@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+---
+'@objectstack/metadata-core': minor
+'@objectstack/rest': minor
+'@objectstack/runtime': minor
+'@objectstack/cloud-connection': minor
+'@objectstack/spec': minor
+---
+
+fix(security)!: under a walled posture every environment-metadata write is the platform operator's, whatever its type (ADR-0131 D12 items 7–8, D11)
+
+Clause-②: no (narrowing)
+
+<!-- adr-0087: registered walled-environment-metadata-writes-retired -->
+
+**BREAKING** accept-set narrowing, shipped as `minor` under the repo's launch-window convention for breaking changes. ADR-0131 D12 item 7: a walled deployment is "one environment, one schema, one catalog … The metadata-authoring capability (`manage_metadata` / `studio.access`) is what headquarters IT holds and plant admins do not." Item 8: a plant "cannot create a position, a permission set, a capability, a template or any metadata … A plant that needs its own catalog is given its own environment." D11: the rules are identical in every posture; only whether the wall is enforced differs.
+
+**Why.** The environment definition ledger carries no organization column, so a write lands for every organization. Measured on booted `isolated` and `group` stacks before this change: an organization owner granted `manage_metadata` inside their own organization created an object, a view and a flow at `/api/v1/meta`, edited, published, rolled back and reset the operator's view, ran `POST /api/v1/meta/_migrate-stored`, passed all thirteen `/api/v1/packages` write doors, installed, upgraded and uninstalled packages through `install-local`, and created a flow at `/api/v1/automation`, each with `2xx`; another organization's owner read every result. The security catalog was refused at these doors already; every other type was not.
+
+**FROM → TO**, on a `group` or `isolated` deployment, for a caller below the platform operator (the `PLATFORM_ADMIN` rung: the deployment's declared `OS_PLATFORM_OWNER_EMAIL` owner):
+
+- `PUT`, `DELETE`, `POST …/publish` and `POST …/rollback` of `/api/v1/meta/:type/:name` on `@objectstack/rest`, and `PUT /meta/:type/:name` on the runtime dispatcher, for a type outside the security catalog (`object`, `view`, `flow`, `app`, `dashboard`, `translation` and every other type): **FROM** admitted to any `manage_metadata` holder **TO** `403 FORBIDDEN` (the dispatcher answers `403 PERMISSION_DENIED`).
+- Every `/api/v1/packages` write on the runtime dispatcher — create, the manifest `PATCH`, enable, disable, publish, publish-drafts, discard-drafts, revert, rollback, `commits/:commitId/revert`, duplicate, adopt-orphans and delete — for a package carrying no position, permission set or capability: **FROM** admitted to any `manage_metadata` holder **TO** `403 PERMISSION_DENIED`, before anything is read or written. The refusal no longer reads the package's items.
+- `POST /api/v1/marketplace/install-local` (install and upgrade) and `DELETE /api/v1/marketplace/install-local/:id` (uninstall) on `@objectstack/cloud-connection`, for a package carrying no catalog item: **FROM** admitted to any `manage_metadata` holder **TO** `403 FORBIDDEN`. The refusal's `error.details` no longer carries `catalogItems`; it carries `manifestId`.
+- `POST /api/v1/automation`, `PUT /api/v1/automation/:name`, `DELETE /api/v1/automation/:name` and `POST /api/v1/automation/:name/clone`: **FROM** admitted to any `manage_metadata` holder **TO** `403 PERMISSION_DENIED`, before the automation service is touched.
+- `POST /api/v1/meta/_migrate-stored`, the install-wide rewrite of the stored metadata, preview and apply alike: **FROM** admitted to any `manage_metadata` holder **TO** `403 FORBIDDEN` on `@objectstack/rest` and `403 PERMISSION_DENIED` on the runtime dispatcher, before a row is read.
+- Every one of these refusals carries one sentence: it names the written type (`a package` at the package doors, `the environment's stored metadata` at the rewrite), the posture and "ADR-0131 D3, D12 items 7–8, D11", and points at an environment of the organization's own. The catalog refusals that shipped before keep their envelopes and now read the same sentence.
+- The activation refusals under a wall (`POST /api/v1/automation/:name/toggle`, `POST /api/v1/actions/_activation/…`, `POST /api/v1/security/_activation/permission/…`) no longer recommend cloning a flow or a permission set, or authoring a sibling action, since those writes are the operator's under a wall too; they name the platform operator.
+
+**Unchanged.** Reads. Assignments: `sys_user_position` and `sys_user_permission_set` rows stay organization rows. The platform operator and the engine's own writes (seeders, installers, migrations) write as before. Under `single` (and with no `tenancy` service), a `manage_metadata` holder writes exactly as before.
+
+**The remedy.** The platform operator authors the environment's metadata, in Studio or through a managed package; an organization that needs metadata of its own is given an environment of its own. `@objectstack/spec` registers the change as the ADR-0087 semantic entry `walled-environment-metadata-writes-retired`. `walledCatalogWriteVerdict` (`@objectstack/metadata-core`) now judges every type alike: a custom door that writes environment metadata asks it after its capability gate, with no `isSecurityCatalogType` pre-filter.
@@ -57,6 +57,15 @@ Get a specific metadata item with optional ETag caching.
 
