. A composition that does not register the ledger object (no `PlatformObjectsPlugin`) switches nothing off and issues no ledger read.
+- The exported `ADMIN_STANDING_SURFACE` follows what the resolver reads: `sys_permission_set`, `sys_position` and `sys_position_permission_set` leave it, and `sys_metadata_activation` enters in the role `derives`, with the columns `metadata_type`, `name` and `active`. The `kind` union of `ADMIN_STANDING_NON_TABLE_INPUTS` gains `security-catalog`, for the catalog's `admin_full_access` definition.
+- `convertDeactivatedCatalogRows` turns the rows' `active: false` flags into ledger rows. A name some organizations switched off and others kept on is reported `conflicting`, because the ledger is deployment-wide. The upgrade ceremony applies it beside `convertPositionBindingRows`. ⛔ It never runs at boot.
+- Platform standing still requires an organization-less `admin_full_access` user grant, now resolved by name in the catalog.
+- An engine no security plugin started on has no catalog bound, and resolves no set and no position-bound set. That is what an engine with no permission tables provisioned resolved before.
+- `convertPositionBindingRows` converts the junction rows into each position's `permissionSets`. It answers per name `declared`, `converted` or `conflicting`, and it lists dangling bindings. The upgrade ceremony applies it. ⛔ It never runs at boot.
+
+**`@objectstack/plugin-security`.** The plugin binds the catalog read (engine registry and metadata service) to its engine at `start()`. At `kernel:ready` the built-in `everyone` anchor declares the deployment's baseline in its `permissionSets`: the app's `isDefault` set and the platform's `member_default`. It is judged by the same high-privilege check against the stack's declared capabilities that the boot binding used. Under a wall the envelope now carries `member_default` beside the app's set, as it did under `single`. `member_default` carries no system or tab permission, and enforcement already applied it to every human as the additive baseline. A Setup edit of a position row under `single` keeps the `permissionSets` the stored definition names (the row has no column for it).
+
+**`@objectstack/plugin-auth`.** The last-administrator guard follows what the resolver reads. Its standing-key map judges `sys_metadata_activation` (`metadata_type`, `name`, `active`) in place of `sys_permission_set`. A ledger write that switches `admin_full_access` off is refused only when it would leave no administrator who can sign in, and switching it back on is never refused. The guard no longer judges `sys_permission_set` writes, because the resolver no longer reads that row.
+
+**`@objectstack/platform-objects`.** The position metadata form gains a `permissionSets` row, translated in zh-CN, ja-JP and es-ES.
+
+**`@objectstack/plugin-security`.** The name-fold warning's remedy now names the position definition's `permissionSets`, not a junction row.
+
+**What stops granting at upgrade, and what to do.**
+
+- **A deactivation made in Setup.** The Deactivate action on a position or a permission set writes the row's `active` column, which no longer switches anything off. ⚠️ Until the upgrade ceremony converts the rows (`convertDeactivatedCatalogRows`), a position or set deactivated that way **grants again**. No enable/disable door accepts the `permission` or `position` type yet, so a new deactivation has no in-product path. To revoke now, remove the assignments or the binding.
+
+- **A binding made in Setup.** Binding a permission set on a position's page writes a `sys_position_permission_set` row, and so does confirming an audience-binding suggestion. That row no longer grants. Until Setup writes the definition (objectui C9), declare the binding in the position's `permissionSets` through the metadata door (`PUT /api/v1/meta/position/:name`, platform administrator) or in the app's code.
+- **Under a wall (`group`, `isolated`): a position or permission set an organization authored in Setup.** It is a data row with no definition in the environment catalog (ADR-0131 D3), so it stops granting (ruling #15196 Q3 = A). To keep it, a platform administrator re-creates it as environment metadata through the metadata door, under the same name, with its `permissionSets` or its set body. No command promotes a row in place today.
+- **Existing junction rows** are converted into definitions by the ADR-0131 upgrade ceremony (`os migrate`), which applies `convertPositionBindingRows`. A name that organizations bound differently is reported `conflicting` and is never merged.
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+---
+'@objectstack/core': minor
+'@objectstack/plugin-security': minor
+---
+
+feat(plugin-security)!: the security plugin's own readers (set resolution, the delegated-administration gate, the permission explainer and the position-assignment refusal) read the security catalog and the activation ledger, not the catalog rows (ADR-0131 D3/D4)
+
+Clause-②: yes
+
+<!-- adr-0087: not-required (already-registered position-permission-sets-declared) stage 1 registered this cutover: row-only catalog items confer nothing, and this changeset carries that rule to the security plugin's own readers -->
+
+**BREAKING** (enforcement stops reading `sys_permission_set` rows), shipped as `minor` under the launch-window convention for breaking changes. This is the second step of the cutover that `position-permission-sets-declared` registers: the authorization resolver already reads the catalog; now the security plugin's readers read the same catalog.
