@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+---
+'@objectstack/plugin-security': minor
+'@objectstack/platform-objects': minor
+'@objectstack/spec': minor
+'@objectstack/core': minor
+'@objectstack/metadata-protocol': patch
+'@objectstack/objectql': minor
+'@objectstack/plugin-sharing': patch
+'@objectstack/lint': patch
+'@objectstack/service-settings': patch
+---
+
+feat(plugin-security)!: the four security-catalog row objects are retired — `sys_position`, `sys_permission_set`, `sys_position_permission_set` and `sys_capability` (ADR-0131 D3)
+
+Clause-②: no (narrowing)
+
+<!-- adr-0087: registered catalog-row-objects-retired -->
+
+**BREAKING**, shipped as `minor` under the repo's launch-window convention for breaking changes.
+
+Positions, permission sets and capabilities live in the security catalog — the environment registry, fed by package declarations and by environment metadata saved through `/api/v1/meta` (ADR-0131 D3). The four row objects that mirrored them are no longer registered, so their data and REST routes and their Setup object pages are gone. No table is dropped and no row is deleted.
+
+FROM → TO:
+
+- `GET|POST|PATCH|DELETE /api/v1/data/sys_permission_set` → `GET|PUT|DELETE /api/v1/meta/permission/:name`; to copy a set, `POST /api/v1/security/permission-sets/:name/clone` with `{ name, label }`.
+- `… /api/v1/data/sys_position` → `/api/v1/meta/position/:name`. A position's permission sets are its definition's `permissionSets`.
+- `… /api/v1/data/sys_position_permission_set` → the position definition's `permissionSets` (`PUT /api/v1/meta/position/:name`).
+- `… /api/v1/data/sys_capability` → read-only `GET /api/v1/meta/capability`; a package declares a capability with `defineCapability` (`stack.capabilities`).
+- Setup → Access Control → Positions / Capabilities / Permission Sets now open Setup's catalog lists (`/apps/setup/metadata/<type>?scope=environment`) instead of the object pages; the `sys_position` record page (`SysPositionDetailPage`) is removed.
+- An object permission on one of the four names in a permission set grants nothing and can be deleted.
+
+What else changes:
+
+- `sys_user_permission_set.permission_set_id` is a plain text column now, not a lookup: same column, same stored ids, same indexes. It is not written and grants nothing; a grant names its set by `permission_set`.
+- A permission set saved through the metadata door is written to no row: the `permission` mutation projector, the `sys_permission_set` and `sys_position` data-door write-throughs and the row-only position backfill are no longer registered.
+- On a fresh `single`-posture database the first human is promoted to platform administrator without reading any catalog row. An unscoped grant written before `sys_user_permission_set.permission_set` existed (it names no set) still withholds the promotion until the organization-ownership migration names it.
+- Uninstalling a package still revokes every grant naming a permission set the package declared, by the names the uninstalling door captures before the withdrawal (`declared`, `captureUninstallDeclared`), and now by those names alone: the cleanup reads and removes no `sys_permission_set` or `sys_position_permission_set` row, so the `sets` and `positionBindings` counts on its outcome are always 0. A grant written before `sys_user_permission_set.permission_set` existed names no set and is not reached; the organization-ownership migration names it.
+- On a `group` or `isolated` deployment the data-door half of the walled catalog refusal goes with the objects: a data-door insert, update or delete on `sys_position`, `sys_permission_set` or `sys_capability` answers `404 OBJECT_NOT_FOUND` for every caller instead of `403 PERMISSION_DENIED` below the platform operator. The refusal at the `/meta` write doors, the permission-set clone door and the `/packages` write doors is unchanged.
+- `capability-reference-unknown` no longer counts a `sys_capability` seed row as a declared capability — no runtime reader consults one. Declare the capability with `defineCapability`.
+- On an existing database `os migrate plan`'s unmanaged-table sweep now lists the `sys_position`, `sys_permission_set`, `sys_position_permission_set` and `sys_capability` tables: they keep their rows and no object declares them any more. The sweep only reports; nothing is dropped, and the tables stay for the organization-ownership migration.
+
+Removed exports, no replacement:
+
+- `@objectstack/plugin-security`: the object definitions `SysPosition`, `SysPermissionSet`, `SysPositionPermissionSet`, `SysCapability` (from `./objects`); `securityObjects` lists the remaining three.
+- `@objectstack/platform-objects/pages`: `SysPositionDetailPage`.
+- `@objectstack/spec`: `SystemObjectName.POSITION`, `SystemObjectName.PERMISSION_SET`; the four names leave `PLATFORM_OBJECTS_BY_PACKAGE['plugin-security']` and `PLATFORM_PROVIDED_OBJECT_NAMES`.
+- `@objectstack/core`: `isRowActive` and `ActivatableRow` — a catalog row's `active` column decides nothing; deactivation is the activation ledger's (`sys_metadata_activation`).
+- `@objectstack/objectql`: the published `PLATFORM_OBJECT_TENANCY` record loses its `sys_permission_set` key (the other three names were never in it). A removed key of an exported constant is a narrowing, so `@objectstack/objectql` takes `minor` under the launch-window convention for breaking changes.
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ cannot read, and they are neither in nor out.
 | write call sites on the application surface | **228** |
 | …whose object name is statically decidable | 155 |
 | …whose object name is chosen at run time | 73 |
-| …against an object with tenancy ENABLED | 154 |
+| …against an object with tenancy ENABLED | 151 |
 | …against an object that declares tenancy off | 1 |
 | threading a tenant context | 167 |
 | PROVABLY carrying none (options read, no context key) | **8** |
@@ -240,9 +240,9 @@ cannot read, and they are neither in nor out.
 | how the instrument reached the site | count |
 | :--- | ---: |
 | receiver carried a readable engine type | 186 |
-| receiver erased, placed by the object NAME | 30 |
+| receiver erased, placed by the object NAME | 27 |
 | receiver erased, placed by an `object: string` PARAMETER | 7 |
-| receiver erased, placed by an `UNTYPED_RECEIVERS` row | 5 |
+| receiver erased, placed by an `UNTYPED_RECEIVERS` row | 8 |
 