 Create or update a metadata item.
 
+Saving requires the `manage_metadata` capability. Under a `group` or `isolated`
+tenancy posture it also requires the platform operator, for every type: the
+environment's metadata is shared by every organization (ADR-0131 D12 items 7–8,
+D11), so a `manage_metadata` holder inside one organization is refused
+`403 FORBIDDEN` naming the posture. The same holds for `DELETE` (reset),
+`POST /meta/:type/:name/publish` and `POST /meta/:type/:name/rollback`, and for
+`POST /meta/_migrate-stored`, the install-wide rewrite of the stored metadata,
+preview included.
+
 Creates are gated per type: `MetadataTypeRegistryEntry.allowRuntimeCreate` decides
 whether a **brand-new** name may be minted under that type at all, separately from
 whether an item that already exists may be overlaid (`allowEnvironmentOverlay`). A type that
@@ -123,22 +132,17 @@ Get package details.
 
 ### `DELETE /packages/:id`
 
-Uninstall a package. Under a `group` or `isolated` tenancy posture, a package
-holding positions or permission sets is the platform operator's to delete: any
-other caller is refused `403 PERMISSION_DENIED` (ADR-0131 D3).
-
-The package's other write verbs follow the same rule under a wall, judged by
-the items each one acts on:
-- `POST /packages/:id/publish-drafts`, `POST /packages/:id/discard-drafts` and
-  `POST /packages/:id/revert`, by the package's pending drafts;
-- `POST /packages/:id/rollback`, by the commits it would undo;
-- `POST /packages/:id/commits/:commitId/revert`, by that commit's own items,
-  whatever package the URL names;
-- `POST /packages/:id/duplicate`, by the source's published items it copies;
-- `POST /packages/:id/adopt-orphans`, by the environment's orphaned rows.
-
-When those items include a position, a permission set or a capability, only the platform
-operator may run the verb.
+Uninstall a package.
+
+Under a `group` or `isolated` tenancy posture every `/packages` write is the
+platform operator's (ADR-0131 D12 items 7–8, D11): install (`POST /packages`),
+the manifest `PATCH`, enable, disable, publish, `publish-drafts`,
+`discard-drafts`, `revert`, `rollback`, `commits/:commitId/revert`, `duplicate`,
+`adopt-orphans` and this delete. Any other caller, a `manage_metadata` holder
+inside one organization included, is refused `403 PERMISSION_DENIED` naming the
+posture, before anything is read or written, whatever the package carries.
+Reads are unchanged. Under `single` every `manage_metadata` holder writes as
+before.
 
 ### `PATCH /packages/:id/enable`
 
 
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ fallback **input** to posture resolution. See
 | Enterprise `@objectstack/organizations` | not needed | **required** | **required** |
 | Default organization | one bootstrapped "Default Organization" | owned by the enterprise runtime | owned by the enterprise runtime |
 | Org-management UI (create / switch org) | hidden | shown | shown |
+| Who writes the environment's metadata | any `manage_metadata` holder | the platform operator only | the platform operator only |
 
 Only the wall's **predicate** differs between `group` and `isolated`. Everything
 about how it composes is identical: Layer 0 is AND-composed ahead of, and
@@ -46,6 +47,33 @@ W1/W2, ADR-0105 D2/D4). A walled posture with no resolvable scope — no active
 organization under `isolated`, an empty membership set under `group` — fails
 closed to zero rows rather than falling through.
 