+
+**Permission-set resolution (`@objectstack/plugin-security`).**
+
+- FROM: a set name the metadata service and the bootstrap sets did not answer was loaded from a `sys_permission_set` row (the caller's organization's, else an organization-less one), its object map and field map included, and dropped when the row's `active` was false.
+- TO: it is loaded from the security catalog (the environment registry the security plugin binds to its engine): every package's sets and every set an author saved through the metadata door. A set that only a row carries resolves nothing. The resolver already granted nothing through such a set; now its object and field permissions stop applying too.
+- Fix: declare the set through the metadata door (`PUT /api/v1/meta/permission/NAME`) or in a package.
+- A permission set that resolves only because a POSITION of the same name was folded into the request is dropped when the activation ledger (`sys_metadata_activation`, type `permission`) switched it off. The row's `active` column is not read.
+
+**Delegated administration (ADR-0090 D12).**
+
+- FROM: the sets a position distributes were its `sys_position_permission_set` rows in the caller's organization; `delegatable` was the organization's `sys_position` row's; the assignable-positions listing (`describeDelegableScope`) listed `sys_position` rows; a direct grant's set (and its `adminScope`) was its `sys_permission_set` row.
+- TO: all four read the security catalog by name. A position distributes the sets its definition's `permissionSets` names, so the containment check and the listing see a binding declared only on the definition. `delegatable` is the definition's. The listing offers every position the catalog holds. A direct grant's set is the catalog's definition of the name the grant carries; a grant naming a set the catalog does not hold is refused for a delegate (a tenant administrator is not judged).
+- A name a position's `permissionSets` carries that the catalog does not hold must be on the delegate's allowlist too. It grants nothing today, but it starts granting as soon as a set of that name is authored.
+- A catalog read that fails refuses the delegate's write. Before, it approved it as "distributes nothing".
+
+**The permission explainer.** "deactivated" is read from the activation ledger through the resolver's own read, so explain and enforce agree. A direct grant whose set the catalog does not hold is reported neither as expired nor as deactivated: there is no set to lose.
+
+**Position assignments (`sys_user_position.position`).**
+
+- FROM: refused `400 VALIDATION_FAILED` unless a `sys_position` row (the writer's organization's, or an organization-less one) carried the name. A position declared only in a package or saved only through the metadata door was refused.
+- TO: refused unless the security catalog holds a position of that name. A registry-declared position is accepted. A name only a `sys_position` row carries (with no definition) is refused, because it grants nothing. A deactivated position is still accepted.
+
+**One position name per deployment under `single`.**
+
+- FROM: a Setup create of a position, or a rename into a name, that an environment definition already held overwrote that definition (another organization's label and description, an empty `permissionSets`).
+- TO: refused `409 UNIQUE_VIOLATION`, the answer a second row of the name in one organization already gets, and the row write is undone. This covers a definition another organization's row wrote, one saved through the metadata door, and one an application stack declares. A name a package or a built-in holds keeps its `403 NOT_OVERRIDABLE`.
+
+**`@objectstack/core`.** `readDisabledCatalogNames(ql, positions, sets)` is exported: the resolver's one read of the activation ledger. It returns the names switched off for this deployment and is now shared by the explainer and the security plugin.
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+---
+'@objectstack/plugin-auth': minor
+---
+
+feat(plugin-auth)!: the last-administrator guard, the self-registration admission and the default-organization step read the security catalog and the activation ledger, never a `sys_permission_set` row (ADR-0131 D3/D4)
+
+Clause-②: yes (narrowing: a zero-administrator write is refused when an unscoped grant names a set the security catalog does not hold, and self-registration is refused when its declared set is not in the catalog or is switched off in the activation ledger; widening: writes to a `sys_permission_set` row are no longer judged by the guard, and a ledger write switching `admin_full_access` off is refused only when it would leave no administrator)
+
+<!-- adr-0087: not-required (no-migration-prescription) no authorable metadata key changes and nothing for an upgrader to rewrite: three runtime readers ask the store the resolver already reads (whose own move is registered as position-permission-sets-declared), and two guard exports with no importer outside this package are removed -->
+
+**BREAKING**, shipped as `minor` under the launch-window convention for breaking changes. It finishes, for `plugin-auth`, the move the authorization resolver made in the same release: a permission set exists when the security catalog bound to the engine holds its definition, and it is switched off by a `sys_metadata_activation` row of type `permission` whose `active` is false. No `sys_permission_set` row decides either any more, its `active` column included.
+
+**The last-administrator guard.**
+
+- A grant-anchored platform administrator is counted the way the resolver derives one: an unscoped, in-window grant naming `admin_full_access`, which the catalog holds and the ledger leaves on. An engine with no catalog bound counts none, as the resolver grants none.
+- Switching `admin_full_access` off in the ledger (an insert, an update of its row, or an update moving another row onto that pair) is judged like every other standing write. It is refused only when it would leave no administrator who can sign in. A config-anchored or organization administrator still standing permits it. The flat refusal of every such write is gone, and with it `refuseLedgerSwitchingAdminOff`.