 | object name spelled inline | 103 |
 | object name spelled through a `const` | 52 |
@@ -297,13 +297,13 @@ holds still. They are required to be HERE and to say WHEN they were true;
 their values are not compared. The reasoning, and the measurement behind it,
 are in `scripts/check-tenant-audit-census.mjs`.
 
-Measured on 2026-10-13 at `ae14c39c5`.
+Measured on 2026-10-13 at `7c01d30c9`.
 
 | corpus scale (not enforced) | count |
 | :--- | ---: |
-| tracked non-test sources scanned | 654 |
+| tracked non-test sources scanned | 650 |
 | engine-shaped types recognised | 73 |
-| declared objects in the registry | 120 |
+| declared objects in the registry | 116 |
 | same-named calls subtracted as non-engine | 160 |
 
 {/* END GENERATED: tenant-audit-census */}
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ const result = AdminScopeSchema.parse(data);
 | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
 | **name** | `string` | ✅ | Permission set name, unique per organization (lowercase snake_case) |
 | **label** | `string` | optional | Display label |
-| **description** | `string` | optional | Human-readable description shown in Setup (persisted as sys_permission_set.description) |
+| **description** | `string` | optional | Human-readable description shown in Setup |
 | **packageId** | `string` | optional | [ADR-0086 D3] Owning package id for a package-shipped set (absent = env-authored) |
 | **managedBy** | `Enum<'package' \| 'platform' \| 'user'>` | optional | [ADR-0086 D3] Record provenance: package (upgrade-owned metadata) vs platform/user (env config) |
 | **isDefault** | `boolean` | optional (default: `false`) | [ADR-0090 D5] App baseline for the everyone position: app-level sets are auto-bound at boot (guarded, idempotent); package-level sets become install-time suggestions an admin confirms |
 