+### Under a wall, the environment's metadata is the platform operator's
+
+A walled deployment is one environment with one schema and one catalog
+(ADR-0131 D12 items 7–8, D11). Its metadata (objects, fields, views, flows,
+apps, dashboards, translations, packages, positions, permission sets,
+capabilities, every type) carries no organization, so a write lands for every
+organization at once. Under `group` and `isolated` only the platform operator
+(the `PLATFORM_ADMIN` rung: an address declared in `OS_PLATFORM_OWNER_EMAIL`)
+and the engine's own writes (seeders, installers, migrations) write it. Holding
+`manage_metadata` inside an organization does not admit a write: the `/meta`
+write doors (save, reset, publish, rollback), the install-wide stored rewrite
+(`POST /meta/_migrate-stored`), every `/packages` write,
+`install-local` install, upgrade and uninstall, and the `/automation`
+definition writes refuse such a caller `403`, naming the posture.
+
+- **Headquarters IT** authors the environment's metadata as the platform
+  operator: declare its administrators in `OS_PLATFORM_OWNER_EMAIL`. A
+  `manage_metadata` grant scoped to an organization authors nothing under a wall.
+- **An organization's administrators assign**: they place their own members in
+  the catalog's positions and permission sets, and manage their organization's
+  data. They define nothing.
+- **An organization that needs metadata of its own** is given an environment of
+  its own.
+
+Under `single` the organization is the environment, and every `manage_metadata`
+holder writes as before.
+
 `single` is not "multi-org with the walls left standing": Layer 0 contributes no
 filter at all, and the platform's own tenant-scoped RLS policies are stripped.
 Policies **you** authored that mention `current_user.organization_id` are
 
@@ -245,9 +245,10 @@ result is an unreferenced grant target sitting in the live authorization
 namespace. `job` and `agent` carry the same pair for the same reason.
 
 Under a `group` or `isolated` tenancy posture, a caller below the platform
-operator reads a different refusal, with the same `403` status: the security
-catalog refusal (ADR-0131 D3), whose message names the posture, with the code
-`FORBIDDEN` on the REST door and `PERMISSION_DENIED` on the runtime dispatcher.
+operator reads a different refusal, with the same `403` status: the walled
+refusal every environment-metadata write takes there (ADR-0131 D3, D12 items
+7–8), whose message names the posture, with the code `FORBIDDEN` on the REST
+door and `PERMISSION_DENIED` on the runtime dispatcher.
 It runs before the code-only refusal, so the block above is the answer the
 platform operator reads, and every caller under `single`.
 
 
@@ -356,13 +356,10 @@ same request (no ghost grants); the uninstall response reports the revocation
 under `data.persisted.cleanups` (the dispatcher's `/packages` domain answers
 the route, and it nests the protocol's uninstall report under `persisted`).
 Environment-authored sets and other packages' rows survive. Under a `group` or
-`isolated` tenancy posture, removing a package that carries positions or
-permission sets is the platform operator's (ADR-0131 D3): that delete, and an
-`install-local` install, upgrade or uninstall of such a package, refuse any
-other caller `403` before anything changes. So do the package verbs that
-publish, discard, roll back, revert, duplicate or adopt catalog items
-(`publish-drafts`, `discard-drafts`, `revert`, `rollback`,
-`commits/:commitId/revert`, `duplicate`, `adopt-orphans`).
+`isolated` tenancy posture every package write is the platform operator's
+(ADR-0131 D3, D12 items 7–8): the delete, an `install-local` install, upgrade
+or uninstall, and every other `/packages` write verb refuse any other caller
+`403` before anything changes, whatever the package carries.
 