+- Writes to a `sys_permission_set` row (delete, rename, `active`, `organization_id`) are no longer judged. The resolver reads no row, so none of them moves an administrator. `PERMISSION_SET_STANDING_KEYS` is removed, and with it the guard's two `sys_permission_set` hooks.
+- With zero administrators, the guard still tells the bootstrap window from an emptied environment. The evidence is now an unscoped, in-window grant naming a set the catalog does not hold (or naming none), or `admin_full_access` switched off in the ledger while such grants name it. Its remedy is to switch the set back on, and that write is permitted.
+
+Two exports of the guard are removed, with nothing in their place: `PERMISSION_SET_STANDING_KEYS` (the table it judged is no longer read) and `refuseLedgerSwitchingAdminOff` (`registerLastAdminGuard` judges ledger writes itself). No package in this repository imports either outside `plugin-auth`.
+
+**Self-registration.** The admission asks whether the declared `selfRegistrationPermissionSet` would grant: the catalog holds it and the ledger leaves it on. A `sys_permission_set` row of that name must also exist, because the grant's `permission_set_id` is written with its id. The row's `active` is no longer read, at admission or when the grant is written.
+
+**The default organization.** The platform administrator the default-organization step binds as owner is found through a set the catalog holds and the ledger leaves on, not through a `sys_permission_set` row.
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+---
+'@objectstack/plugin-sharing': minor
+---
+
+feat(plugin-sharing)!: a sharing rule reads a position's deactivation from the activation ledger, as the authorization resolver does (ADR-0131 D3, ADR-0126 §4)
+
+Clause-②: yes (narrowing: a position switched off in the activation ledger stops receiving sharing-rule shares in every organization; widening: a position whose `sys_position` row reads `active: false` receives them again)
+
+<!-- adr-0087: not-required (no-migration-prescription) no authorable metadata key changes; the sharing-rule evaluator reads deactivation from the store the resolver already reads, whose own move is registered as position-permission-sets-declared -->
+
+**BREAKING**, shipped as `minor` under the launch-window convention for breaking changes. A position's deactivation now comes from `sys_metadata_activation` instead of the `sys_position` row's `active` column, so the shares a sharing rule materializes follow the same switch the authorization resolver reads.
+
+- A sharing rule whose recipient is a position materializes no share while that position is switched off. Switched off means a `sys_metadata_activation` row of type `position` naming it, with `active` false (a driver `0` included). The switch is deployment-wide, like the ledger, so it no longer depends on the rule's organization.
+- The `sys_position` row's `active` is no longer read. A deactivation made in Setup writes that column, so until the upgrade ceremony converts it into a ledger row it stops neither the resolver nor sharing rules.
+- A name with no ledger row keeps sharing, including a membership-derived position name. A composition that registers no ledger object issues no ledger read. A ledger read that fails still grants for the pass, as the row read did.
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+---
+'@objectstack/runtime': minor
+---
+
+feat(runtime): `POST /api/v1/security/_activation/:type/:name` switches a position or a permission set on or off for the deployment (ADR-0126 §3 regime C, as ADR-0131 D6 amends it)
+
+Clause-②: yes
+
+The authorization resolver reads whether a position or a permission set is switched off from the activation ledger, `sys_metadata_activation` (types `position` and `permission`), and never from the catalog row's `active` column (ADR-0131 D3). Until now nothing wrote that ledger for these two types, so a deactivation switched nothing off. This route is the write half:
+
+- **Route:** `POST /api/v1/security/_activation/:type/:name`, with `:type` either `position` or `permission`. It is also mounted under `/api/v1/environments/:environmentId` when project scoping is on, like the action door.
+- **Body:** `{ enabled?: boolean }`. `enabled` defaults to `true`. Unknown keys and a non-boolean `enabled` are refused `400 VALIDATION_FAILED`, the same body reader `POST /actions/_activation/:object/:action` uses.
+- **Effect:** one `sys_metadata_activation` row through the engine, carrying the definition's package. Re-enabling updates that row. Switching a position off stops every grant through it for every holder in the deployment. Switching a permission set off stops it granting by every path. No definition and no catalog row is written.
+- **Authority:** the same as the flow and action activation doors. The caller needs `manage_metadata`. Under a `group` or `isolated` tenancy posture the caller must also be the platform operator (ADR-0126 §5). Refusals are `403 PERMISSION_DENIED`, and nothing is written.
+- **Refusals:** the audience anchors `position/everyone` and `position/guest` are refused `400` in either direction, before anything is read or written, because one row would switch the authenticated or anonymous baseline off for every principal. A name that does not resolve in the security catalog is `404`. No catalog bound, or a catalog that cannot be read, is `503 SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE`. A composition without the ledger object is `501`. Switching `admin_full_access` off is refused `403 PERMISSION_DENIED` by the last-admin guard's ledger hook.
+
+The route is not in the JS SDK. Its caller is the Setup console's Deactivate on the position and permission-set pages, which calls the platform API directly.