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ Advanced / low-level Better-Auth options
 | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
 | **posture** | `Enum<'invite_only' \| 'email_domain' \| 'open'>` | optional (default: `"invite_only"`) | Who may self-register into this environment: invite_only (default — operator acts only), email_domain (allowlisted email domains), or open (anyone). email_domain forces email verification on; open forces it on unless the deployment explicitly sets emailAndPassword.requireEmailVerification to false. |
 | **allowedEmailDomains** | `string[]` | optional | Email domains admitted to self-register under posture email_domain (exact, case-insensitive match; subdomains need their own entries). Required non-empty for email_domain; refused under other postures. |
-| **selfRegistrationPermissionSet** | `string` | optional | sys_permission_set name granted to each self-registrant. Required when posture is email_domain or open; refused for invite_only. admin_full_access is refused. |
+| **selfRegistrationPermissionSet** | `string` | optional | Name of the permission set granted to each self-registrant. Required when posture is email_domain or open; refused for invite_only. admin_full_access is refused. |
 
 
 ---
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ OIDC / Generic OAuth2 provider configuration for enterprise SSO
 | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
 | **posture** | `Enum<'invite_only' \| 'email_domain' \| 'open'>` | optional (default: `"invite_only"`) | Who may self-register into this environment: invite_only (default — operator acts only), email_domain (allowlisted email domains), or open (anyone). email_domain forces email verification on; open forces it on unless the deployment explicitly sets emailAndPassword.requireEmailVerification to false. |
 | **allowedEmailDomains** | `string[]` | optional | Email domains admitted to self-register under posture email_domain (exact, case-insensitive match; subdomains need their own entries). Required non-empty for email_domain; refused under other postures. |
-| **selfRegistrationPermissionSet** | `string` | optional | sys_permission_set name granted to each self-registrant. Required when posture is email_domain or open; refused for invite_only. admin_full_access is refused. |
+| **selfRegistrationPermissionSet** | `string` | optional | Name of the permission set granted to each self-registrant. Required when posture is email_domain or open; refused for invite_only. admin_full_access is refused. |
 
 ### Nested Shape: `AuthConfig.advanced`
 
 
@@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ flagged inline below.
 |---|---|---|
 | **D1** classification on the provenance axis | **Adopted**; table vocabulary now stale — see "revised table" below | Principle intact. Rows renamed/removed by ADR-0090 (Profile gone, role→position). |
 | **D2** DEFINITION↔ASSIGNMENT principle | **Adopted, reinforced** | ADR-0090 D2 leans on it to justify removing Profile; ADR-0091 dates the *assignment* rows only (`valid_from`/`valid_until`), confirming they are env data. |
-| **D3** `packageId` + provenance `managedBy` on the set | **Implemented** | `packages/spec/src/security/permission.zod.ts#managedBy` (`packageId`, tagged `[ADR-0086 D3]`) + (`managedBy` enum); record fields `package_id`/`managed_by`/`customized` + index on `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/objects/sys-permission-set.object.ts#managedBy`. |
+| **D3** `packageId` + provenance `managedBy` on the set | **Implemented** | `packages/spec/src/security/permission.zod.ts#managedBy` (`packageId`, tagged `[ADR-0086 D3]`) + (`managedBy` enum); record fields `package_id`/`managed_by`/`customized`; the `sys_permission_set` row object that carried them is retired by C3 stage 8 (ADR-0131 D3; `packages/spec/src/migrations/entries/semantic/18.catalog-row-objects-retired.ts`). |
 | **D4** Shape B (packages ship own sets; union; shared slices env-only) | **Adopted, reinforced; subtract layer upgraded** | ADR-0090 D9 / Alt #6 reject package-written shared/builtin sets for the same reasons. Composition is now anchored at the **position** ("bind several packages' sets to one position"), ADR-0094 D5. **Subtract layer changed** — see ⚠️ below. |
 | **D5** `bootstrapDeclaredPermissions` | **Implemented; `isDefault` semantics refined by ADR-0090 D5** | `plugin-security/src/bootstrap-declared-permissions.ts` (invoked at `kernel:ready`, `security-plugin.ts`); seeds `managed_by:'package'` + `package_id`, idempotent/upgrade-aware; closes the ADR-0078 inert-metadata smell the D5 header calls out. `isDefault` no longer means "profile fallback": app-level default sets **auto-bind to the `everyone` position**; package-level default sets materialize a `sys_audience_binding_suggestion` an admin confirms (new object). |
 | **D6** package Access door under draft/publish | **Implemented** | objectui writes the package door as `mode:'draft', packageId` (`PermissionMatrixEditor.tsx`); env door stays live and, per ADR-0094 D3, that "live" save is itself redirected into a metadata overlay. |
 