 ## One authoritative store — the definition (ADR-0094 D1, ADR-0131 D3)
 
 
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ One of the largest consumers of the flag;
 | 54 | Package REST route capability gate bypassed | rest | Get: a marketplace publish over REST (`POST /packages/publish`, the one route the REST registrar mounts since #14503) without `manage_metadata`; the package read cohort (`studio.access` / `setup.access`) is enforced by the dispatcher `/packages` domain's own read gate, where the reads are served | `packages/rest/src/package-routes.ts#refusePackageRequest` |
 | 55 | Package domain capability gates bypassed | runtime | Get: package management and package-inventory reads without the capability | `packages/runtime/src/domains/packages.ts#requireManageMetadata`, `#requireReadCapability` |
 | 56 | Activation write / authoring refusals do not fire | runtime | Get: activation artifacts writable and authorable without the activation-authoring capability | `packages/runtime/src/domains/activation-gate.ts#refuseUngrantedActivationWrite`, `#refuseUngrantedActivationAuthoring` |
-| 55b | Walled catalog refusal does not fire | metadata-core, rest, plugin-security, runtime | Get: under `isolated` / `group`, a create, change or delete of a position, a permission set or a capability, at the `/meta` write doors (save, reset, publish, rollback), at the permission-set clone door, at the data door on `sys_position`, `sys_permission_set` and `sys_capability`, and at the `/packages` write doors (delete, `publish-drafts`, `discard-drafts`, `revert`, `rollback`, `commits/:commitId/revert`, `duplicate`, `adopt-orphans`) when the items they act on include a position, a permission set or a capability. Every other caller below the platform-operator rung is refused `403` there (ADR-0131 D3), because one organization's write would change what every organization resolves by name. The seeders, the package door and migrations write the catalog this way. Under `single` the refusal is inert for every caller | `packages/metadata-core/src/meta-write-capability.ts#walledCatalogWriteVerdict`, `packages/rest/src/rest-server.ts#walledCatalogRefusal`, `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/walled-catalog-data-door.ts#createWalledCatalogDataDoorRefusal`, `packages/runtime/src/domains/packages.ts#refuseWalledCatalogPackageWrite` |
+| 55b | Walled environment-metadata refusal does not fire | metadata-core, rest, plugin-security, runtime | Get: under `isolated` / `group`, a write of the environment's metadata, of any type, at the `/meta` write doors (save, reset, publish, rollback) and `POST /meta/_migrate-stored` on both transports, at every `/packages` write door (create, the manifest `PATCH`, enable, disable, publish, `publish-drafts`, `discard-drafts`, `revert`, `rollback`, `commits/:commitId/revert`, `duplicate`, `adopt-orphans`, delete), at the `/automation` definition writes (create, update, delete, clone), at the permission-set clone door, and at the data door on `sys_position`, `sys_permission_set` and `sys_capability` while those objects are registered. Every other caller below the platform-operator rung is refused `403` there (ADR-0131 D3, D12 items 7–8, D11), because one organization's write would change what every organization resolves. The seeders, the package door and migrations write the environment's metadata this way. Under `single` the refusal is inert for every caller | `packages/metadata-core/src/meta-write-capability.ts#walledCatalogWriteVerdict`, `packages/rest/src/rest-server.ts#walledCatalogRefusal`, `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/walled-catalog-data-door.ts#createWalledCatalogDataDoorRefusal`, `packages/runtime/src/domains/packages.ts#refuseWalledCatalogPackageWrite`, `packages/runtime/src/domains/automation.ts#refuseWalledFlowDefinitionWrite` |
 | 57 | Automation run-state read, flow-authoring write, the paused-run caller gate (screen read and resume), the two operator run-lifecycle writes and the elevated self-triggered start at every door that starts a flow by name all pass | runtime | Get: run state, flow writes, a paused run's screen and its resume with no grant and without being the run's starter — and cancelling or restoring a suspension without the platform-operator rung. The screen read and the resume ask one predicate, so this is one bypass for both. The lifecycle bypass is the in-process owner's door: plugin-approvals' revise-window recall (ADR-0044) cancels on behalf of a decision it already authorized and recorded. And starting a flow declared `runAs: 'system'` whose type is self-triggered (`autolaunched`, `record_change`, `schedule`) through any door that starts a flow by name — the trigger route, an action of `type: 'flow'` (REST `/actions` and the MCP `run_action` bridge) and a declared endpoint of `type: 'flow'` — which every other caller, the guest principal included, is refused `403 PERMISSION_DENIED` (the maintainer's rulings, letters B and A). The three doors ask one predicate, so this is one bypass for all of them, and it is the in-process caller's, such as a job: inbound HTTP never carries the flag | `packages/runtime/src/domains/automation.ts#mayReadRunState`, `#refuseUngrantedFlowWrite`, `#isRunStarterOrRunStateReader`, `#refuseUngrantedRunLifecycleWrite`, `packages/runtime/src/flow-start-admission.ts#refusesElevatedSelfTriggeredStart` |
 | 58 | Audience-binding suggestion authority gate passes | plugin-security | Get: a system caller lists, accepts and dismisses suggestions without `manage_metadata` and, under a wall, without the platform-operator rung | `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/suggested-audience-bindings.ts#assertDeploymentAuthority` |
 | 59 | Email-template organization door passes; webhook provenance stamp skipped | plugin-email, plugin-webhooks | Get (`sys_email_template`): a create or update of a template row. The door refuses every other write that names a caller, `403 PERMISSION_DENIED` (ADR-0131 D6); the plugin itself no longer writes the table (templates resolve from the registry), so the v18 migration ceremony's promotion is the one remaining writer. Lose (`sys_webhook`): the row is not marked as an admin customization | `packages/plugins/plugin-email/src/email-template-door.ts#isOrganizationWrite`, `packages/plugins/plugin-webhooks/src/webhook-provenance.ts#bindWebhookProvenanceStamp` |