@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+---
+'@objectstack/spec': patch
+---
+
+docs(spec): `server.trustProxy`'s description names both consumers of the client-address rule
+
+Clause-②: no
+
+The `.describe()` on `server.trustProxy` named only the inbound rate limiter. `objectstack serve` also passes the value to the authentication plugin, whose IP allow-list (`allowed_ip_ranges`) judges, and whose login audit stamps as `last_login_ip`, the address that the same rule establishes (`@objectstack/plugin-auth/client-address`). The description now names both. No key, type, default or accepted value changes.
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ const result = ServerRateLimitConfigSchema.parse(data);
 | Property | Type | Required | Description |
 | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
 | **security** | `{ rateLimit?: object }` | optional | Server-level security configuration. Today: the global inbound rate limit. |
-| **trustProxy** | `boolean` | optional (default: `false`) | Believe `X-Forwarded-For` / `X-Real-IP` when identifying a caller. Declare `true` ONLY when a reverse proxy you control overwrites those headers on every inbound request. Left `false` (the default) the caller IP is the transport's own peer address, which a client cannot forge. Consumed by the inbound rate limiter when `server.security.rateLimit.enabled` is set. |
+| **trustProxy** | `boolean` | optional (default: `false`) | Believe `X-Forwarded-For` / `X-Real-IP` when identifying a caller. Declare `true` ONLY when a reverse proxy you control overwrites those headers on every inbound request. Left `false` (the default) the caller IP is the transport's own peer address, which a client cannot forge. One client-address rule, two consumers: the inbound rate limiter when `server.security.rateLimit.enabled` is set, and the authentication plugin, whose IP allow-list (`allowed_ip_ranges`) judges and whose login audit stamps (`last_login_ip`) the same address. |
 
 ### Nested Shape: `StackServerConfig.security`
 
 
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # ADR-0069: Enterprise authentication hardening — password policy, enforced MFA, SSO, session controls, network gating, and anti-brute-force, all enforcement-wired
 
-**Status**: Accepted — **P1 + P2 implemented** (2026-07-04); P3 partially landed (see Addendum). Original proposal 2026-06-24. Session-of-record question settled 2026-08-04 (#4785): sessions live in `sys_session`; the kernel `cache` service backs D2's rate-limit counters only. · **Amended** (2026-10-14, ruling C′ on [#23287](https://github.com/objectstack-ai/objectstack/issues/23287), [`6159450584`](https://github.com/objectstack-ai/objectstack/issues/23287#issuecomment-6159450584), maintainer 「同意」) — D3 states what the gate holds for an API key, for password expiry and for a forced reset; see the note under D3.
+**Status**: Accepted — **P1 + P2 implemented** (2026-07-04); P3 partially landed (see Addendum). Original proposal 2026-06-24. Session-of-record question settled 2026-08-04 (#4785): sessions live in `sys_session`; the kernel `cache` service backs D2's rate-limit counters only. · **Amended** (2026-10-14, ruling C′ on [#23287](https://github.com/objectstack-ai/objectstack/issues/23287), [`6159450584`](https://github.com/objectstack-ai/objectstack/issues/23287#issuecomment-6159450584), maintainer 「同意」) — D3 states what the gate holds for an API key, for password expiry and for a forced reset; see the note under D3. · **Amended** (2026-10-20, PR [#24795](https://github.com/objectstack-ai/objectstack/pull/24795), no decision changes) — D5's client-address mechanism follows the shared `server.trustProxy` rule; see the note under D5.
 **Deciders**: ObjectStack Protocol Architects
 **Builds on**: [ADR-0049](./0049-no-unenforced-security-properties.md) (**the governing constraint** — a security property that isn't enforced at runtime is forbidden; no toggle may be a "false surface"), [ADR-0007](./0007-settings-manifest-and-kv-store.md) (settings manifest + cascade KV store), [ADR-0057](./0057-erp-authorization-core-business-units-and-scope-depth.md) (`sys_role` is platform-native, decoupled from better-auth; org scoping), [ADR-0066](./0066-unified-authorization-model.md) (capability/assignment split), [ADR-0068](./0068-unified-user-context-and-built-in-identity-roles.md) (`current_user` contract, built-in roles)
 **Consumers**: `@objectstack/plugin-auth` (better-auth wiring, `bindAuthSettings`/`applyConfigPatch`, auth route middleware), `@objectstack/service-settings` (`auth.manifest.ts`), `@objectstack/platform-objects` (identity objects `sys_user`/`sys_session`/`sys_account`), `@objectstack/rest` (auth request middleware seam), `../objectui` (settings UI rendering)
@@ -132,11 +132,24 @@ Legend: **[native]** = a better-auth config/plugin does the enforcing; **[custom
 