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ silent, and `node scripts/tenant-audit-census.mjs --write` is the resolution.
 | Write call sites | 228 |
 | Object name statically decidable | 155 |
 | Object name chosen at run time | 73 |
-| Against a tenancy-enabled object | 154 |
+| Against a tenancy-enabled object | 151 |
 | Against an object declaring tenancy off | 1 |
 | Threading a tenant context | 167 |
 | Provably carrying none | 8 |
@@ -90,13 +90,13 @@ holds still. They are required to be HERE and to say WHEN they were true;
 their values are not compared. The reasoning, and the measurement behind it,
 are in `scripts/check-tenant-audit-census.mjs`.
 
-Measured on 2026-10-13 at `ae14c39c5`.
+Measured on 2026-10-13 at `7c01d30c9`.
 
 | corpus scale (not enforced) | count |
 | :--- | ---: |
-| tracked non-test sources scanned | 654 |
+| tracked non-test sources scanned | 650 |
 | engine-shaped types recognised | 73 |
-| declared objects in the registry | 120 |
+| declared objects in the registry | 116 |
 | same-named calls subtracted as non-engine | 160 |
 
 ## Every site
@@ -163,10 +163,10 @@ Measured on 2026-10-13 at `ae14c39c5`.
 | `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/invitation-placement.ts` | `insert` | `sys_user_position` | enabled | elevated | 1 |
 | `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/permission-set-projection.ts` | `insert` | `object` | undecidable | context, elevation undecidable | 1 |
 | `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/permission-set-projection.ts` | `update` | `object` | undecidable | context, elevation undecidable | 1 |
-| `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/permission-set-projection.ts` | `delete` | `sys_permission_set` | enabled | elevated | 1 |
+| `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/permission-set-projection.ts` | `delete` | `sys_permission_set` | undeclared-name | elevated | 1 |
 | `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/position-environment-backfill.ts` | `insert` | `DATA_MIGRATION_FLAG_OBJECT` | undecidable | elevated | 1 |
-| `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/position-write-through.ts` | `delete` | `sys_position` | enabled | elevated | 1 |
-| `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/position-write-through.ts` | `update` | `sys_position` | enabled | elevated | 1 |
+| `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/position-write-through.ts` | `delete` | `sys_position` | undeclared-name | elevated | 1 |
+| `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/position-write-through.ts` | `update` | `sys_position` | undeclared-name | elevated | 1 |
 | `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/suggested-audience-bindings.ts` | `delete` | `sys_audience_binding_suggestion` | enabled | context, elevation undecidable | 1 |
 | `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/suggested-audience-bindings.ts` | `insert` | `sys_audience_binding_suggestion` | enabled | context, elevation undecidable | 1 |
 | `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/suggested-audience-bindings.ts` | `update` | `sys_audience_binding_suggestion` | enabled | context, elevation undecidable | 3 |
 
@@ -2560,8 +2560,9 @@
       "id": "access-security.packaged-permission-set-lifecycle",
       "title": "Packaged permission-set lifecycle (#11513) survives ADR-0126 unchanged: locked base at the data door, clone-to-customize with every facet carried, `active` row-state flip — and NONE of it writes a sys_metadata_activation row",
       "since": "v16",
-      "status": "active",
-      "revision": 1,
+      "status": "retired",
+      "retiredReason": "C3 stage 8 (ADR-0131 D3) retired the sys_permission_set row object: its data door, its Activate / Deactivate / Clone row actions and its `active` column are gone. A packaged set's base stays locked at the metadata door, a copy is made with POST /api/v1/security/permission-sets/:name/clone, and a set is switched off in the activation ledger (sys_metadata_activation).",
+      "revision": 2,
       "priority": "P2",
       "surface": "mixed",
       "personas": [
@@ -2646,7 +2647,7 @@
       "source": [
         "packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/packaged-permission-set-lock.ts (classifier + both refusals; the SchemaRegistry-not-managed_by decision)",
         "packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/permission-set-projection.ts (insert-path lock + duplicate 409; the #4669 row-state carve-out ordered BEFORE the update-path lock)",
-        "packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/objects/sys-permission-set.object.ts#bodyExtra (activate/deactivate bodyExtra {active}, clone_permission_set params — the payload contract)",
+        "packages/runtime/src/domains/permission-set-clone.ts (the clone door that replaced the retired object's clone_permission_set action)",
         "docs/adr/0126-packaged-metadata-customization-model.md §1.1 (the #11513 machinery, named as the regime's first instance), §8 item 3 (permission sets converge later; the landed shape stays valid meanwhile)",
         "#11513 (lock the base, clone to customize — the 2026-08-24 ruling), #11703 (the three dropped clone facets), #12159 (ruling 2026-08-26: no ledger rows for permission sets pending the convergence card), #12438 (the sweep)"
       ],
@@ -2656,6 +2657,12 @@
           "date": "2026-08-26",
           "change": "new — the landed #11513 surface (data-door lock, clone action, active row-state lifecycle) had no checklist item: readonly-package-locks-studio covers the /meta door on objects and permission-matrix-edit-loop explicitly scopes itself to WRITABLE sets, so the packaged-set data-door lifecycle was uncovered end to end. Authored as the ADR-0126 regression guard with the no-ledger-row wall as its ⭐ clause, per the 2026-08-26 ruling in #12159 (card 已知边界 4): flipping active or cloning must keep writing sys_permission_set state only, never a sys_metadata_activation row",
           "ref": "#12438"
+        },
+        {
+          "revision": 2,
+          "date": "2026-10-12",
+          "change": "retired — the sys_permission_set row object, its data door and its row actions are retired with C3 stage 8 (ADR-0131 D3)",
+          "ref": "#15204"
         }
       ]
     },
 
@@ -223,7 +223,6 @@
         "access-security.sharing-rule-authoring-ui",
         "access-security.owd-save-gate",
         "access-security.share-link-capability-tokens",
-        "access-security.packaged-permission-set-lifecycle",
         "access-security.platform-owner-email-anchor",
         "access-security.me-permissions-aggregation-parity",
         "api-backend.api-methods-verb-gate"
 
@@ -199,26 +199,6 @@
       "viewAllRecords": false,
       "modifyAllRecords": false
     },
-    {
-      "permissionSet": "showcase_field_ops_delegate",
-      "object": "sys_permission_set",
-      "create": false,
-      "read": true,
-      "edit": false,
-      "delete": false,
-      "viewAllRecords": false,
-      "modifyAllRecords": false
-    },
-    {
-      "permissionSet": "showcase_field_ops_delegate",
-      "object": "sys_position",
-      "create": false,
-      "read": true,
-      "edit": false,
-      "delete": false,
-      "viewAllRecords": false,
-      "modifyAllRecords": false
-    },
     {
       "permissionSet": "showcase_field_ops_delegate",
       "object": "sys_user",