 | Setting | Default | Seam | Mechanism |
 |---|---|---|---|
-| `sys_organization.allowed_ip_ranges` (CIDR[]) | — | auth request middleware (Hono, **before** the better-auth handler in `plugin-auth` route registration) | **[custom]** extract client IP (`x-forwarded-for` / `cf-connecting-ip`, trust-proxy aware); reject login/session outside the org's ranges with `IP_NOT_ALLOWED` |
+| `sys_organization.allowed_ip_ranges` (CIDR[]) | — | auth request middleware (Hono, **before** the better-auth handler in `plugin-auth` route registration) | **[custom]** extract client IP (`x-forwarded-for` / `cf-connecting-ip`, trust-proxy aware); reject login/session outside the org's ranges with `IP_NOT_ALLOWED` *(client-address mechanism amended 2026-10-20 — see the note below)* |
 | `sys_user.allowed_ip_ranges` (optional override) | — | same | **[custom]** per-user override, evaluated before org |
 | `require_ip_match` (toggle) | off | session refresh | **[custom]** detect `request IP != session.ip_address` (already captured) -> re-verify or revoke |
 
 > IP is already captured on `sys_session.ip_address`; the only missing piece is the **gate** — a middleware seam exists in the auth route registration, before requests reach better-auth.
+>
+> **How the client address is established (amended 2026-10-20: PR [#24795](https://github.com/objectstack-ai/objectstack/pull/24795),
+> `25e16ab00c`, for [#24739](https://github.com/objectstack-ai/objectstack/issues/24739)).** The header list in the
+> first row's mechanism cell no longer describes the code. The address the allow-list judges is the one the server
+> establishes by the platform's single client-address rule, `resolveClientAddress`, published as
+> `@objectstack/plugin-auth/client-address` and imported back by the runtime's inbound rate limiter, so both apply it
+> identically: `X-Forwarded-For` (its leftmost entry), then `X-Real-IP`, are believed **only** when the deployment
+> declares `server.trustProxy` (`objectstack serve` passes the authored value to `AuthPlugin`); otherwise the address is
+> the transport's own peer address. `CF-Connecting-IP` is no longer read. An address that cannot be established is
+> refused like one outside the ranges — `403 IP_NOT_ALLOWED` while any range is set (with no ranges set, nothing is
+> judged). The D7 login audit stamps that same established address as `last_login_ip`, and stamps none when it is
+> undetermined. The decision itself — a gate ahead of the better-auth handler, refusing with `IP_NOT_ALLOWED` — is
+> unchanged.
 
 ### D6 — Enterprise SSO (P2/P3)
 
 
@@ -209,12 +209,20 @@ export const StackServerConfigSchema = lazySchema(() => strictObject(
      * address (limit weaponised). Trusting the header therefore has to be an act
      * of authorship — the operator asserting "a proxy I control rewrites this
      * header on every request" — and never a default.
+     *
+     * Both consumers apply one rule, `resolveClientAddress` from
+     * `@objectstack/plugin-auth/client-address`: the runtime's inbound rate
+     * limiter, and `AuthPlugin` (passed this value by `objectstack serve`),
+     * whose ADR-0069 D5 IP allow-list and D7 `last_login_ip` audit use the
+     * address it establishes — so a header believed without such a proxy is
+     * an allow-list bypass as well as a rate-limit one.
      */
     trustProxy: z.boolean().default(false).describe(
       'Believe `X-Forwarded-For` / `X-Real-IP` when identifying a caller. Declare `true` ONLY when a reverse proxy '
       + 'you control overwrites those headers on every inbound request. Left `false` (the default) the caller IP is '
-      + "the transport's own peer address, which a client cannot forge. Consumed by the inbound rate limiter when "
-      + '`server.security.rateLimit.enabled` is set.',
+      + "the transport's own peer address, which a client cannot forge. One client-address rule, two consumers: the "
+      + 'inbound rate limiter when `server.security.rateLimit.enabled` is set, and the authentication plugin, whose IP '
+      + 'allow-list (`allowed_ip_ranges`) judges and whose login audit stamps (`last_login_ip`) the same address.',
     ),
   },
 ));